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THINGS “TOO AMORPHOUS TO TALK ABOUT”: 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON PRAGMATISM AND 
LITERATURE 
Wojciech Małecki 
University of Wrocław 
 
 
 
Suppose we were to make a survey among literary 
scholars asking what they first associate with the phrase 
“pragmatism and literature.” It is highly probable, I 
suggest, that the most frequent reply would be “Richard 
Rorty” – a hypothesis that is based on the simple fact 
that the latter immensely contributed to all sorts of 
“turns” that define the recent history of literary studies. 
And thus, with his seminal Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1979) and subsequent works, Rorty not only 
singlehandedly revived philosophers’ interest in 
pragmatism,
1
 but also helped to establish it as a 
powerful option within literary theory, opening the way 
for the so-called pragmatist turn, associated with the 
likes of Stanley Fish, Giles Gunn, Steven Mailloux, 
Richard Shusterman, and others.
2
 With his unique 
combination of Davidsonian semantics and a Bloomian 
conception of misreading, and with the resulting radical 
pronouncements on the nature of literary interpretation, 
he became one of the primary architects of the 
interpretive turn.
3
 By constantly emphasizing literature’s 
potential to help us in our personal quest for self-
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., William Egginton and Mike Sandbothe, eds., 
The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: Contemporary 
Engagements between Analytic and Continental Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
2
 For an account of this turn and Rorty’s role in it, see 
Leszek Drong, Disciplining the New Pragmatism: Theory, 
Rhetoric, and the Ends of Literary Study (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2007). See also Richard Shusterman, 
“Beneath Interpretation, Against Hermeneutic Holism,” 
The Monist, vol. 73 (1990), pp. 181-204; Steven J. 
Mailloux, Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and 
American Cultural Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998); and Stanley Fish, “Truth and Toilets,” in 
Morris Dickstein (ed.), The Revival of Pragmatism: New 
Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 418-433. 
3
 See, e.g., James Bohman, David. R. Hiley, and Richard 
Shusterman, eds., The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, 
Science, Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).  
perfection and in making us more sensitive to the 
suffering of others, he laid some of the foundations for 
the so-called turn to ethics,
4
 and due to his penchant for 
deflating the overblown balloon of literary theory, he 
found himself in the eye of the storm that has come to 
be known as theory wars.
5
 Quite naturally, then, if there 
is any pragmatist philosopher whom the majority of 
literary scholars must have heard of it is Richard Rorty. 
Rorty, to put it another way, is the pragmatist 
philosopher of literature.
6
  
 
Yet interestingly, in a 2002 interview conducted by E. P. 
Ragg, Rorty made it clear that he thought pragmatism 
and literature were “too amorphous to talk about,”
7
 
which was perhaps meant as an explanation for his all 
too visible uneasiness toward the reviewer’s questions 
on the relations between the two. What makes this even 
more curious, however, is that in his own texts Rorty did 
not hesitate to talk in quite general terms about both 
literature and pragmatism, and even placed the latter in 
the title of one his books.
8
 So can one talk about such 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Lawrence Buell, “Introduction: In Pursuit of 
Ethics,” PMLA, no. 1 (1999), pp. 7-16; and Peter Johnson, 
Moral Philosophers and the Novel: A Study of Winch, 
Nussbaum, and Rorty (Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
5
 See, e.g., Richard Rorty, “Philosophy without 
Principles,” in: Against Theory: Literary Studies and the 
New Pragmatism, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 132-
138. Cf. Richard Rorty, “Looking Back at Literary Theory,” 
in:  Comparative Literature in an Age of Globalization, 
ed. Haun Saussy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006), pp. 63-67. For a criticism of Rorty’s “anti-
theory,” see Terry Eagleton, After Theory (New York: 
Basic Books, 2003), p. 54-58, 72. 
6
 Even if he himself would reject that label, for reasons 
that should become clear as this paper unfolds.  See, 
e.g., Richard Rorty and E. P. Ragg, “Worlds or Words 
Apart?: The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary 
Studies: An Interview with Richard Rorty,” in: Take Care 
of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself: Interviews 
with Richard Rorty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006), p. 145. 
7
 Actually, these words belong to the reviewer, who 
explicitly asks Rorty whether he deems pragmatism and 
literature “too amorphous to talk about,” to which the 
latter responds with a simple: “Yes.” Rorty and Ragg, 
“Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 146. 
8
 See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).  
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 6 
things as pragmatism and literature or not? How is one 
to make sense of all this? Or maybe one shouldn’t try to 
do so at all, contenting oneself with the thought that 
Rorty is after all well-known for his inconsistency?  
 
I believe that one should try indeed as there are 
important lessons to be learned from picking apart 
Rorty’s position. First of all, it is imperative to observe 
that as a self-described “nominalist,” Rorty would 
sometimes express doubts about the usefulness of such 
general notions as philosophy and literature, or even 
some slightly less general ones such as pragmatism, 
novel, and poetry.
9
 What lurked behind this was the 
contention that the things we call “philosophy,” 
“literature,” “pragmatism,” and “the novel” embrace so 
many different phenomena, and have undergone so 
many and such dizzying transformations in the past,
10
 
that if we try to define them in terms of some 
unchanging necessary and sufficient conditions we will 
unavoidably end up “kicking up dust and then 
complaining that we cannot see.”
11
  
 
On the other hand, Rorty needed the general notions of 
such things. He needed them in order to spin his favored 
sweeping narratives of the cultural history of the West 
(narratives of the fall of “redemptive truth” and the rise 
of “literary culture,”
12
 or of the struggles between 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Richard Rorty, “Responses to Critics,” in: 
Rorty, Pragmatism, and Confucianism, ed. Yong Huang 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), pp. 292, 296. See also Rorty 
and Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 140. Cf. Richard 
Rorty, “Afterword: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and 
Postmodernism,” in: Philosophy and Social Hope 
(London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 262-277.  
10
 See also Rorty and Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 
135 
11
 This is actually a phrase Rorty used in a different 
context, but it nevertheless perfectly describes the 
position I am referring to above. See  Richard Rorty, 
“Response to Richard Shusterman,” in: Richard Rorty: 
Critical Dialogues, ed. Matthew Festenstein and Simon 
Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 257.  
12
 See Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Transitional 
Genre,” in: Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 89-104. 
novelists and ascetic priests
13
), which he perceived as 
essential to the project of philosophy understood as 
cultural politics; the most useful kind of philosophy he 
was able to imagine. Therefore, he kept on referring to 
“literature,” “pragmatism,” and “philosophy” in his 
works, admitting, however, that he does so “to the 
extent” that one can talk about them.
14
 To the extent, 
that is, that they can be redefined in appropriately 
historicist terms.  
 
What this means is probably best illustrated by the 
following clarifying remarks Rorty made in response to a 
letter by the Indian philosopher Anindtita Niyogi Balslev. 
Namely, while in his infamous essay “Philosophy as a 
Kind of Writing” (1978),
15
 Rorty referred to philosophy as 
a “genre of discourse,” which might “suggest” that it 
possesses a set of ahistorical, formal features, he “did 
not mean to do that.”
16
 For, as he explained, we should 
understand philosophy instead as a fluctuating cultural 
tradition that consists of a string of authors referring, 
explicitly or implicitly, to some particular figures rather 
than others. We should see it, indeed, as “a family 
romance” that includes people who always have “Father 
Parmenides” or “honest old uncle Kant” in the back of 
their heads (the way one cannot avoid having one’s 
parents and siblings somewhere in one’s mind whatever 
                                                 
13
 See Richard Rorty, “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens,” 
in: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 66-82. Cf. 
Wojciech Małecki, “Ascetic Priests and O’Briens: Sadism 
and Masochism in Rorty’s Writings,” Angelaki: The 
Journal of Theoretical Humanities, no. 3 (2009), pp. 101-
115; and idem, “What Do Thermonuclear Bombs Have to 
Do with Intercultural Hermeneutics (Or on the 
Superiority of Dickens over Heidegger),” Human Affairs, 
vol. 21, no. 4 (2011), pp. 395-404. 
14
 Rorty, “Responses to Critics,” p. 292. 
15
 See Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay 
on Derrida,” New Literary History, vol. X (1978-79), pp. 
141-160; reprinted in: Rorty, Consequences of 
Pragmatism, pp. 90-109. 
16
 Richard Rorty, “Letter 4,” in: Anindita Niyogi Balslev, 
Cultural Otherness: Correspondence with Richard Rorty 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press 1999), p. 67. 
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 7 
one does),
17
 with pragmatism being a sub-romance in 
which James, Dewey, and Putnam figure more 
prominently than other thinkers. Ditto for literature, the 
only difference being that the characters in this story are 
instead Sophocles, Rabelais, Proust, and Wallace 
Stevens.
18
 The literary and philosophical traditions are 
obviously to an extent entangled with each other, just 
like some families are, but just as is the case with the 
latter, one can talk about separate “ancestral” lines with 
regard to the former too. Having thus formulated his 
historicist/genealogical position, Rorty would sometimes 
stray from it in his later texts, yet had he been asked 
about this, I suppose, he would still have responded that 
that stance was his official one.  
 
Official or not, his historicist take on literature and 
philosophy allows us not only to grasp in a more precise 
manner Rorty’s admitting that pragmatism and literature 
are too “amorphous” to talk about, but also partly 
understand his skepticism, expressed in the same 
interview, toward the idea of a “dialogue” between 
them.
19
 To understand it fully, however, necessitates 
taking a closer look at the peculiar context of the 
conversation between Rorty and Ragg. And peculiar it is 
because Ragg’s apparent presumption that pragmatism, 
as an important philosophical movement, must 
automatically be important for literary studies
20
 led to a 
somewhat comical situation where he was trying to 
convince Rorty of that very view, while the latter, 
despite himself being a pragmatist philosopher 
interested in all things literary, desperately tried to 
contradict it, up to the point of pronouncing that we had 
better not “give pragmatism more of an importance that 
it should claim.”
21
 Why did Rorty react in such a way? If 
he cared so much about pragmatism, then why, as his 
                                                 
17
 Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing,” p. 92. See 
also Rorty, “Letter 4,” p. 67; Rorty and Ragg, “Worlds or 
Words Apart?,” p. 133 
18
 Rorty and Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 133. 
19
 Ibid., p. 145. 
20
 Ibid. , p. 135, 143 
21
 Ibid., p. 137. See also pp. 142-143. 
words seem to suggest, didn’t he want to cement its 
influence in literary studies?  
 
The main reason is that the notion, widespread in the 
humanities and, one suspects, underpinning Ragg’s 
thinking, that philosophy is somehow a fundamental 
discipline to which all scholars need look up to 
(philosophy as regina scientiarum),
22
 constituted to 
Rorty a veritable anathema; a clear example of what he 
called vertical thinking
23
 and openly fought against in his 
works. On a more concrete level, he lamented what he 
saw as the perversions of philosophically oriented 
literary theory, such as the overproduction of tedious 
literary criticism (which mechanically applies some 
philosophical “principles” in analyzing literary works),
24
 
and, related to that, many a literary critic’s inability to 
acknowledge, and to help her readers understand, the 
inspirational value of the great works of literature.
25
  
 
In a word, Rorty wanted to convey his contention that to 
talk about pragmatism and literature “in general,” in the 
sense of pragmatist philosophy as a whole
26
 providing a 
systematic account  of literature as a whole (something 
which would constitute a sort of “pragmatist literary 
theory”) seemed to him rather pointless.
27
 What he saw 
as more sensible, on the contrary, was using concrete 
insights taken from a given philosopher – not necessarily 
a pragmatist, to address concrete problems encountered 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p.52- 
53. 
23
 See Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 96-
97; Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 82-3, 265-6; 
Rorty, Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 214. Cf. Małecki, “Ascetic 
Priests and O’Briens,” pp. 101-104. 
24
 Rorty and Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 127, 
137. Cf. Wojciech Małecki, “Dethroning the Dark God of 
Absence: On Rorty, de Man, and Unreadability,” The 
Oxford Literary Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (2011), in 
particular, pp. 91-92.  
25
 See Richard Rorty, “The Inspirational Value of Great 
Works of Literature,” in: Achieving Our Country: Leftist 
Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 125-140. 
26
 Ibid., p. 135 
27
 Ibid., p. 125 
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in studying a given novel or a poem.
28
  However, this 
would be sensible only on the proviso that the situation 
demanded it (because the resources available to literary 
scholars in their own discipline, or the resources of  
disciplines other than philosophy, proved insufficient), 
and not because consulting philosophy, rather than, say, 
psychology, art history, physiology, botany, parasitology 
or seismology, were to be a default reaction in all 
circumstances.   
 
*** 
 
The essays in this special issue of Pragmatism Today 
correspond with the aforementioned views of Rorty’s in 
at least a few ways. For one, some of them (e.g., 
Bartczak’s and Drong’s) touch on the question of the 
possibilities and limitations of employing theory in 
literary studies, with Richard Hart’s text explicitly 
addressing Rorty’s worries about improperly used 
theory’s hampering inspired readings of literature. Some 
others, and some of the same too, illustrate, whether 
their authors intended that or not, the fact that 
pragmatism and literature may sometimes seem so 
“amorphous,” or “omnivorous,”
29
 that it is hard to 
decide what their exact boundaries are.  
 
Consider the well-known example of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, whose work constitutes the subject of John 
Lysaker’s paper and appears in Bartczak’s too. Was 
Emerson a pragmatist (a proto-pragmatist, if you will), or 
not? The debate seems to be endless, with the likes of 
Cornel West
30
 and Richard Shusterman
31
 favoring the 
former option, and Stanley Cavell asking skeptically 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., p. 129, 141. 
29
 This latter adjective I borrow from Stanley Fish, who so 
described pragmatism in his “Truth and Toilets” (p. 424). 
30
 See Cornel West, “The Emersonian Prehistory of 
Pragmatism,” in: The American Evasion of Philosophy: A 
Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 9-41.  
31
 See Richard Shusterman, “Emerson’s Pragmatist 
Aesthetics,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, No. 
207 (1999), pp. 87-99. 
“what’s the use” of doing so.
32
 Having died before the 
term “pragmatism,” in its philosophical meaning, first 
appeared in print, Emerson obviously could not have 
applied that label to his own thought. But what to do 
with such authors as Gerald Graff (to whom Leszek 
Drong devotes his contribution), who have had this 
possibility yet failed to do so despite the many 
similarities one might observe between their position 
and that of “card-carrying” pragmatists such as Dewey? 
Or what about the relation between analytic philosophy 
and pragmatism, which is often depicted as uniformly 
antagonistic? At least in the sense that, as the common 
opinion has it, the unstoppable expansion of the latter in 
American philosophy departments after WWII meant the 
former’s (temporary) demise, and that when Rorty 
converted from his analytic creed to a pragmatist one in 
the 80s, he became a sort of bête noir in the analytic 
circles. This picture has been rightly questioned by 
various authors before
33
 and is further undermined, in 
this issue, by Richard Shusterman’s pointing to the 
analytic roots of his own pragmatist take on literature.  
 
The word “roots” brings us back to Rorty’s historicizing 
approach, which allows one to ease these and analogous 
problems by locating the figures they involve in a 
genealogical narrative, such as that, for instance, which 
may be traced from Emerson through James and Dewey 
to Rorty himself. Of course, Cavell is right in insisting that 
there are some irremediable differences between the 
work of Emerson and, say, that of Dewey, but, as has 
been stressed by other scholars, upon a closer exposition 
one finds enough similarities between the two to be able 
to include both men in the same, pragmatist family.
34
  
 
                                                 
32
See Stanley Cavell, “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson 
a Pragmatist?,” in: The Revival of Pragmatism, pp. 72-80. 
33
 See, e.g., Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an 
American Philosopher (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008) 
34
 See, e.g., Vincent Colapietro, “The Question of Voice 
and the Limits of Pragmatism: Emerson, Dewey, and 
Cavell,” in: The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of 
Philosophy, ed. Richard Shusterman (Malden: Blackwell, 
2004), pp. 174-196.  
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Rorty’s approach can also justify to an extent the 
inclusion in this issue of Steven Mailloux’s paper devoted 
to rhetoric. True, it would be folly to deny that rhetoric 
cannot be entirely equated with literature, insofar as 
today we do not consider all rhetorical uses of language 
as literary. Yet it would be equally absurd to question 
that, historically speaking, the tradition of the ars bene 
dicendi and the literary one have always been tightly knit 
together,
35
 as evidenced, for instance, by the fact that 
some historical figures, such as Horace, belong to both, 
not to mention that some of the most famous 
contemporary students of rhetoric have also been 
literary critics or even poets (Kenneth Burke being a 
good case in point). 
 
Finally, instead of typifying what Rorty despised about 
theoretically-minded literary scholarship, the 
contributions to this issue are rather good instances of 
what he thought to be theory’s value. Quite in keeping 
with the general reactive character of his discourse, 
Rorty outlined his idea of that value in response to 
Walter Benn Michaels and Steven Knapp’s diatribe 
entitled bluntly “Against Theory,”
36
 asserting that he 
sees it in literary theory’s giving us a possibility of 
creatively “splicing together [our] favorite critics, 
novelists, poets, and such, and [our] favorite 
philosophers.”
37
  
 
This is in a way what the contributions to this issue do. 
Richard Hart’s essay, for instance, functions as a locus of 
interaction between John Steinbeck on the one hand 
and Rorty on the other; John Lysaker’s text does the 
same for Walt Whitman, Robert Pinsky, and Emerson; 
and Tim Milnes’ for the English Romantics and Rorty, 
which notably leads to an intriguing exercise in what can 
only be called comparative literary botany (a comparison 
                                                 
35
 See, e.g., George Maximilian Antony Grube, The Greek 
and Roman Critics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1965), p. x. 
36
 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Against 
Theory,” in: Against Theory, pp. 11-30. 
37
 Rorty, “Philosophy without Principles,” p. 136. Cf. 
Rorty and Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart?,” p. 146. 
between Rorty’s meditation on orchids in one of his 
autobiographical texts and Wordsworth’s famous verses 
on the pansy in “Ode: Intimations of Immortality”). In a 
word, the contributions to this issue of Pragmatism 
Today play off some ideas derived from a philosophical 
tradition (pragmatism, that is) against some themes, 
figures, and works belonging to a family romance known 
as literature (or to such cultural traditions as literary 
criticism and rhetoric). But what is perhaps most 
important, as a result, they shed a new light on all 
elements of the resulting unique constellation.
38
 
  
                                                 
38
 I put together this issue of Pragmatism Today during 
my stay as an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation 
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North American Studies, Freie Universität Berlin in 2011. 
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excellent research environment and to the Alexander 
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like to thank Leszek Koczanowicz, Alex Kremer, Don 
Morse, Krzysztof Skarbek, Emil Višňovský, and David 
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NOT WITH SYLLABLES BUT MEN: 
EMERSON’S POETICS OF THE WHOLE 
John Lysaker 
Emory University 
 
for Garrett Hongo and Terry Hummer,  
knowers and sayers 
 
 
“Art is the Urge.” 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
 Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks, 1840 
 
“Poetry is the gai science.  
The trait of the poet is that he builds, adds, and affirms.”  
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Poetry and Imagination” 
 
 
 
There are at least two Emersons, or rather, one, 
manifold Emerson and no less than two sets of 
Emersonians. One cluster, currently vigorous, valorizes 
Emerson’s recoiling perspectivalism, his recurring 
insistence that phenomena like moods and 
temperament (or tropes, for that matter) foreshorten 
whatever clarity one might find in ‘kingdoms of cause 
and effect,’ in the “middle region,” “amid surfaces,” or 
even along the “subterranean and invisible tunnels and 
channels of life,” to invoke the varied, eco-psychic 
geography of “Experience.” Another bunch is drawn to 
the ecstatic sallies that depart these regions in an effort 
to map our condition, to “expand our orbit” as “Circles” 
would have it, to find the shores of our departures and 
ports for our bearing. But this group has been less vocal 
of late, which leads me to fear that we might be overly 
domesticating Emerson, trimming whatever shoots rise 
above the nominalist, often pragmatic contours of our 
critical present. I thus offer this essay as something of a 
counter-swing, a kind of reversal one might find in an 
essay like “Nominalist and Realist,” one that says, in 
effect, ‘yes, but not so fast.’ 
 
“Man lives by pulses,” Emerson writes in “Experience.”
1
 I 
wish to explore a set of such pulses. They arrive courtesy 
of the muses and stand among the wildest phenomena 
in Emerson’s corpus, namely, art and poetry, and it is 
precisely their abandon that renders them exemplary for 
one interested in recalling us to Emerson’s boldest 
affirmations. Moreover, a kind of unbridled enthusiasm 
for the work of art spans Emerson’s corpus. In his 
lectures, for example, several texts struggle to fathom 
art’s power. Some concern particular artists and poets 
such as Milton, Michelangelo, Hafiz, and Shakespeare 
while others pursue more general themes like the nature 
of art and poetic figuration as well as their import for 
self-knowledge and self-culture. And these themes 
appear across his career, from early lectures on 
“Biography” (1835) and “English Literature” (1835-36) to 
later ones like “Poetry and English Poetry” (1854), the 
series “Life and Literature” (1861), and the very late pair, 
“Imagination” and “Poetry” (1872).  
 
Questions concerning art and poetry also appear in most 
of the essay collections, e.g. “Art” (Essays: First Series), 
“The Poet” (Essays: Second Series), “Beauty” (Conduct of 
Life), “Art” (Society and Solitude), and “Poetry and the 
Imagination” (Letters and Social Aims). Equally significant 
is the organization of the first two collections. Essays: 
First Series closes with “Art” and Essays: Second Series 
commences with “The Poet.” On the one hand, essays 
that begin these collections orient a whole that, by its 
very nature, eschews an axiomatic or even inferential 
structure in favor of leitmotifs and whatever pools and 
eddies their confluence generates. Opening overtures 
thus resonate throughout the volume, even if those 
ventures are transformed by what follows, as with 
“game,” which appears in the poems that open “The 
Poet” and “Experience” and recurs in some central, late 
lines in “Nominalist and Realist,” the rhetorical close of 
Essays: Second Series. On the other hand, essays that are 
given the final word or words accentuate leading lines of 
thought, thereby returning the reader to previous essays 
                                                 
1
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays and Poems (New York: 
Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1996), p. 482. 
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with an eye for their more salient concerns, even if the 
closing essay foregoes a summation, as with “Art,” e.g. 
when it invokes an “aboriginal power,” which recalls the 
“aboriginal Self” of “Self-Reliance.”
2
 Or consider the 
claim that art should “throw down the wall of 
circumstance on every side,” which recalls 
complementary thoughts in “Circles,” e.g. the “only sin is 
limitation.”
3
 It is thus noteworthy that two of Emerson’s 
most significant collections give pride of place to two 
essays focused upon the power of art and poetry.
4
 
 
In Emerson’s writings on art and poetry, poetry is the 
favored child, though in a qualified sense, as we will see. 
Besides being a poet in his own right, Emerson also 
edited Parnassus in 1875, a collection of poems that he 
copied out over the years from the likes of Herrick, 
Wordsworth, and Shakespeare, as well as the occasional 
woman poet, for example, Julia Ward Howe, Lady Anne 
Lindsay, and a Mrs. Barbauld.
5
 Also, Representative Men 
gives us essays on Shakespeare (“or, the Poet”) and 
Goethe (“or, the Writer”), but none on sculptors or 
painters, though he praises sculpture in the late lecture, 
“Art,” which he delivered several times between 1861 
and 1869. And yet, in order to offer this praise, he 
quotes, in full, a nine-stanza poem by the English poet, 
John Sterling, and closes the lecture with that poem, 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., p. 434, 268. 
3
 Ibid., p. 437, 406. 
4
 Note also that the last collection, Letters and Social 
Aims, opens with “Poetry and the Imagination,” though I 
hesitate to make too much of that volume given how 
much of its shape is due to hands other than Emerson’s. 
For a detailed account of the book’s editorial history, see 
Ronald Bosco’s massive historical introduction to 
Volume VIII in The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
5
 A review of Parnassus indicates Emerson’s conception 
of gender. The text is arranged thematically. Under 
“Human Life,” one finds the sub-topics “Home, Woman, 
Love, Friendship, Manners, Holy Days, Holidays.” Under 
“Contemplative  – Moral – Religious,” one finds the sub-
topics “Man, Virtue, Honor, Time, Fate, Sleep, Dreams, 
Life, Death, Immortality, Hymns and Odes.” This suggests 
that Emerson understands men and women to have 
distinct temperaments or ways of inhabiting the cosmos, 
and that each is fitted for different subject matters. But 
that is an issue for another time. 
thus giving the final word to poetry.
6
 But most 
importantly, none of Emerson’s remarks on painting or 
sculpture rise to the rhapsody of “The Poet,” where we 
read that a poet is the “principal event in chronology” 
and the “true and only doctor,” that poetry is “true 
science,” and that poets are “liberating gods.” For 
Emerson, then, poetry, though not exclusively, best 
exemplifies the transformative power of art. 
 
Because Emerson finds poetic language so remarkable, I 
want to come to terms with his assertions on its behalf, 
to determine why, on his view, poetry is healing and 
liberatory, and to determine how it manages such 
remarkable feats. To that end, I will focus on the “The 
Poet” from Essays: Second Series. Presuming that 
“Poetry and Imagination” (1875) was in part assembled 
by his daughter, Ellen, and his literary executor, James 
Elliot Cabot, “The Poet” marks Emerson’s most sustained 
treatment. Moreover, Emerson’s feel for poetic 
figuration does not dramatically change over the course 
of his career.
7
 But “The Poet” has its limits. Notably, it 
offers few concrete analyses of how poetic language 
achieves (or approximates) its end. Other texts must 
come into play, therefore, including various poems (or 
parts of poems), though not necessarily Emerson’s own. 
 
“Poetry,” Emerson writes in a lecture of 1841, “finds its 
origin in that need of expression which is a primary 
impulse of nature.”
8
 “The Poet” from 1844, elaborates: 
                                                 
6
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Volume II: 1855-1871 (Athens, Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press, 2001), pp. 224-225. 
7
 Both “The Poet” (1844) and “Poetry and English 
Poetry” (1854), for example, present poetry as the true 
science, and precisely because it finds unity beneath 
change, wholeness across nature’s diverse forms and 
trajectories. (Notably, “Poetry and Imagination” 
concurs.) In order to further defend the claim that 
Emerson maintains a consistent (which is not to say 
identical) conception of poetry throughout his career, 
throughout I will illustrate agreements between texts of 
different periods, although I will not call particular 
attention to this agreement, if only because there are 
more interesting matters to discuss. 
8
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Volume III: 1838-1842 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 348-349. 
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For all men live by truth, and stand in need of 
expression. In love, in art, in avarice, in politics, 
in labor, in games, we study to utter our painful 
secret. The man is only half himself, the other 
half is his expression.
9
  
 
I begin with these remarks because a perceived need lies 
at the heart of Emerson’s high esteem for poets. 
Humans, he believes, must manifest their character, 
express it in a wealth of performances, a wealth equal to 
the richness of that character, or they suffer – “That man 
is serene who does not feel himself pinched and 
wronged by his condition but whose condition in general 
and in particular allows the utterance of his mind; and 
that man who cannot utter himself goes moaning all the 
day.”
10
 Where Adam Smith sees an innate need to truck, 
barter, and exchange, Emerson sees a broader 
trajectory: a need to find one’s character written into 
the world that one inhabits.
11
 
 
Notably, this broader trajectory is at once intellectual 
and practical. It begins in actions: gardening, clothing, 
what we buy and where, and so forth. But it culminates 
in a recognition of the truth of those actions, that is, the 
expression we seek must successfully reflect us back to 
ourselves, and for that, we need words. In his concept of 
expression, therefore, Emerson weds a sense of human 
restlessness, what Nietzsche later presents as pro-active 
desires, with the desire to understand that Aristotle 
finds integral to being human. And it is within that braid 
of lack and burgeoning surplus that the need for poetry 
germinates. 
 
Unfortunately, most fail to find adequate expression. 
“We but half express ourselves,” says “Self-Reliance,” 
“and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us 
                                                 
9
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 448. 
10
 Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Volume III, p. 349. 
11
 This need and Emerson’s proposals for addressing it 
are the principal concern of my Emerson and Self-Culture 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). For 
Smith’s observation, see Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1981), p. 25. 
represents.”
12
 The problem is not merely one of 
cowardice, however. As the essay “The Poet” explains: 
“but the great majority of men seem to be minors, who 
have not come into possession of their own, or mutes, 
who cannot report the conversation they have had with 
nature.”
13
 This remark is interesting in at least two ways 
(or three, since it offers a poetic redirection of Kant’s 
claim that pre-enlightenment culture and character has 
not yet reached maturity or Mündigkeit). First, it 
suggests that many of us, even courageous ones, lack 
the ability to express all that we are. Second, we now 
have a better sense of what “expression” (and what a 
human life) entails: a manifestation of our character as it 
arises within an ongoing conversation with nature. What 
is to be expressed is not some internal state of affairs 
but the truth of our character as it appears to us, as it is 
disclosed in what the essay “Experience” terms “the 
world I converse with in the city and in the farms.”
14
 To 
be precise, Emerson denies neither interiority, i.e. 
manifold self-relations like feeling inspired or self-trust, 
nor its influence. Rather, his claim is that interiority 
bears the impress of manifold worldly relations such that 
the truth of our condition is the whole in which the 
genuine character of all our relations appears. In this at 
least, Emerson is thoroughly Hegelian: “The true is the 
whole.”
15
 
 
Let me underscore that the issue before us is one of 
genuine relation. The whole that is the true is not an 
undifferentiated unity, some perpetually congealing 
globe of divine essence. Instead, it involves multiple 
interactions and the differences (and the differentiation) 
those interactions presume. Moreover, for Emerson, as 
                                                 
12
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 260. 
13
 Ibid., p. 448 – emphases added. 
14
 Ibid., p. 491. 
15
 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 11. 
Emerson’s sources for metaphysical holism are no doubt 
manifold (as are Hegel’s), drawing from neo-Platonic 
thought and Vedanta. I note this to underscore Buell’s 
important insistence that Emerson’s thought springs 
from and wishes to return to world culture and neither 
from nor towards a purely domestic let alone 
exceptionalist discussion. Lawrence Buell, Emerson 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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for Hegel, our thicket of relations relentlessly becomes, 
as does all of nature. 
 
That rushing stream will not stop to be observed. 
We can never surprise nature in a corner; never 
find the end of a thread; never tell where to set 
the first stone. … If anything could stand still, it 
would be crushed and dissipated by the torrent it 
resisted, and if it were a mind, would be crazed; 
as insane persons are those who hold fast to one 
thought, and do not flow with the course of 
nature.
16
  
 
Bringing this thought from “The Method of Nature” into 
the task of self-expression, we could say, therefore, that 
our expressions must keep pace with our perpetual 
expression, for each marks an expression whose truth 
must be found. 
 
All is progress, and ascension, and 
metamorphosis. Chyle becomes blood, bone, 
tooth, nail, hair, skin, according to exigency, and, 
so, over the animal, its soul runs out to the 
expression and incarnation of all its inmost self – 
as is the bird to the bird’s nest. We have not 
seen the bird till we have seen its egg and its 
nest. The nest is part of the bird, so is of man the 
house, the temple, the garden, the laboratory, 
the school, the state house, the theater, the 
Academy of Music.
17
  
 
This thought from the 1861 lecture “Art” suggests that 
each new manifestation potentially unveils a new side of 
our character. If we are to give voice to our existence, 
therefore, manifest and recognize it for what it is, we 
must learn to track ourselves wherever we go, even into 
that very tracking. And so, we who are cowards, or 
minors, or mutes (or all of the above), come to rely on 
poets. “For, the experience of each new age requires a 
new confession, and the world seems always waiting for 
its poet.”
18
 
                                                 
16
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 119. 
17
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Volume II: 1855-1871 (Athens, Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press, 2001), p. 221. 
18
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 450. At least two 
senses of expression are now in play. One is appropriate 
to the way in which human character is expressed 
through action while the other binds appearance and 
reality to ongoing events of nature, e.g. in the neo-
Platonic thought of emanation. And yet, because 
Emerson regards our need to express ourselves as yet 
another manifestation of nature (one that is thereby 
But how does poetry pursue this task? “The Poet” 
replies: “the poet … re-attaches things to nature and the 
Whole…”
19
 What we lack and what the poet offers is a 
sense for the whole drama to which we belong. 
 
Every man should be so much an artist, that he 
could report in conversation what had befallen 
him. Yet, in our experience, the rays and 
appulses have sufficient force to arrive at the 
senses, but not enough to reach the quick, and 
compel the reproduction of themselves in 
speech. The poet is the person in whom these 
powers are in balance, the man without 
impediment, who sees and handles that which 
others dream of, traverses the whole scale of 
experience, and is representative of man, in 
virtue of being the largest power to receive and 
to impart.
20
 
 
We know parts and many of us can analyze them, 
naming the qualities of things, some primary, most less 
so, tracing consequents back to their antecedents in 
discrete ecologies of cause and effect, but most cannot 
bring together work and play, body and mind, human 
and animal, life and death, the terrestrial with the 
celestial. That requires what “Circles” names a “bolder 
generalization” that takes up diverse accounts and finds 
in their pools and eddies broader phenomena.
21
 
Let’s consider some examples. The first comes from 
Heraclitus, whom Emerson names and implicitly quotes 
in the first paragraph of “The Poet.”  
 
But the highest minds of the world have never 
ceased to explore the double meaning, or, shall I 
say, the quadruple or the centruple, or much 
more manifold meaning, of every sensuous fact: 
Orpheus, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, 
                                                                       
continuous with it), the distinction should not be 
substantialized. 
19
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 455. 
20
 Ibid., p. 448 – emphases added. In the Preface to 
Parnassus, Emerson writes: “The poet demands all gifts, 
and not one or two only. Like the electric rod, he must 
reach from a point nearer to the sky than all surrounding 
objects, down to earth, and into the wet soil, or neither 
is of use.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, Parnassus (Boston: 
James R. Osgood and Company,1874), p. viii. 
21
 Note that with regard to such expansions, “Circles” 
also defers to literary works. “Literature is a point 
outside our hodiernal circle, through which a new one 
may be described. The use of literature is to afford us a 
platform whence we may command a view of our 
present life, a purchase by which we may move it.” 
Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 408. 
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Plutarch, Dante, Swedenborg, and the masters of 
sculpture, picture, and poetry. For we are not 
pans and barrows, nor even porters of the fire 
and torch-bearers, but children of the fire, made 
of it, and only the same divinity transmuted, and 
at two or three removes, when we know least 
about it.
22
  
 
Emerson follows Heraclitus and uses “fire” as a universal 
figure, one whose manifold meaning names a basic 
character of all things and sets us along a continuum 
with everything that comes to be and passes away, and 
insistently so – we are not pans or barrow or porters but 
“children of the fire, made of it.”
23
 
 
One way that poets re-attach things to the whole thus 
involves universal symbols that purport to name 
something essential in all things. This means, of course, 
that for Emerson, “poetry” names the figurative power 
of language not simply verse. Whenever symbol, 
allegory, metaphor, metonymy, or synecdoche operate, 
the gesture is poetic on Emerson’s terms. (This is why 
Plato proves a poet: cave, chariot, divided line, the 
demiurgos slapping form onto matter.) 
 
Note, however, the origin of such figuration: the 
selfsame conversation with nature that each tries to 
grasp. “Things admit of being used as symbols, because 
nature is a symbol, in the whole, and in every part.”
24
 
And: 
 
We are symbols, and inhabit symbols; workman, 
work, and tools, words and things, birth and 
death, all are emblems; but we sympathize with 
the symbols, and, being infatuated with the 
economical uses of things, we do not know that 
they are thoughts. The poet, by an ulterior 
intellectual perception, gives them the power 
which makes their old use forgotten, and puts 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., p. 447. 
23
 In “Poetry and English Poetry,” Emerson aligns 
figuration of this sort with metonymy, which he defines 
as “seeing the same sense in divers things.” Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Volume I: 1843-1854 (Athens, Georgia: University of 
Georgia Press, 2001), p. 303. Because this is a rather 
loose definition that focuses more on analogical sense 
than actual poetic operations, I am not employing the 
analysis here. 
24
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 452. 
eyes, and a tongue, into every dumb and 
inanimate object.
25
  
 
These passages are remarkable in their reflexivity. If 
poetry re-attaches things to the whole, its own figurative 
power also must belong to that whole. Otherwise, its 
figurations are actually detachments and enclosures. 
Emerson rejects such discontinuities, however, insisting 
that the “poet names the thing because he sees it, or 
comes one step nearer to it than any other. This 
expression, or naming, is not art, but a second nature, 
grown out of the first, as a leaf out of a tree.”
26
 It is 
necessary, therefore, that successful figurations track 
their own figurative sallies, and in a manner that belongs 
as much to the whole as that which they poetically 
figure. 
 
A second path lies with particulars through which broad 
nature appears. According to Emerson, “there is no fact 
in nature which does not carry the whole sense of 
nature; and the distinctions which we make in events, 
and in affairs, of low and high, honest and base, 
disappear when nature is used as a symbol.”
27
 Begin 
with a tree and soon you will find the history of soil, the 
history of planters and woodsman, the history of rain 
and thus of tides, hence the moon, and of global 
industry, and of course, one will find the sun both 93 
million miles away and yet here in the heliotropic arc of 
a house plant. All that seemed distant and long gone 
proves near when some particular is seen as the meeting 
place of everything else.  
One can witness such figuration in Robert Pinsky’s 
“Shirt.”
28
 It begins concretely. 
 
The back, the yoke, the yardage. Lapped seams, 
The nearly invisible stitches along the collar  
(lines 1-2) 
 
The effect of this concreteness is to open up the 
assemblage that each shirt is, which allows the stanza to 
effortlessly continue: 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 456. 
26
 Ibid., p. 457. 
27
 Ibid., p. 454. 
28
 Robert Pinsky, The Want Bone (New York: Ecco Press, 
1990), p. 55. 
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…along the collar 
Turned in a sweatshop by Koreans or Malaysians. 
(lines 2-3) 
 
And so we are off and running, finding in the shirt upon 
our backs a history of global labor, though our weavers 
may live closer to home.  
 
George Herbert, your descendant is a Black  
Lady in South Carolina, her name is Irma 
And she inspected my shirt. …  
(lines 38-40) 
 
The poem thus sets something seemingly self-contained, 
a shirt, into a larger economy of forces and events. And 
it sets itself therein as well, continuing: 
 
…Its color and fit 
 
And feel and its clean smell have satisfied 
Both her and me. We have culled its cost and 
quality 
Down to the buttons of simulated bone. 
(lines 40-43) 
 
This penultimate stanza is striking in its irony and implicit 
reflexivity. On first blush, the speaker appears as a 
consumer who shares the inspector’s estimation of the 
shirt’s quality. But on another level, the speaker, who 
has recalled sweatshops and the Triangle Factory fire of 
1911 in which 146 garment workers lost their lives, 
opens a dialogue with the inspector about the cost and 
quality of the shirt, “Down to the buttons of simulated 
bone.” In other words, down to the buttons, this is an 
unconvincing performance, and neither thinks that what 
has passed through their hands is satisfactory. More 
importantly, in addressing Irma Herbert in the second 
person, the speaker sets the poem into a larger 
conversation with other points and persons in the 
network of global labor, thus re-attaching itself to the 
world to which it has returned our shirts – one in which, 
on the poem’s own admission, the final word has not yet 
been uttered. 
 
It is precisely because the poet unveils an enveloping 
world, one that so often eludes us, that he or she proves 
a liberating god.
29
  
 
We are like persons who come out of a cave or 
cellar into the open air. This is the effect on us of 
tropes, fables, oracles, and all poetic forms. 
Poets are thus liberating gods. Men have really 
got a new sense, and found within their world, 
another world, or nest of worlds; for, the 
metamorphoses once seen, we divine that it 
does not stop.
30
  
 
A good deal is at work in this passage. Let us begin with 
the notion of liberation, which runs in two directions. “In 
my daily work I incline to repeat my old steps, and do 
not believe in remedial force, in the power of change 
and reform,” Emerson says in “Circles.” “But some 
Petrarch or Ariosto ... breaks up my whole chain of 
habits, and I open my eye on my own possibilities. He 
claps wings to the sides of all the solid old lumber of the 
world, and I am capable once more of choosing a 
straight path in theory and practice.”
31
 Again, the issue is 
intellectual and practical. A genuine poetic disclosure 
turns us around; it interrupts old habits as it opens new 
vistas. 
 
As Pinsky’s poem evinces, concretion is everything in 
these transformations. Images focus and convert us. But 
atop them, or rather, through them, the poet’s 
achievement is also somewhat formal. Once we witness 
a particular – a shirt, a tree, some pale light – waxing 
cosmological, it should dawn on us that any particular 
could play that role, even our own lives. In “The System,” 
John Ashbery says this to haunting effect.
32
  
 
The system was breaking down. The one who 
had wandered  
alone past so many happenings and events 
began to feel, backing 
                                                 
29
 I think the use of “god” is designed to both: (a) deify 
the poet, rendering him or her a “divine” who provides 
ongoing revelation, and (b) continue the process, begun 
in “The Divinity School Address,” of rendering Jesus 
ontologically unexceptional. 
30
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 461. 
31
 Ibid., p. 409. 
32
 See John Ashbery, Collected Poems, 1956-1987 (New 
York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 2008).  
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up along the primal vein that led to his 
center, the beginning 
of a hiccup that would, if left to gather, 
explode the center to  
the extremities of life …  
(lines 1-5) 
 
If we work toward our center atop the thought that each 
part relates to each, each belongs to a whole, we will 
undo the distinction between near and far, high and low, 
that is, that system of demarcation, including inside and 
outside, will break down. All at once, the center will be 
everywhere. This is quintessential Emerson. Again: 
“there is no fact of nature which does not carry the 
whole sense of nature…”
33
 But that is not all. In our 
continuity with nature, and in nature’s relentless 
unfolding: “There is no outside, no inclosing wall, no 
circumference to us.”
34
 But this is a hard thought, 
difficult to say without risking a circumference, or rather, 
difficult to hear since everything seems to say it. Ashbery 
is right therefore to figure this realization as an 
occasional feeling as does in the opening lines of Flow 
Chart.
35
   
 
Still in the published city but not yet 
overtaken by a new form of despair, I ask 
the diagram: is it the foretaste of pain 
it might easily be? Or an emptiness  
so sudden it leaves the girders  
whanging in the absence of wind, 
the sky milk-blue and astringent? We know 
life is so busy, 
but a larger activity shrouds it, and this is 
something  
we can never feel, except occasionally, in 
small signs 
put up to warn us and as soon expunged, in 
part 
or wholly  
(lines 1-11).
36
 
 
With Emerson in mind, particularly the line “… character 
evermore publishes itself,” I want to take “the published 
city” in terms of a thoroughly symbolic nature, one that 
                                                 
33
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 454. 
34
 Ibid., p. 405. 
35
 John Ashbery, Flow Chart (New York: Farrar, Strauss, 
and Giroux, 1991). 
36
 In an early lecture on Michelangelo, Emerson claims 
that the whole cannot be understood, only felt. Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Volume I: 1833-1836 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), p. 101. 
includes sentences and sunsets, characters and 
characters, one worthy of the phrase “larger activity,” 
though it remains (and will remain) to be said what kind 
of “action” this is.
37
 Second, I would add that only within 
the “published city” does the whole appear, that is, each 
appearing requires some other that indicates the 
appearing, if obliquely. “Direct strokes she never gave us 
the power to make,” Emerson observes in “Experience,” 
continuing: “all our blows glance, all our hits are 
accidents.”
38
 And art works are no different. “Our arts 
are happy hits,” we find in Society and Solitude.
39
 But 
how could it be otherwise? How could a part indicate a 
self-differentiating, ecstatic whole to another part, 
except by way of suggestion, one whose reach, 
affectively effective, exceeds what either part could 
concretely synthesize?
40
 The whole, this larger “activity” 
that binds speakers, addressees, and all that concerns 
them (and no doubt much that doesn’t), rushes into us 
as a feeling, a presence without circumference, a 
presence felt just at that point where our symbols break 
open and suggest more than they could possibly mean, a 
point where we find ourselves “like a traveler, surprised 
by a mountain echo, whose trivial word returns to him in 
romantic thunders,” to return again to Society and 
Solitude.
41
  
                                                 
37
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 318. Whether 
“activity” fruitfully accounts for the dynamics of 
synchronic and diachronic webs of relation is a matter I 
have addressed in You Must Change Your Life, principally 
through the poetry of Charles Simic, though also in terms 
of Ammons’s Garbage and Stevens’s “Reality is an 
August Activity of the Imagination.” John Lysaker, You 
Must Change your Life: Philosophy, Poetry, and the Birth 
of Sense (State College: Penn State University Press, 
2002). 
38
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 473. 
39
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Volume  VII: Society and Solitude 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 23. 
40
 In Emerson’s Fall, Barbara Packer also finds the 
inevitability of suggestion in Emerson’s poet. See 
Barbara Packer, Emerson’s Fall: A New Interpretation of 
the Major Essays (New York: The Continuum Publishing 
Company, 1982), p. 193. For her, this primarily is due to 
nature’s ongoing ecstasies. I would add that part-whole 
problems thicken the issue, and further note that 
suggestiveness has affective dimensions. 
41
 Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Volume  VII, p. 23. 
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In a more general way, feeling is integral to the full range 
of poetic liberations that Emerson imagines.
42
 
Introducing Parnassus, he says:  
 
Whatever language the bard uses, the secret of 
tone is at the heart of the poem. Every great 
master is such by this power… The true 
inspiration always brings it. Perhaps it cannot be 
analyzed; but we all yield to it.
43
  
 
Here we enter the murky field of voice, that 
characteristic tone with which a poem or occasionally a 
corpus addresses its subject matter and readership. 
Perhaps these lines from Whitman’s “I Sing the Body 
Electric” will prove concrete.
44
  
 
O my Body! I dare not desert the likes of you 
in other men and women, nor the like of the 
parts of you; 
I believe the likes of you are to stand or fall 
with the likes of the Soul, (and that they are the 
soul;) 
I believe the likes of you shall stand or fall 
with my poems – and that they are poems; 
(lines 131-33) 
 
This poem overflows with enthusiasm, e.g. in the great 
length of each line. Interestingly, Emerson himself says: 
“the length of lines in songs and poems is determined by 
the inhalation and exhalation of the lungs,” which I take 
to image a certain capacity for expression and thus for 
life.
45
 But not just by way of line length, at least not in 
the case of these lines from Whitman, which brim with 
affirmation in the exclamation and declaration that open 
each line recalled: “O my Body!” “I believe…” “I 
                                                 
42
 This is true on the side of the text and the reader, as 
Richard Deming notes. “At the very least, I would 
venture to say that affect, emotional valence, is one 
measure of response and investment.” Richard Deming, 
Listening on All Sides: Towards an Emersonian Ethics  of 
Reading (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 
128.  I suppose I would say that it is the principal 
measure, even for poets as presumably “intellectual” as 
Ashbery, at least in efforts like “The System” and Flow 
Chart. 
43
 Emerson, Parnassus, p. x. 
44
 See Walt Whitman, Complete Poetry and Collected 
Prose (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 
Inc., 1982), pp. 250-258. 
45
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Volume  
VIII, p. 24. 
believe…” And the repetition deepens the thematic 
point: the body is a fit subject for praise, even 
veneration, since the repeated “I believe” recalls a 
Credo. 
 
For Emerson, the poem’s mood creates a space wherein 
one can assume the possibilities it figures. In “Persian 
Poetry,” he writes: “Every song in Hafiz affords new 
proof of the unimportance of your subject to success, 
provided only the treatment is cordial.”
46
 In this context, 
“cordial” has powerful overtones, though one might 
miss them if one only thinks of a sweet aperitif or 
chocolate. But a return to the 1828 edition of Webster’s 
dictionary gives us two other applicable meanings: (1) 
hearty and sincere as well as (2) invigorating and 
reviving.
47
 What Emerson finds in Hafiz is a tone or mood 
that both radiates sincerity and invigorates whoever 
receives it. And in invigorating the reader, such a tone 
re-attaches us to the whole at the level of affect and 
action, that is, it recalls us from dulled habit, possibly 
despair, and allows us to find and pursue possibility in 
the world at our door.
48
 
If we focus on the invigorating tones of certain poets, I 
think we can see why Emerson terms the poet the “true 
and only doctor.” She or he gives us back a kind of youth, 
renewed vigor. In “Culture,” Emerson suggests: 
“Incapacity of melioration is the only mortal 
distemper.”
49
 Whitman’s lines, in their verve and 
exultation, cure such distemper. With rhythm and sound 
and sense they instill a visceral confidence in a life that 
will not treat the body as the soul’s poor relation. And 
even Pinsky’s poem is never overcome by disclosures 
that remind us of the bleak entanglements we wear. In 
                                                 
46
 Ibid., p. 133. 
47
 In “Poetry and Imagination,” Emerson laments: “And 
the fault of our popular poetry is that it is not sincere.” 
Ibid., p. 15. 
48
 Emerson reports: “It is much to know that poetry has 
been written this very day, under this very roof, by your 
side. What! that wonderful spirit has not expired! these 
stony moments are still sparkling and animated! I had 
fancied that the oracles were all silent, and nature had 
spent her fires, and behold! all night, from every pore, 
these fine auroras have been streaming.” Emerson, 
Essays and Poems, p. 451. 
49
 Ibid., p. 845. 
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fact, at the level of tone, and in the poise of its lines and 
images, there is a confidence that these stories can be 
told, and that conversations with the likes of Irma 
Herbert can be pursued, and that poems will help us 
pursue them. 
 
In several ways, then, poets re-attach us to the whole, 
thus empowering, Emerson believes, our own self-
expression. Poetic figures help us see the world to which 
we belong (and the worlds within those worlds as well as 
what is, properly speaking, not a world but a “larger 
activity”), and in such a way that we inhabit that world 
with greater richness. In fact, on this view, the opening 
of such futures is the yet to be written verse of every 
truly great poem. As Emerson suggests: “He is the true 
Orpheus who writes his ode, not with syllables, but 
men.”
50
 The suggestion is not as strange as it sounds. 
Every poetic figuration is an action – it “adorns nature 
with a new thing” and “Words are also actions” – and 
every action a symbolic expression of the character of 
the actor and the ecology in which that action arose.
51
 
Emerson can thus, in a somewhat strict sense, regard the 
world as a poem in need of further elaboration, and he 
can regard each elaboration as the initiation of futures 
whose future poems we will be, as “principal events in 
chronology,” to recall one of his more robust phrases. 
Turning to Emerson’s figurations, then, the world is less 
a stage than a poem in the process of perpetual revision 
or turning, as in the turns of a trope, from tropos, 
meaning manner and style, or even way of becoming, 
given the root verb trepein, to turn. “Nature itself is a 
vast trope,” Emerson writes in “Poetry and Imagination,” 
continuing: “and all particular natures are tropes.”
52
 I am 
                                                 
50
 Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Volume VIII, p. 37. This line from “Poetry and 
Imagination” has a partner in “Art” from Essays: First 
Series. “There is higher work for Art than the arts. … 
Nothing less than the creation of man and nature is its 
end. A man should find in it an outlet for his whole 
energy. … Art should exhilarate … and its highest effect is 
to make new artists.” Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 
437. 
51
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 450. 
52
 Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Volume VIII, p. 7. 
happy to confess, then, that I find something startlingly 
plausible in Whitman’s wild suggestion that the likes of 
bodies should stand and fall with his poems and that 
they are poems. 
 
I have been working my way into some of Emerson’s 
strongest claims on behalf of poetry, e.g. that the poet is 
a liberating god, the true doctor, and the inception of a 
chronology. I have also tried to show how and why 
Emerson thinks of nature and our role therein as an 
ongoing poem of visions and revisions that a moment 
might replace.  But I have yet to pursue the thought that 
poetry is in some way a “true science.” Admittedly, the 
claim is somewhat odd, as is the later assertion that the 
“Poet is a better logician than the analyzer.”
53
 I think we 
can track these thoughts, however. Moreover, doing so 
should lead us into a variety of critical contexts that will 
help us evaluate the position I have been elaborating.  
 
Emerson’s decision to present poetry as a kind of 
knowledge stems in part from a struggle with Plato that 
appears at various points within “The Poet,” most often 
through rhetorical revisions. According to Emerson, the 
poet, contra arguments found in the Republic, possesses 
a higher kind of seeing that brings him or her closer to 
what is to be known, and it is on that basis that the poet 
leads us out of the fabled cave.
54
 Moreover, that higher 
seeing does not result from the elenchus but from the 
kind of rhapsody that makes poets such a threat in the 
Republic and such silly gooses in Ion. Moreover, in a 
revision of a core image from the Phaedrus, Emerson 
orients the soul away from a mind-governed chariot 
towards an instinct propelled steed. “The traveler who 
has lost his way, throws his reins on his horse’s neck and 
trusts to the instinct of the animal to find his road, so 
must we do with the divine animal who carries us 
through this world.”
55
 At various points, then, Emerson, 
often by mere inversion, insists that Plato is wrong to 
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 Emerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Volume I, p. 304. 
54
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 456, 461. 
55
 Ibid., p. 460. 
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distrust inspiration and its persuasions, and wrong to 
claim that poetry only offers replicas of replicas. 
 
And yet, a recurring thought underwrites these revisions. 
According to Emerson, the poet, qua sayer, surpasses 
the knower because the poet “uses forms according to 
life, and not according to the form,” which leads 
Emerson to conclude: “This is true Science.”
56
 The key to 
this thought is Emerson’s claim that the bird can only be 
known through the egg and the nest. The suggestion is 
that the character of any being lies in its expressions 
(including its relations), and that no single expression – 
no particular form, e.g. wing, beak, flying creature, egg 
layer, etc. – provides the whole story of any being that 
becomes. It inevitably omits dimensions and mistakes a 
partial for a complete development. And the problem 
only intensifies if we move to the whole, which is 
Emerson’s principal concern in “The Poet.” Not only is 
the whole manifest in every part, but also in unity 
through dynamic differentiation such that the whole is at 
once tern and warbler, minnow and pitcher plant, 
gravity, and RNA codon. And no form can capture this 
dynamic multiplicity, nor its movement, nor its 
differentiated continuity within and across that 
movement, nor its appearing to poets and dullards alike. 
As Emerson says, “because ecstasy is the law and cause 
of nature, therefore you cannot interpret it in too high 
and deep a sense,” that is, again, there is no 
circumference, and forms, by definition, exact just 
that.
57
 But the Emersonian poet does not rest with 
forms. Instead, she or he presents forms that, in their 
                                                 
56
 Ibid., p. 456. “The Poet” actually addresses a 
triumvirate: the sayer, the knower, and the doer. In the 
first Shakespeare lecture of 1835, the trio includes the 
Imaginative, the Reflective, and the Practical. Emerson, 
The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Volume I, p. 
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University Press, 1971), p. 338. 
57
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 127. 
evolving interanimation, suggest the life therein, and so 
his or her “speech flows with the flowing of nature.”
58
  
 
“This preference of the genius to the parts,” writes 
Emerson, “is the secret of that deification of art, which is 
found in all superior minds.”
59
 No one expects to find the 
meaning of a poem in one word or in all its words taken 
as an aggregate. So too, Emerson thinks, no one should 
seek a form for the whole or assemble it one necessary 
and sufficient condition at a time. Or, in his words: 
“Natural objects, if individually described, and out of 
connection, are not yet known, since they are really 
parts of a symmetrical universe, like words of a 
sentence…”
60
 So too with us, that is, we are parts of a 
whole and our lives are drawn there-from (and there-
on). And so poetry, which can indicate that whole 
through figure and feeling, can claim a kind of knowing 
that trumps a knowledge assembled out of universals, 
no matter how broadly (or compositely) drawn.
61
 
 
Emerson’s feel for poetry’s power is thus 
epistemologically ambitious, which makes him an 
interesting interlocutor for someone like Richard Rorty 
who also prefers the poet to Platonic metaphysics, 
particularly with regard to languages of self-expression, 
or, in Rorty’s words, self-creation. But Rorty eschews any 
epistemic register at this point, setting practices of self-
creation in direct contrast to practices of self-
knowledge.
62
 As we have seen, Emerson binds the two; 
deeper self-knowledge enables broader and richer self-
creation. Now, on one level, Rorty could agree. Given a 
vocabulary, e.g. a neo-Platonic, expressivist metaphysics, 
certain forays might count as self-knowledge and one 
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might revise a life on that basis, e.g. one might no longer 
eat animal flesh upon discovering that nature does not 
admit of fundamentally distinct natural kinds but is 
rather continuous. But vocabularies are invented not 
discovered and thus local gains in self-knowledge lose 
their epistemic sheen when their dependence on non-
referential, hence non truth-functional vocabularies 
becomes apparent. 
 
If we follow Emerson here, an interesting argument 
awaits. First, Emerson could agree that there are no 
finished or final vocabularies. As he says in “Circles,” in a 
line partially cited above:  
 
Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new 
series. Every general law only a particular fact of 
some more general law presently to disclose 
itself. There is not outside, no inclosing-wall, no 
circumference to us.
63
  
 
Moreover, Emerson acknowledges the perspectival 
nature of every orientation. In “The Poet,” he locates 
creativity in moods to which the poet resigns him or 
herself.
64
 And then in “Nominalist and Realist,” he 
exclaims: “If only we could have security against 
moods!” and be certain that today’s inspiration would 
not be replaced by tomorrow’s despair or, worse still, 
the “same immeasurable credulity will be demanded for 
new audacities.”
65
 But does it follow from our subjection 
to apparently inevitable and incalculable successions 
that we should abandon any epistemic sense with regard 
to phenomena like vocabularies?  
 
I think Emerson believes that at least one epistemic 
dimension persists in events of poetic figuration; call it a 
concern for phenomenological fit. According to Emerson, 
poetry involves an “abandonment to the nature of 
things,” which requires “suffering the ethereal tides to 
roll and circulate through him: then he is caught up into 
the life of the Universe…”
66
 As the language of 
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“abandonment” and “suffering” indicate, 
phenomenological fit is not determined according to 
egological acts that compare concepts and sense data. 
Rather, mood and feel run the show, as when we say 
that something doesn’t sit right with us. But let me be 
more concrete. 
 
Rorty presents psychoanalysis as an instance of strong 
poetry fit for projects of self-creation.
67
 He valorizes it 
because it grants everyone their own personal, epic 
drama, as opposed to Nietzsche, who reviews most lives 
like Peter Warlock purportedly reviewed the music of 
Vaughan Williams: “a little too much like a cow looking 
over a gate.” But is a democratic air sufficient to 
recommend psychoanalysis as a language for self-
creation? Rorty prefers this line of evaluation because it 
relies on terms like “useful” and “interesting” as 
opposed to “true” or “false.” But doesn’t a vocabulary 
have to make sense in a general way? Doesn’t it have to 
sit right with us? Repression, displacement, and 
sublimation – these terms make a good deal of sense in 
our conversation with nature, whereas the thought of 
libidinal energy running like steam through pipes fares 
less well for many. But the issue is not whether Freud 
works for you. Rather, my point concerns how it works or 
does not work, and to that question, phenomenological 
fit seems relevant. Emerson thus seems justified when 
he claims: “The condition of true naming, on the poet’s 
part, is his resigning himself to the divine aura which 
breathes through forms, and accompanying that.”
68
 
 
I suppose Emerson would have another worry about 
Rorty’s impatience with the language of self-knowledge 
within practices of self-expression. What are we to make 
of tropes like “vocabulary”? I ask because it seems to 
function like a circumference beyond which we cannot 
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 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 459. This is not to 
suggest that phenomenological fit, any more than a 
feeling of certainty, will answer the skeptic or secure a 
path to things in themselves. But Emerson does not take 
those projects to have the last word on whether 
epistemic concerns should persist in our efforts to arrive 
at genuine self-expression. 
NO T  W I T H  SY L L A B L E S  B U T  M E N :  EM E R S O N ’S  PO E T I CS  O F  T H E  WH O L E  J ohn  L y sake r  
 21 
reach, even though it invites all kinds of questions. For 
example, how are vocabularies acquired in the process 
of human development? One might reply, ‘they are 
acquired as we learn a language,’ but what learning 
processes are operative in that transition? The question 
is a forceful one because it indicates that in order for the 
form “vocabulary” to do the work it does, it arises in the 
course of a life already unfolding, that is, in order to 
account for its own emergence, the rhetoric of a 
“vocabulary” must reach beyond its limits.  Similarly, one 
can ask: are vocabularies discrete? Clearly not, so how 
do they interact? How do Newtonian mechanics and 
psychoanalysis interact? Where do they meet? Again, 
the questions have force because they rush to the limit 
that “vocabulary” marks and push into questions of 
genesis, of emergence, transformation, and decay. 
 
At points of genesis and transformation, Rorty begins to 
appear rather Kantian. I say this because the term 
“vocabulary” seems to frustrate lines of inquiry that the 
term itself awakens. Ask about the genesis of a 
vocabulary and one will meet with the claim that such 
questions only can arise and be pursued within a 
vocabulary. In other words, for Rorty, “vocabulary” 
functions as an a priori condition for the possibility of 
experience, inquiry, or poetry, and I think Emerson 
would resist the drift of “vocabulary” to the point of a 
quasi-Kantian limit. “There is not outside, no inclosing-
wall, no circumference to us,” he insists, and rightfully 
so. Not only do vocabularies have origins and porous 
limits, thus indicating a site where they emerge and 
interact, but the very term has its own porous lineage as 
well, e.g. in Dewey’s “pattern of inquiry,” Quine’s “web 
of inquiry,” and Kuhn’s “paradigms,” as well in the 
various situations to which each term is a response. It 
thus strikes me that “vocabulary” itself gives the lie to 
the limit it would police. Or, to put the matter in 
Emersonian terms, whenever “vocabulary” marks a limit 
that cannot be surpassed its advocates use life according 
to a form when they should be using forms according to 
life. 
 
Given Rorty’s pragmatism, I realize the irony of my 
charge. But Rorty’s focus on the “useful” and 
“interesting” takes its leave from certain commitments 
that do not seem open to revision, and the rhetoric of 
“vocabulary” is one. Another, one Emerson would also 
resist, involves the pragmatic strategist who picks and 
chooses among vocabularies according to his or her 
purposes, e.g. psychoanalysis for private lives, liberalism 
for public ones. According to Emerson, it is unthinkable 
that we could choose our basic orientations in the 
cosmos, and poetry makes this plain. “In our way of 
talking,” Emerson writes, “we say, ‘That is yours, this is 
mine;’ but the poet knows well that it is not his; that it is 
as strange and beautiful to him as to you…”
69
 On 
Emerson’s terms, our bearings take their leave from 
events that claim us prior to anything like choice. “He is 
the poet, and shall draw us with love and terror, who 
sees, through the flowing vest, the firm nature, and can 
declare it.”
70
 But we need not be swayed by Emerson’s 
account – call it a phenomenology of conversion – in 
order to see a more general point. To the degree that 
the pragmatic reckoner is a rhetorical figure which 
functions as a practical substratum in Rorty’s thought, it 
circumscribes our condition in a manner that, like 
“vocabulary,” unconvincingly suppresses its own genesis 
and the waves of relations that circulate along, through, 
and beyond the hem of any circumference. 
 
In this recollection of Emerson’s feel for poetry, I have 
been defending Emerson’s enthusiasms against possible 
objections from the likes of Plato and Richard Rorty. My 
hope is that such contrasts allow the power of Emerson’s 
position to appear in starker relief. I think the same 
might result from another contrast, though this one 
involves one of Emerson’s strongest readers, Stanley 
Cavell. In particular, I want to use Emerson’s career-long 
affirmation of poetry to resist Cavell’s efforts to set 
Emerson along a continuum shared by Wittgenstein’s 
pronouncement in section 116 of Philosophical 
Investigations, namely that: “What we do is lead/bring 
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[führen] words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use.”
71
 
 
Cavell connects Emerson’s thought to section 116 of 
Philosophical Investigations in several places.
72
 I find the 
richest connection in the “Introduction” to Conditions 
Handsome and Unhandsome. 
 
Wittgenstein’s return of words to their everyday 
use may be said to return words to the actual life 
of language in a life momentarily freed of 
illusion; Emerson’s return of words may be said 
to return them to the life of language, to 
language and life transfigured, as an eventual 
everyday.
73
  
 
What strikes me as odd is the perceived analogy 
between (1) a return to the “actual life of language,” 
what Wittgenstein names their Heim, their home, which 
he casts in terms of the everyday, the alltäglich, and (2) 
a return to the “life of language,” what in Emerson’s 
terms can only be the whole, and thus a good deal more 
than language, as we have seen, though one should also 
note that for Emerson, the poet “has no definitions, but 
he is commanded by nature, by the living power which 
he feels to be there present.”
74
 But even setting aside 
Cavell’s presumption regarding life and language, I don’t 
see how the “life of language” on Emerson’s terms can 
be thought in terms of the everyday uses that 
                                                 
71
 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). To be clear, my 
resistance is not to the whole of Cavell’s reading; far 
from it, as my Emerson and Self-Culture makes clear. 
Cavell’s feel for Emerson’s non-conformist, revisionary 
writings, like Poirier’s feel for Emerson’s punning, is 
exemplary. 
72
 I know of five: Postscript A to “Being Odd, Getting 
Even,” in: In Quest of the Ordinary Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 130-136; “Finding as Founding: 
Taking Steps in Emerson’s ‘Experience’,” in: This New Yet 
Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after 
Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 
pp. 77-118; the “Introduction” to Conditions Handsome 
and Unhandsome (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990), pp. 1-32; “Aversive Thinking” from the same 
volume (pp. 33-63);  and “Emerson’s Constitutional 
Amending,” in: Philosophical Passages: Wittgensetin, 
Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1995), pp. 192-214.  
73
 Cavell, “Introduction,” p. 21 – emphases added. 
74
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 454. 
Wittgenstein presents as the home of philosophical 
terms like knowledge, being, object, I, sentence, name, 
etc. I say this because Emerson repeatedly presents the 
poet as abandoning conventional usages. “His mastery 
of his native tongue was more than to use as well as any 
before,” Emerson says of Milton; “he cast it into new 
forms. He uttered in it things unheard before.”
75
 And all 
to the good since everyday usage often fails to keep 
pace with souls that become – “the experience of each 
new age requires a new confession, and the world seems 
always waiting for its poet.”
76
  
 
Now, one might recall me to Emerson fondness for the 
low and the common, to use the language of “The 
American Scholar,” or to his observation in “The Poet” 
that the “meaner the type by which a spiritual law is 
expressed, the more pungent it is, and the more lasting 
in the memories of men.”
77
 Fair enough, but these mean 
types are not left in the hands of everyday usage, hence 
Emerson’s insistence that the person of “poetic 
temperament … delights in this victory of genius over 
custom.”
78
 In short, I think poetry names an event that 
transgresses the dictates of everyday usage in a manner 
that is difficult to square with Wittgenstein’s language of 
“everyday” and “home.” And one sees this in Pinsky’s 
poem “Shirt.” The poem transforms our sense of “shirt,” 
turning the word and the clothes we wear into allegories 
of global labor, alienated labor, and the history of 
exploitation that haunts the garment industry. But it 
does not do so by returning the word to any everyday 
meaning. Now, to be fair, achievements like Pinsky’s may 
underwrite an “eventual everyday,” which is to say, they 
may transform us (to recall Cavell’s gloss of Emerson), 
but again, the how of this transformation seems to have 
little in common with the labor of returning 
philosophically twisted words to their home in ordinary 
language. 
                                                 
75
 Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Volume I, p. 153. 
76
 Emerson, Essays and Poems, p. 450. 
77
 Ibid., p. 545. 
78
Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Volume I, p. 346. 
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Emerson’s “The Poet” is a rich and remarkable essay and 
his occasionally wild affirmation of poetic figuration is 
provocative and instructive to those willing to track its 
celebrations and aversions. Of late, the theme and the 
essay have been eclipsed by essays like “Experience,” 
which square more easily, at least initially, with a 
generation willing to live with the masters of suspicion 
and their fiercest heirs. Buell does devote an entire 
chapter of Emerson to “poetics,” but his discussion 
strongly favors the self-interrupting style that 
characterizes “Experience,”
79
 as does Richard Deming’s 
Listening on all Sides, which claims that Emerson’s 
poetics “enact a constitutive skepticism.”
80
 I hope I have 
managed to provide a broader expanse for the more 
affirmative dimensions of Emerson’s thought, one in 
which  they can soar more freely. 
                                                 
79
 See Buell, Emerson. 
80
 Deming, Listening, p. 4. 
In another context, or in a larger one, it would be nice to 
bring “The Poet” into dialogue with “Experience,” first by 
showing how the affirmations of “The Poet” occur in the 
fifth section of “Experience” (though I more or less do 
this in the fifth chapter of Emerson and Self-Culture), and 
then by arguing that “The Poet” only offers what 
“Experience” relentlessly works to embrace – that we 
“thrive by casualties,” that the life of a fragment essayed 
from a fragment of self-knowledge is still a life of 
possibilities well worth essaying. But that is not the 
context of this essay and thus I’ll let Emerson have the 
final word in a passage that, flush with the cordiality of 
Hafiz, offers a voice re-attached to the whole. 
 
An air of sterility, of incompetence to their 
proper aims, belongs to many who have both 
experience and wisdom. But a large utterance, a 
river that makes its own shores, quick perception 
and corresponding expression, a constitution to 
which every morrow is a new day, which is equal 
to the needs of life, at once tender and bold, 
with great arteries – this generosity of ebb and 
flow satisfies, and we should be willing to die 
when our time comes, having had our swing and 
gratification.
81
 
  
                                                 
81
 Emerson, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Volume VIII, pp. 131-132. 
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Tim Milnes 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past twenty years or so, debates surrounding 
the relationship between romanticism and pragmatism 
have opened up two particularly interesting avenues of 
inquiry. First, literary critics and intellectual historians 
have explored the possibility that the romantic period 
itself fostered a kind of proto-pragmatism.
1
 Secondly, 
philosophers and theorists have thoroughly – and not 
always sympathetically – scrutinized Richard Rorty’s 
interest in, and use of romantic themes and ideas.
2
 This 
essay is, in part, an attempt to draw these lines of 
research together. Rorty himself was careful to 
distinguish between two distinct romanticisms: a 
                                                 
1
 See Russell B. Goodman, American Philosophy and the 
Romantic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Jerome Christensen, Romanticism at the 
End of History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000); Paul Hamilton, Metaromanticism: 
Aesthetics, Literature, Theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003); Tim Milnes, The Truth about 
Romanticism: Pragmatism and Idealism in Keats, Shelley, 
Coleridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
2
 See Kathleen Wheeler, Romanticism, Pragmatism and 
Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Richard 
Eldridge, The Persistence of Romanticism: Essays in 
Philosophy and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Thomas Claviez, ‘Pragmatism, 
Critical Theory, and the Search for Ecological 
Genealogies in American Culture,’ in: Pragmatism and 
Literary Studies, vol. 15 of REAL: The Yearbook of 
Research in English and American Literature, ed. 
Winfried Fluck (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1999), pp. 
343-380. For less sympathetic commentary, see Nancy 
Fraser, ‘Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty between 
Romanticism and Technocracy,’ in: Consequences of 
Theory, eds. Jonathan Arac and Barbara Johnson 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 
93-110; Joan C. Williams, ‘Rorty, Radicalism, 
Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze,’ in: A Pragmatist’s 
Progress? Richard Rorty and American Intellectual 
History, ed. John Pettegrew (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 61-84; Terry 
Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 
p. 56. 
‘German’ tradition of metaphysical idealism and an 
‘English’ tradition of literary nature-worship.
3
 
Foregrounding the latter, in this essay I shall compare 
Rorty’s ‘privatised’ romanticism to Habermas’s notion of 
the romantic aesthetic as a mediator between reflective 
thought and everyday communication. What emerges 
from this is a view of aesthetic engagement as not only 
essential to the worldview of ‘romantic’ writers 
generally, but also as incorporating a form of 
pragmatism avant la lettre. Under the sign of the 
‘Literary Absolute,’ aesthetic engagement engenders a 
performative kind of writing, which, for a writer such as 
Wordsworth, undermines the boundaries between 
private and public, literature and philosophy.  
 
Rorty on Romanticism 
 
Broadly characterised, the sort of romanticism that Rorty 
prefers is the independent, muscular variety celebrated 
by his literary mentor, Harold Bloom.
4
 Throughout his 
career, Rorty embraced a number of ideas and attitudes 
associated with Bloom’s picture of the romantic poet as 
engaged in a dialectical struggle for articulacy and 
autonomy. Rorty’s romantic watchwords, accordingly, 
are imagination, spontaneity, freedom, contingency, 
plurality, power, and creativity – ideas that he pits 
against notions such as reason, receptivity, truth, 
necessity, commensurability, knowledge, and harmony. 
Most important, perhaps, is the notion of truth as 
created rather than discovered, enabled by the romantic 
inversion of the values assigned by Kant to the 
determinative and the reflective judgement in the third 
                                                 
3
 Richard Rorty, ‘Romanticism to Pragmatism: Notes for 
Introductory Lecture,’ Richard Rorty Born Digital Files. 
<http://ucispace.lib.uci.edu/handle/10575/158> 
(accessed June 11 2010). 
4
 See Richard Rorty, ‘Letter to Michael Lind,’ June 8, 
1998. Richard Rorty Born Digital Files, 1988-2003. 
UCIspace, University of California at Irvine, 
<http://ucispace.lib.uci.edu/handle/10575/90> 
(accessed June 11 2010): ‘As a fervent disciple of Harold 
Bloom, I think that something new and wonderful came 
into the world with the Romantics, and so I find your 
view that “literature ... is a matter of decorum, rituals, 
traditions, allusions” disturbingly Eliotic.’ 
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Critique.
5
 According to Rorty, by reconfiguring Kant’s 
cognitive, determinative judgement as that which 
merely produces agreement, and reflective, lawless 
judgement as paradigm-shifting spontaneity, 
romanticism ‘inaugurated an era in which we gradually 
came to appreciate the historical role of linguistic 
innovation.’
6
  
 
In later work, Rorty connected this movement to a 
broader nineteenth-century shift away from 
foundationalist ‘metaphysical comfort’ and towards a 
future-directed sense of ‘historical hope,’ in which poets 
follow Percy Shelley’s call to become the legislators of 
social progress.
7
 Shelley’s writing encapsulates the 
secular utopianism that Rorty finds the most valuable 
element in the romantic elevation of poetical awe and 
sublimity over philosophical harmony and beauty. In this 
way, romantic enthusiasm becomes the opponent of 
Enlightenment and postmodern knowingness. It also 
partakes of Hegel’s temporalisation of truth. On Rorty’s 
reading, Shelley recommends that we poetically forget 
about the relation between eternity and time, between 
unconditioned truth and contingency, and instead 
‘concentrate on the relation between the human 
present and the human future.’
8
 Among the important 
corollaries of this exchange, Rorty believes, are the idea 
of ‘freedom as the recognition of contingency’ and what 
he calls ‘romantic polytheism,’ the romantics’ Hellenistic 
rejection of the Hebraic-Enlightenment notion of a 
universal standard against which all human values 
should be measured.
9
 
                                                 
5
 See Richard Rorty, ‘Nineteenth-Century Idealism and 
Twentieth-Century Textualism,’ in: Consequences of 
Pragmatism. Essays: 1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 142-143. 
6
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 52. 
7
 Richard Rorty, ‘Afterword: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and 
Postmodernism,’ in: Philosophy and Social Hope 
(Penguin Books, 1999), p. 263. 
8
 Richard Rorty, ‘Emancipating our Culture,’ in: Debating 
the State of Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty and 
Kolakowski, ed. Jozef Niznik and John T. Sanders 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 25. 
9
 See Rorty, Contingency, p. 26, and idem, ‘Pragmatism 
as Romantic Polytheism,’ in: Philosophy as Cultural 
Romantic idealism, however, troubles Rorty. What is 
useful about the romantic claim that truth is made 
rather than found, he cautions, is the idea ‘that 
languages are made rather than found, and that truth is 
a property of linguistic entities, of sentences.’
10
 Thus, 
while he claims that both romanticism and pragmatism 
are the rebellious offspring of the Enlightenment, united 
as ‘reactions against the idea that there is something 
non-human out there with which human beings need to 
get in touch,’ Rorty objects to Coleridge’s replacement of 
analytic reason with the numinous imagination as the 
‘decoder’ of truth.
11
 Kant’s Copernican revolution, ‘the 
idea that we receive but what we give,’ means not, as 
Coleridge suggests, that we are God-like creators of ideal 
Truth, but that we should dispense with the idea of 
‘Truth’ as something to which our beliefs must 
correspond.
12
 Rorty advocates jettisoning the 
‘philosophical bad faith’ of  transcendental argument, or 
argument by way of necessary presuppositions, in favour 
of a narrative of human change according to which 
forms of normativity evolve through contingent and 
linguistic processes.
13
 However, ‘[t]his road couldn’t be 
taken until Darwin and later thought helped us get rid of 
the idea of “Mind” and substituted “Language” – 
substituted Words for Ideas.’
14
 Pragmatism really sets 
out from Darwinian naturalism, from a picture of human 
beings as evolutionary accidents.  
 
Rorty has a further agenda here. By embracing 
naturalism, he hopes to distinguish his own work from 
postmodern appropriations of romantic ideas, many of 
                                                                       
Politics: Philosophical Papers Volume 4 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 29. 
10
 Rorty, Contingency, p. 7. 
11
 Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism and Romanticism,’ in: 
Philosophy as Cultural Politics, p. 105. 
12
 Rorty, ‘Romanticism to Pragmatism.’ 
13
 See Richard Rorty, ‘Is Derrida a Transcendental 
Philosopher?’ in: Essays on Heidegger and Others: 
Philosophical Papers Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). Here, Rorty refers to 
transcendental argument as a Kantian ‘gimmick’ that 
encourages the thinker to take ‘so many leaps into the 
darkness which surrounds the totality of everything 
previously illuminated’ (p. 123). 
14
 Rorty, ‘Romanticism to Pragmatism.’ 
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which he sees, like Habermas, as perpetuating romantic 
idealism by transcendentally hypostatising others of 
reason.
15
 Thinking seriously about the self as constituted 
by intersubjectivity demands that we abandon the 
notion of an ‘outside’ of thought, an unthought. From 
this perspective, Derrida’s ‘trace’ and other attempts to 
think the unthinkable are simply rehashing romantic 
sublimity, functioning as ‘the name of the Ineffable, of 
what can be shown but not said, believed but not 
known, presupposed but not mentioned, that in which 
we move and have our being.’
16
 Romantic ‘sublimity’ and 
‘depth,’ taken in this way, make Rorty suspicious. He 
sees himself as arguing on behalf of reform rather than 
revolution, for the beauty of intersubjectivity rather than 
the sublimity of incommensurable phrase-regimes. 
Following Davidson, he maintains that ‘[f]rom a 
Darwinian point of view, there is simply no way to give 
sense to the idea of our minds or our language as 
systematically out of phase with what lies beyond our 
skins.’
17
  
 
All of this leads Rorty to distinguish between two 
romanticisms: one dangerous (or, at best, useless), and 
one useful. The first is metaphysical, hypostatising and 
‘deep,’ using imagination as a stand-in for reason in the 
creation of ideal Truth; the second is playful, metaphoric 
and utopian, celebrating imaginative power as the 
                                                 
15
 See Richard Rorty, ‘Grandeur, Profundity, and 
Finitude,’ in: Philosophy as Cultural Politics: ‘Berlin, like 
Dewey, recognized that the Platonist hope of speaking 
with an authority that is not merely that of a certain 
time and place had survived within the bosom of 
romanticism, and engendered what Habermas calls 
“others of reason.”’ The most important of these, Rorty 
claims, is the infinite, figured by terms such as ‘depth’ 
and ‘profundity’: ‘Depth does not produce agreement, 
but for romantics it trumps agreement’ (pp. 83-84). 
16
 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An 
Essay on Derrida,’ in: Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 
102. See also idem, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism,’ in:  Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. 
Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996): Because of 
his perceived transcendentalism, Rorty describes Derrida 
as ‘a sentimental, hopeful, romantically idealistic writer’ 
(p. 13). 
17
 Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, 
Ethnocentrism, and Liberalism,’ in: Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth, p. 12. 
natural engine of linguistic innovation. Maintaining this 
distinction means emphasising the possibilities of 
redescription implicit in ‘the romantic notion of man as 
self-creative,’ and downgrading the equally romantic but 
less laudable aspiration that the vocabulary for that 
redescription be final, grounded in the noncontingent 
foundations of a ‘transcendental constitution.’
18
 
Outmanoeuvring romantic idealism, in short, means 
embracing ‘romantic utilitarianism.’
19
  
 
In turn, Rorty’s ironic, ‘romantic utilitarianism’ involves 
the separation of private and public spheres. It involves 
dropping ‘the assumption, shared by Plato and Foucault, 
that there is a deep philosophical connection between 
private intellect and public behaviour.’
20
 The idea that 
one must lead a pure and unified life, Rorty maintains, is 
an unwelcome hangover from Christianity, ‘the quest for 
purity of heart – the attempt to will one thing – gone 
rancid.’
21
 Rorty accordingly celebrates romanticism, 
elitism, innovation, and sublimity in private and defends 
liberalism, democracy, reform, hope and beauty in 
public. But he denies that there is any connection 
between these attitudes. Indeed, he claims, public 
romanticism is rarely a good thing, since it is ‘when a 
Romantic intellectual begins to want his private self to 
serve as a model for other human beings that his politics 
                                                 
18
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 358. 
19
 Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,’ p. 27. In 
his ‘Notes on Impressions of Kloppenberg,’ Rorty writes: 
‘“Pragmatism as Romantic Utilitarianism” means 
something like: (a) the utilitarians were right that 
nothing matters except human needs and human 
suffering (b) we have to expand our conception of what 
counts as a human need ... so as to make sure that past 
practices don’t get in the way of a Romantic future (c) 
there is a utopian goal of Human Freedom to be attained 
at the End of History, but what that utopia will look like 
cannot be formulated in advance ... It will be attained 
experimentally, and will always recede before us.’ 
(Richard Rorty Born Digital Files,  
<http://ucispace.lib.uci.edu/handle/10575/766> 
(accessed June 11, 2010). 
20
 Richard Rorty, ‘Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: 
The Case of Foucault,’ in: Essays on Heidegger and 
Others, pp. 196-197. 
21
 Richard Rorty, ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,’ in: 
Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 
1999), p. 13. 
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tend to become antiliberal.’
22
 Instead, he maintains, 
private aesthetic self-creation and public justice should 
be treated as two different kinds of tools, ‘as little in 
need of synthesis as are paintbrushes and crowbars.’
23
 
 
Rorty and Habermas 
 
Rorty’s private/public distinction has proved 
controversial, with some arguing that it is at best 
unnecessary, and at worst out of step with his broader 
advocacy of playfulness and irony.
24
 Rorty himself 
admitted to never quite having ‘found a satisfactory way 
of reconciling my admiration for the romantic 
intellectual with the habits of a democratic society,’ 
conceding that Contingency, Irony and Solidarity ‘doesn’t 
do justice to the interplay between public and private.’
25
 
                                                 
22
 Rorty, ‘Moral Identity and Private Autonomy,’ p. 194. 
23
 Rorty, Contingency, p. xiv. 
24
 See especially Nancy Fraser, ‘Solidarity or Singularity?’ 
Fraser claims that the struggle between ‘a Romantic 
impulse and a pragmatic impulse’ (p. 94) – i.e. between a 
liberal pragmatism and the romantic ‘impulse that thrills 
to the sublimity of metaphor,’ is never satisfactorily 
resolved in Rorty’s work (p. 96). Kathleen Wheeler 
accuses Rorty in Romanticism, Pragmatism and 
Deconstruction of having ‘gotten stuck’ in a dualism 
between individual and community that his mentor 
Dewey managed to avoid (p. 280, n.9). Wheeler follows 
Derrida, who rejects Rorty’s application of the 
public/private distinction to his own work (see Rorty, 
‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,’ pp. 78-
80). See also Sterling Lynch, ‘Romantic Longings, Moral 
Ideals, and Democratic Priorities: On Richard Rorty’s Use 
of the Distinction Between the Private and the Public,’ 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 15, no. 
1 (2007), pp. 97-120. Lynch argues that the 
private/public separation is unnecessary and 
inconsistent with the rest of Rorty’s thought, since 
‘without the brute application of equal, competing, and 
a priori claims about moral priority, Rorty’s moral 
problem will not arise’ (p. 104). For a defence of the 
distinction, see Günter Leypoldt, ‘Uses of Metaphor: 
Richard Rorty’s Literary Criticism and the Poetics of 
World-Making,’ New Literary History, vol. 39, no. 1 
(2008), pp. 145-163. Even Leypoldt, however, defends 
the distinction on the grounds that it is not a dichotomy. 
On the contrary, he claims, for Rorty, sublime ‘literary 
world-making’ and ‘the sort of empathetic identification 
that encourages human solidarity’ are ‘noncompetitive 
goods that should not be ranked within a single 
hierarchy of literary or narrative functions ...’ (p. 156). 
25
 Richard Rorty, ‘Letter to Jacques Bouveresse, 3 Feb. 
1992,’ Richard Rorty Born Digital Files,  
One way in which Rorty attempts to explore this 
‘interplay’ is by introducing the idea that we should 
exchange the ‘romance and idealistic hopes’ of the 
pursuit of objective truth for ‘a rhetoric that 
romanticizes the pursuit of intersubjective, unforced 
agreement among larger and larger groups of 
interlocutors.’
26
 We should, he suggests, be romantic 
enthusiasts in promoting solidarity rather than idealists 
in obtaining objectivity. To the question: what is the 
normative basis of ‘should’ in this imperative? Rorty’s 
reply is: we are. By generating our own forms of validity, 
we romantically create the norms by which we judge, 
and are judged.  
 
There remains, however, an important difference 
between romanticising solidarity and hypostatising the 
unconditioned. We make progress, Rorty maintains, ‘by 
our lights ... But when we hypostatize the adjective 
“true” into “Truth” and ask about our relation to it, we 
have absolutely nothing to say.’
27
 Instead, truth must be 
explained within a naturalistic framework. To be a 
‘naturalist’ in Rorty’s sense is not to privilege scientific or 
materialist accounts of causality; on the contrary, it 
simply involves refusing to ‘divide things up into those 
which are what they are independent of context and 
those which are context-dependent.’
28
 By 
accommodating pluralism in this way, ‘holism takes the 
curse off naturalism.’
29
 
 
From the 1980s onwards, Rorty engaged in a series of 
debates with other pragmatist thinkers over the 
coherence and consequences of his own brand of 
                                                                       
<http://ucispace.lib.uci.edu/handle/10575/71> 
(accessed June 11, 2010). 
26
 Richard Rorty, ‘Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald 
Davidson Versus Crispin Wright,’ in: Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 41. 
27
 Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction’ to Truth and Progress, p. 
4. 
28
 Richard Rorty, ‘Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-
Dualist Account of Interpretation,’ in: Objectivity, p. 98. 
29
 Ibid., p. 109. 
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‘holistic’ naturalism.
30
 Among his many interlocutors, 
Jürgen Habermas criticised the attempt to eliminate 
even the presupposition of context-independent truth 
from dialogue. Rorty’s naturalism, Habermas argues, 
fails to distinguish between the reflexivity of 
philosophical discourse, which suspends the 
preconditions of everyday thought, and the dialogue of 
the ‘lifeworld,’ for which a concept of objective truth is a 
necessary precondition. Naturalist or deflationary 
theories of truth are fine for reflective thinking, 
Habermas maintains, but ‘in everyday life we cannot 
survive with hypotheses alone, that is, in a persistently 
fallibilist way.’
31
 Consequently, any pragmatic account of 
truth must accommodate ‘the entwining of the two 
different pragmatic roles played by the Janus-faced 
concept of truth in action-contexts and in rational 
discourses respectively.’
32
 It is possible to preserve a 
notion of the absoluteness of truth within a pragmatic 
account of the speech-act situation without falling prey 
to the perils of hypostatisation. 
 
Rorty rejects this, countering that while it is possible to 
use idealisations in the same way that ‘admirers of Plato 
have used ... hypostatizations—Beauty, Goodness, and 
Rightness ... the point of telling such stories is unclear.’
33
 
He is perplexed by Habermas’s reluctance to embrace a 
playful romantic irony: ‘Romanticism,’ he notes, ‘seems 
to make Habermas nervous.’
34
 In Habermas’s picture of 
truth as ‘Janus-faced,’ alternating between system and 
lifeworld, Rorty detects the vestiges of an essentially 
religious worldview, a yearning for an encounter with a 
nonhuman reality. Habermas, on the other hand, is 
puzzled by Rorty’s refusal to acknowledge ‘the 
pragmatic dimension’ played by normativity in ‘a 
particular deployment of the [truth] predicate.’ This 
aversion to a strong notion of context-independent truth 
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 See especially the exchanges in Rorty and his Critics, 
ed. Robert Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 
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 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,’ in: Rorty 
and his Critics, pp. 43-44. 
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 Rorty, ‘Introduction’ to Truth and Progress, p. 4. 
34
 Richard Rorty, ‘Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions 
of Philosophy,’ in: Truth and Progress, p. 311. 
is still more surprising, Habermas claims, when one 
realises that, in the notion of ‘solidarity,’ or extending 
the circle of dialogue and agreement, even Rorty 
smuggles a ‘weak idealization into play.’
35
 This in turn 
Habermas links to what he sees as a ‘Platonist 
motivation’ behind Rorty’s outright rejection of any 
notion of unconditionality, a nostalgia for youthful 
idealism.
36
 Even in Rorty’s work, he suggests, 
hypostatisation is not without its uses.  
 
Romanticism and Pragmatism 
 
Lurking behind the Rorty / Habermas debate on truth is 
a disagreement within neopragmatism over the legacy of 
romanticism. Rorty sets his romanticism at the level of 
‘least common denominator’: creative, playful, future-
oriented.
37
 The aesthetic domain for Rorty is governed 
by ‘play’ only because it is securely privatised. 
Consequently, he sees Habermas as both too romantic 
(i.e. too transcendental and ‘deep’) in his hypostatising 
of truth and not sufficiently romantic (i.e. not ironic) in 
his resistance to the role of play in human discourse. 
Viewed another way, however, Habermas’s romanticism 
can be seen as playful precisely because it embodies the 
predicament of being between private and public 
spheres, between a recognition of truth as a human 
fiction and truth as the precondition of communication. 
For Habermas, accordingly, Rorty is both too romantic 
(i.e. secretly nostalgic and homesick) in his rejection of 
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 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,’ p. 51. 
36
 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘“...And to define America, her 
Athletic Democracy”: The Philosopher and the Language 
Shaper; In Memory of Richard Rorty,’ New Literary 
History, vol. 39, no. 1 (2008), pp. 3-12. Habermas 
observes that ‘[t]here is a streak of nostalgia about 
claiming to offer a philosophy that cleans up with all 
extant philosophy ...’ (p. 8). See also Michael Fischer, 
‘Redefining Philosophy as Literature: Richard Rorty’s 
“Defence” of Literary Culture,’ in: Reading Rorty: Critical 
Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and 
Beyond, ed. Alan Malachowski (London: Blackwell, 
1990): Fischer argues that because ‘Rorty’s definition of 
literary discourse is fundamentally negative, generated 
by the philosophical tradition that he wants to subvert,’ 
his own view of literature ‘perpetuates what he sees as 
the Platonist’s all-or-nothing outlook’ (p. 241).  
37
 Richard Rorty, ‘Rationality and Cultural Difference,’ in: 
Truth and Progress, p. 200. 
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idealism and not suitably romantic (i.e. not tolerant of 
equivocity) in his refusal to recognise the Janus-faced 
nature of the truth concept, which is both 
philosophically dubious and pragmatically indispensable.  
 
Of the two thinkers, it is Rorty who makes the 
rehabilitation of romantic ideas a key component of 
neopragmatism. Any assessment of Rorty’s romanticism, 
however, is beset by two problems. The first, perhaps 
surprisingly, is that he underestimates just how 
pragmatic the romantics already are. Until recently, it 
was still not uncommon to find critics broadly 
characterising the romantic revolt against the 
instrumental rationalism of the Enlightenment 
(Wordsworth’s ‘meddling intellect’) as the idealisation of 
the ‘other’ of reason in the shape of the creative 
imagination. Romanticism, according to this picture, 
reacts against the reification of truth as object by 
producing, in turn, its own hypostatisation in the form of 
aesthetic plenitude. Accepting this narrative, Rorty 
remains concerned that insofar as they tried to say 
something ‘about’ truth, the romantics (particularly 
English, ‘nature-worshipping’ ones) were guilty of 
unnecessary and sometimes mischievous 
hypostatisation.  
 
The main difficulty with this picture is that it disregards 
the relationship between the newly-forged concept of 
the aesthetic and the Enlightenment-romantic discourse 
of communicative reason. Habermas describes how early 
nineteenth-century culture develops a language of 
decentred, communicative rationality that forms a 
‘counterdiscourse’ to the reifying tendencies of both 
empiricism and idealism. As I have argued elsewhere, in 
Britain this counterdiscourse emerges from a number of 
sources within linguistic and anthropological currents in 
late eighteenth-century empiricism.
38
 Foremost amongst 
these were Thomas Reid’s hermeneutics of perception, 
John Horne Tooke’s linguistic deflation of ‘Truth’ and 
Jeremy Bentham’s understanding of the role played by 
                                                 
38
 See Tim Milnes, The Truth about Romanticism, chapter 
2. 
‘logical fictions’ in everyday communication. In 
developments such as these one finds a shift away from 
mentalism and representationalism and towards an 
interest in how beliefs are justified through norms 
embedded in the communicative practices of 
communities. This linguistic and proto-pragmatic turn is 
incorporated into the work of writers such as Coleridge, 
Shelley and Keats, where it re-emerges as the immanent 
critique of their own habits of idealism.
39
 Rorty’s 
conversational pragmatism is prefigured in romanticism, 
then, but not in the way that he supposes. As David 
Simpson has argued, Rorty’s idea of truth as 
‘conversation’ can be traced back to an eighteenth-
century intellectual culture that elevated 
nonprofessionalism and politeness, ultimately feeding 
romantic conceptions of creativity, authorship, and the 
‘literary.’
40
 The English romantics, in turn, reconstruct 
Enlightenment ideas of conversation, extending the 
public and dialogical mode of a writer like Pope inwards, 
so that the Lockean, punctual self itself becomes 
dialogical, exposed to the same ‘conversations’ that 
shape communities. 
 
Unlike Rorty, however, Coleridge and Wordsworth 
maintain a concern with the role played by 
transcendental conditions embedded in the pragmatics 
of communication. This brings us to the second problem 
with Rorty’s romanticism, which is that Rorty appears to 
strip romanticism of what makes it distinctive as an 
intellectual force in the first place: the idea of aesthetic 
engagement with the world and with other people. 
What is at stake in the romantic idea of the aesthetic is 
Kant’s redescription of the thing-in-itself as a purely 
regulative category. The impossibility of reconciling the 
finite with the infinite, the conditioned with the 
unconditioned, produces romantic equivocity as truth 
becomes, in Habermas’s terms, ‘Janus-faced’, 
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 This form of critique is what Paul Hamilton aptly terms 
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 David Simpson, The Academic Postmodern and the 
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University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 47. 
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unknowable and yet always presupposed. Being in two 
minds about truth in this way drives the romantic 
interest in the aesthetic as mediator between everyday 
communicative practices and their transcendental 
conditions. This in turn means bringing private and 
public spheres, imagination and reason, literature and 
philosophy, into free play. For writers such as Schiller, 
Coleridge and Friedrich Schlegel, such free play does not 
occur outside the aesthetic; it is the aesthetic process 
itself. Romantic aesthetic mediation emerges as a form 
of self-critique rather than hypostasis, elevating, as 
Habermas puts it, the ‘body-centred experiences of a 
decentred subjectivity that function as the placeholders 
for the other of reason.’
41
  
 
Herein lies the romantic challenge to philosophy: to see 
itself as exhausted in artistic activity, what Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy term the ‘Literary 
Absolute.’ By declaring that ‘[t]he actual infinite is the 
infinity of the work of art,’ romanticism designates the 
work in progress as the ‘infinite truth of the work’ and 
invents the genre of ‘Literature’ as the interplay of 
spontaneity and reflection, poetry and philosophy.
42
 
Lying indeterminately between a thing and an act, the 
aesthetic process is always becoming, which is another 
way of saying that it is always performed.
43
 This notion 
of performativity, essential to romantic writers as the 
basis of an aesthetic means of overcoming contradiction, 
is inimical to pragmatists committed to dismissing 
contradiction. Consequently, Rorty’s private ironism 
bears little resemblance to that of Coleridge and 
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Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
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 See, for example, Angela Esterhammer, The Romantic 
Performative: Language and Action in British and 
German Romanticism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000). Esterhammer observes that for Coleridge, 
‘the verb “to be”’ functions ‘as a verb-substantive, thus 
as both an act and a state – and thus as a phenomenon 
that resembles becoming or even performance’ (p. 8). 
Schlegel, for whom the ironic or performative features of 
aesthetic objects testify to an ineffable encounter with 
the unconditioned.
44
 And yet, when Rorty attempts to 
evade dangerous hypostatisations in his own work by 
privatising the imagination, he transforms the romantic 
idea of the aesthetic, the very point of which was to 
mediate between the finite and infinite, between 
everyday pragmatism and regulative idealism, beyond 
recognition. While Rorty alternates betwen his romantic 
and naturalistic sides, the romantics mediate: since the 
Absolute is fundamentally ‘literary’, to think at all is to 
aestheticise. Only by understanding how the romantic 
idea of the aesthetic relates to absoluteness can we 
understand why the romantics write in the way that they 
do, that is, performatively.  
 
Rorty and Wordsworth 
 
At this point I should make it clear that none of this 
necessarily implies that Rorty’s romantic utilitarianism is 
a bad idea, merely that it trades on a bad idea of 
romanticism. Nor is the point that Rorty’s conception of 
romanticism is partial (that much he admits) but that in 
stripping the aesthetic imagination of its power to 
engage with a public world, Rorty stretches the idea of 
‘romanticism’ beyond breaking point. In order to 
illustrate this, I would like finally and briefly to compare 
two ‘romantic’ autobiographical narratives. The first is 
Rorty’s own. In his essay, ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,’ 
Rorty recounts how his upbringing by Trotskyite parents 
led him to view his non-political, ‘private, weird, 
snobbish, incommunicable interests’ with unease, 
particularly his enthusiasm for wild orchids. He recalls 
how the romantic poetry of Wordsworth and Yeats 
inspired him in the attempt to synthesise his sense of 
political duty with his botanical pursuits: 
 
                                                 
44
 See Adam Carter, ‘“Self-Creation and Self-
Destruction”: Irony, Ideology, and Politics in Richard 
Rorty and Friedrich Schlegel,’ Parallax, vol. 4, no. 4 
(1998), pp. 21-40. Carter maintains that by failing to 
heed Schlegel’s account of irony as the ‘dialectic of self-
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I wanted to find some intellectual or aesthetic 
framework which would let me – in a thrilling 
phrase which I came across in Yeats – ‘hold 
reality and justice in a single vision’. By reality I 
meant, more or less, the Wordsworthian 
moments in which, in the woods around 
Flatbrookville (and especially in the presence of 
certain coralroot orchids, and of the smaller 
yellow lady slipper), I had felt touched by 
something numinous, something of ineffable 
importance.
45
 
 
The young Rorty was rescued from his dilemma by 
reading Hegel’s Phenomenology, whose historicism 
taught him (once he had been immunized against 
pantheism by Dewey) a ‘cheerful commitment to 
irreducible temporality’
46
 and thus that ‘there is no need 
to weave one’s personal equivalent of Trotsky and one’s 
personal equivalent of my wild orchids together.’
47
 The 
adult Rorty’s solution to the paradox of Trotsky and the 
wild orchids, then, was to privatise his romantic 
enthusiasms. This involves ‘accepting that what matters 
most to you may well be something that may never 
matter much to most people ... But that is no reason to 
be ashamed of, or downgrade, or try to slough off, your 
Wordsworthian moments.’
48
 
 
Rorty’s use of the term ‘Wordsworthian moments’ is 
suggestive, particularly in light of the poet’s own 
association of flowers with epiphanic and renovating 
‘spots of time’ recovered through the ‘inward eye’ of 
memory and imagination. Closer inspection, however, 
reveals that Wordsworth’s relationship with evocative 
flora bears little resemblance to Rorty’s. Take, for 
example, the memorable appearance of the pansy in 
‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’, which confirms the 
poet’s deep sense of loss:  
 
The Pansy at my feet 
Doth the same tale repeat: 
Whither is fled the visionary gleam? 
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?  
(54-57)
49
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 Text from William Wordsworth, Poems, in Two 
Volumes, and Other Poems, 1800-1807, ed. Jared Curtis 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 272. 
Wordsworth chooses his flower with care. Traditionally 
likened to the human face, the pansy, whose name 
derives from the French term pensée, has a long 
association in Western culture with thought and 
memory – key themes in Wordsworth’s narratives of loss 
and recovery. Thus, in the ‘Intimations’ ode, the pansy 
echoes the forms of nature that ‘speak of something 
that is gone’ (53). As Paul de Man claims, however, 
images of plant life in romantic poetry generally carry 
the heavy (for de Man, impossible) burden of 
symbolically binding being and truth, metaphor and 
meaning, in an organic unity.
50
 The romantic plant 
promises to overcome contingency and temporality; 
hence the numinous power of those suspended 
‘moments.’ In the particular case of the ‘Intimations’ 
Ode, the flower offers the narrator the prospect of 
recovering a ‘visionary’ unity by reminding him of what 
he has lost since childhood. At the same time, the face of 
the flower suggests an interlocutor, an equivalent centre 
of self, and thus the possibility of dialogue. Seen this 
way, Wordsworth’s pansy is a metaphor for 
metaphoricity, signifying the dependence of ‘face-to-
face’ conversation upon an act of imaginative projection 
that is itself fundamentally poetic or figurative.  
 
More (much more than I can detail here) could be said 
about the role played by the pansy at this pivotal point 
in the ‘Ode.’
51
 The point I wish to make, however, is that, 
by imagining a dialogue with a corresponding form in 
nature, Wordsworth foregrounds the constitutive role of 
the aesthetic imagination in mediating one’s interaction 
with the world and with other people. From this 
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perspective, aesthetic idealisations (such as visualising 
the possibility of communication through the image of a 
pansy) and public behaviour cannot be divided. For 
Wordsworth, the relationship between the personal and 
the social is aesthetic insofar as the normative forms 
that our thoughts presuppose are shaped by complex 
relationships between sense, memory, emotion, and 
pleasure. Rorty’s flowers, by contrast, are Platonic and 
remote, detached from everyday life. Initially collector’s 
items, the wild orchids come to function to the teenaged 
Rorty as symbols of ‘moral and philosophical absolutes,’ 
insofar as they are ‘numinous, hard to find, known only 
to a chosen few.’
 52
 The pansy at Wordsworth’s feet, 
however, is more than just a private curiosity. Always 
already humanised, the communicative face of the pansy 
figures the very aestheticisation of thought (the 
figuration of the Absolute) performed by the poem itself. 
It is this aestheticisation that, for Wordsworth, makes 
conversation and thought possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued here that, insofar as they replace the 
romantic idea of an aesthetic dialectic between self and 
world with one bracketed within the private sphere, 
Rorty’s numinous ‘moments’ are far from 
‘Wordsworthian’. By privatising a notion of the aesthetic 
that is always more than merely private, Rorty throws 
the romantic baby out with the bathwater. In this 
respect, he is closer to a naturalist thinker like Hume 
than to a romantic poet like Wordsworth. Rorty might 
have accepted this claim (he described himself as a ‘neo-
Humean’).
53
 Indeed, it could be argued that all this 
demonstrates is that, in coining the term ‘romantic 
utilitarianism,’ Rorty alighted on an unhelpful adjective, 
                                                 
52
 Rorty, ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,’ p. 8. 
53
 See ‘“Relativism: Finding and Making” and 
transcription of conversation with Juergen Habermas 
and other scholars,’ Richard Rorty Born Digital Files 
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a problem solved by simply replacing ‘romantic’ with a 
less loaded descriptor, such as ‘creative’ or ‘linguistic.’ 
There is an element of truth to this: again, I am claiming 
that Rorty’s misprision of romanticism undermines not 
his neopragmatism, but merely his characterisation of 
the latter as romantic utilitarianism. That he chose to do 
so, especially when viewed in light of his wide-ranging 
writing on romanticism and pragmatism, tells us 
something interesting about his understanding of the 
relationship between the two. 
 
In particular, as I suggested at the beginning of this 
essay, it confirms that Rorty’s image of romanticism is 
fundamentally Bloomian. Like Bloom in his early work, 
Rorty’s interest in the romantics is based on notions of 
power. On this picture, the romantics are creative 
idealists committed to ‘taking the world by the throat 
and insisting that there is more to this life than we have 
ever imagined.’
 54
 And yet, while this formulation goes 
some way to explaining why Rorty preferred to keep 
romantic enthusiasms indoors, it offers a rather limited 
account of philosophical romanticism. Habermas’s work, 
by contrast, enables us to question the Bloomian model 
of the romantic imagination as centred in a powerful 
ego. What Habermas offers is an account of romantic 
aesthetics as rooted in ideas of sociability and 
conversation. Rather than relying upon hypostatised 
negations of reason, writers like Wordsworth located the 
condition of possibility for communication in a shared 
notion of truth as the unconditioned, or Absolute.  
 
Rorty, of course, rejects such transcendental narratives, 
citing Donald Davidson’s argument that ‘the very 
absoluteness of truth is a good reason for thinking “true” 
indefinable and for thinking that no theory of the nature 
of truth is possible.’
55
 Davidson, however, did not go 
quite so far as to dismiss all stories about truth as 
pointless. Just because truth is an ‘indefinable concept,’ 
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he maintains, ‘does not mean we can say nothing 
revealing about it: we can, by relating it to other 
concepts like belief, desire, cause and action. Nor does 
the indefinability of truth imply that the concept is 
mysterious, ambiguous, or untrustworthy.’
56
 Even Rorty 
is compelled to say something ‘about’ truth when he 
links its ‘absoluteness’ to its indefinability; this is one 
point, at least, upon which he and Wordsworth are in 
agreement. It is Habermas’s and Davidson’s idea of truth 
as the condition of possibility for communication that 
best reflects the philosophical accent of much romantic 
poetry. Davidson’s own recommended method ‘is to 
attempt to trace the connections between the concept 
of truth and the human attitudes and acts that give it 
body.’
57
 For Wordsworth, tracing the connections 
between ‘human attitudes and acts’ and a concept that 
is both pragmatically indispensable and theoretically 
indefinable demands a narrative technique that can 
overcome contradiction by mediating the natural and 
the Absolute. Insofar as it incorporates an awareness of 
the impossibility of this task, and thus its own figurality, 
this kind of romantic narrative is aesthetic.
58
 By 
‘conversing’ with (rather than privately idealising) 
pansies and daffodils, Wordsworth’s narratives 
aesthetically perform what cannot be sentenced without 
contradiction: the idea that the truth predicate upon 
which communication depends is both fictional and 
unconditional, figurative and absolute. In their 
persistent, obstinate engagement with the literary-
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25 (1992), pp. 149-64. 
absoluteness of truth, the romantics were more 
pragmatic than Rorty allowed. 
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I 
 
    “…the imaginative experiencing of a work of  
    literature frequently calls into being the moral  
    imagination.”  
 
    “This expansion and deepening of the student’s  
    moral awareness constitutes the education of  
    moral imagination.”  
 
        James, E. Miller, Jr. 
         “Literature and the Moral Imagination”  
 
     
    “Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature  
     and the arts helps ethics do its.”  
 
        Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism 
 
 
Having long been interested in the intersection of 
literature and morality, I have become increasingly 
intrigued upon hearing speakers at academic 
conferences make reference to Richard Rorty and his 
notion of moral progress through literature. Over the 
years I have witnessed many voices, in philosophy and 
elsewhere, skeptically deny that moral progress is ever, 
or can ever be, realized – anywhere, in any context – and 
certainly not through reading fiction. While one might 
counter by citing advances made over the last half 
century in areas such as human and civil rights or 
concern for the natural environment, what would any of 
this possibly have to do with literature? Consequently, I 
have begun to feel a need to get a clearer picture of just 
how Rorty conceives the relation between literature and 
morality, and, more specifically, what he means by moral 
progress plausibly achieved through reading novels in 
particular. Though Rorty occasionally refers to major 
philosophers as strong poets (a term borrowed from 
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 I would like to thank Christopher Voparil and Eduardo 
Mendieta for their wise counsel and helpful suggestions 
as this paper was taking shape.  
Harold Bloom), he claims not to be a very good reader of 
poetry; hence, his preference for novels, that is, for 
longer narratives in which strong characters can be 
developed.
2
 
  
There appears to be no single location where Rorty 
comprehensively lays out his broad conception of 
literature and morality. What we do have are snippets, 
morsels, developing ideas that emerge in various essays, 
sometimes returned to and elaborated further in other, 
later essays. This paper is simply an initial attempt to 
gather such ideas, notions, suggestions from a few 
limited, but essential, sources, put them together in a 
reasonably coherent fashion, and lay them down in 
hopes of painting at least an initial portrait of Rorty’s 
overall perspective or vision. Insofar as this is my first 
writing of any sort on Rorty, what follows is not intended 
to be a masterful, technical demonstration of 
philosophical or literary scholarship on Rorty. Rather it is 
a suggestive piece, in which there will be no rational 
arguments per se, or attempts to “prove” a point. In 
what I take to be a Rortyan spirit, this will rather be an 
essay that seeks to clarify and extend a philosopher’s 
views on an important and recurring topic in philosophy 
and literature. To that end, I reiterate that I am 
consciously adopting a limited focus. I do not deal 
directly with Rorty’s politics, his various challenges to 
the analytic tradition, his views on (T)truth and 
knowledge, his hopes for liberal democracy or for 
America, all terribly important subjects for Rorty studies 
generally. In addressing his ideas on morality and 
literature, these topics are, of course, unavoidably 
implicated in varying degrees, but I am content here in 
simply trying to answer the question of what Rorty 
means when he says we can achieve a measure of moral 
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progress by reading novels. His ideas on this matter are, I 
believe, generally in tune with traditional strains of 
American pragmatism, particularly leading ideas of John 
Dewey and William James, but I do not wish to make the 
question of Rorty’s understandings of pragmatism, or 
neo-pragmatism, a focal point of this work. Such would 
be another, and different, paper; indeed, the sort of 
project that numerous students of Rorty, both 
supporters and critics, have already expertly directed 
their attention to. 
  
As an initial generalization, it is fair to say that Rorty 
offers all of us (pragmatists, neo-pragmatists, 
aestheticians, literature people – inclusive of writers, 
critics, and theoreticians) a unique and challenging 
perspective, or better yet, something like a varied quilt 
of seemingly unconventional and provocative reflections 
on literature, philosophy and morality. His views are 
singular in our contemporary context, especially when 
contrasted with currently reigning “theories” of 
literature, its nature and how it works. Rorty’s views do 
not constitute a formal theory, nor are they overtly 
dogmatic. He cannot, nor does he seek to, prove the 
validity of his ideas. In a pragmatic vein he is more 
interested in whether his notions work. Are they useful 
rather than true, and do they allow for more expansive, 
generous and sympathetic reading encounters with 
literary works? Do they show persuasively how some 
literature may assist in moral progress?  
 
His preoccupation is with narratives – not theory about 
narrative – with the story and story-telling, not 
presumed arguments or principles engrained within or 
growing out of the story. Rorty, I suspect, would object 
to my use of the following words to describe his 
approach: his readings of texts strike me as, in a sense, 
“traditional” and “intuitive” in the way literature was 
perhaps read and understood in a pre-theory obsessed 
time, a period which assumes that some ideology or 
other (i.e. Marxism, psychoanalysis) or some 
philosophical development (i.e., semiotics, 
deconstruction) must be the key to unlocking the 
mysteries and deeper meaning of narratives. If pressed I 
might even say his views reflect a practical, “common 
sense” (another phrase he likely would resist) approach 
to fiction, implying simply the way in which any reader 
quite naturally wonders about what the experience of 
reading a story, feeling and thinking about the story, 
does to her. Does it somehow change her, and, if so, in 
what ways? Instead of obsessing over whether the text 
can be fitted into, or most fruitfully interpreted by, a 
philosophical, psychological or political theory, Rorty 
would have us ask whether our readings of say American 
authors like Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Philip 
Roth or John Steinbeck afford new insight into ourselves 
and others, perhaps strengthening and expanding our 
appreciation of and empathy for those in need? Does 
such reading help us better comprehend our human 
social reality? Does it provide a moment for the reader 
to get inside the skin of others, namely, the strong 
characters in a story, and, for a moment, experience the 
world from their perspectives?
3
 
 
As stipulated, I will here make use of a limited number of 
Rorty essays I have found particularly helpful. Principle 
sources include “Ethics Without Principles,” “Heidegger, 
Kundera and Dickens,” “Justice As a Larger Loyalty,” and 
the lesser known “Redemption From Egotism: James and 
Proust As Spiritual Exercises.” Other helpful references 
are Consequences of Pragmatism, especially the 
“Introduction” and chapter “Is There a Problem With 
Fictional Discourse?,” and “The Inspirational Value of 
Great Works of Literature,” an appendix to Achieving 
Our Country. As for literary illustrations, Rorty’s essays 
on Nabokov and Orwell in Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity are perhaps the most pointed and well 
developed. The secondary, scholarly work of Christopher 
Voparil and Eduardo Mendieta will, also, be of 
considerable assistance in this endeavor.  
                                                 
3
 I have pursued this “inside the skin of” line of 
interpretation in previous writings, perhaps most 
notably in “Moral Experience in Of Mice and Men: 
Challenges and Reflection,” included in The Moral 
Philosophy of John Steinbeck, ed. Stephen K. George 
(Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), pp. 61-71.  
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II 
 
 In attempting to articulate Rorty’s views on the relation 
between literature and morality, it will be at first helpful 
to briefly draw a contrast with what he is definitely not 
saying. Theorists, ideologists of differing stripes, literary 
critics, advocates of religion and ethicists have all, over 
the ages, offered their own at times self-serving theories 
of literature, virtually all of them criticized or even 
rejected by Rorty.  
  
In the essay, “Redemption From Egotism,”
4
 Rorty clearly 
identifies several things that his sort of imaginative 
approach to literature is not about when it comes to 
morality. Fiction, for Rorty, ought not promote a 
religious conception of ethics or morality. It is not about 
advancing, for example, Christian or Jewish values or 
seeking, through reading, converts to such religious 
faiths. Literature does not peddle dogma any more than 
it lays out a system of religiously inspired moral do’s and 
don’ts for its readers. In fact, Rorty believes that religion 
(as well as philosophy) must be overcome in narratives. 
Contrarily, he suggests that in order to attain what 
Harold Bloom refers to as greater reader autonomy – 
readers who are more sensitive, knowledgeable, perhaps 
wiser – “the replacement of religion and philosophy by 
literature is a change for the better.”
5
 And further, when 
speaking of the differences between religious and 
literary cultures, Rorty claims that “devotional reading 
emphasizes purification, rather than enlargement, 
getting rid of distractions rather than incorporating them 
in a larger unity. Novel reading … aims at encompassing 
multitudes rather than eliminating superfluities.”
6
 As will 
be seen, for Rorty such notions as “enlargement,” 
“distractions,” “larger unity,” and “multitudes” are all 
essential to literature’s achievement of moral progress.  
                                                 
4
 Richard Rorty, “Redemption From Egotism: James and 
Proust as Spiritual Exercises,” in: The Rorty Reader, eds. 
Christopher J. Volparil and Richard J. Bernstein (West 
Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 
389-406.  
5
 Ibid., p. 390. 
6
 Ibid., p. 406. 
Imaginative narratives are, also, not about promoting a 
philosophy, ideology or particular ethical theory 
formulated by philosophers, social scientists or 
theologians. Rorty continually admonishes us to avoid 
ideology or theory in our reading of stories, and this 
includes expecting to find arguments in literary works. A 
novel simply does not, and cannot, put forth a litany of 
logical or quasi-logical arguments, just as it does not 
confirm or illustrate a particular theory or ideology. 
When Bloom advises on how to read, he points out how 
literature specialists of our time often use, for example, 
Heidegger-Derrida critiques of metaphysics or Marx-
Foucault critiques of capitalism as ideological guides that 
tell readers “what to look for when reading imaginative 
literature.” Rorty shares with Bloom the view that “the 
dominance in U.S. departments of literature first of 
‘theory’ and then of ‘cultural studies’ has made it more 
difficult for students to read well … such attempts to give 
politics or philosophy hegemony over literature diminish 
the redemptive power of works of the imagination.”
7
 
 
Likewise, Rorty’s preferred narratives steer clear of 
advocacy for particular philosophical theories of ethics. 
Literature that embraces “imaginative novelty, rather 
than argumentation … does most for the autonomy of 
the entranced reader.” While argumentative works of 
philosophy may offer novelty, and may transform a 
reader’s life in some respect, Rorty again sides with 
Bloom when he writes: “the kind of autonomy he 
[Bloom] is thinking of is primarily the sort that liberates 
one from one’s previous ways of thinking about the lives 
and fortunes of individual human beings,”
8
 thereby 
allowing for expansion of imagination and sympathy. For 
Rorty works of literature “hint rather than proclaim, 
suggest rather than argue, and offer implicit rather than 
explicit advice.”
9
 
 
Ideology, “in the sense of a set of general ideas which 
provide a context in which the reader places every book 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., p. 389. 
8
 Ibid., p. 389-390. 
9
 Ibid., p. 391. 
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she reads,” turns out to be an enemy of reader 
sensibility and autonomy. Indeed, it may well promote 
bad reading habits. An ideal reader actually hopes that 
“the next book she reads will re-contextualize all the 
books she has previously read – that she will encounter 
an authorial imagination so strong as to sweep her off 
her feet, transporting her into a world she has never 
known existed.”
10
 Just as with all the authors and 
characters she has before known, so with her real life 
family and acquaintances, all may start to look different, 
regarding their thinking, motives and actions.  
 
From the foregoing it should be evident that Rorty 
eschews any suggestion that a work of literary art seeks 
to advance a particular theory of ethics, philosophically 
or theologically conceived. Earlier we noted Rorty’s 
rejection of religion in literature. Similarly, for Rorty, 
readers or critics debase, and unduly restrict, a novel by 
assuming, for instance, that it reflects or advances 
Kantian deontology, Mill’s utilitarianism, Aristotle’s 
conception of virtue ethics, etc. Though such readings 
have often been attempted,
11
 the unfortunate outcome 
is that, in their zeal to attach every clue and nuance in 
the story to something that could be construed as like 
Kant or Mill, they overlook the obvious expansive, 
exploratory, imaginative prospects of the text. Instead of 
letting the work speak for itself and establish its own 
relations and projections, they funnel it through an 
apriori theoretical prism. They essentially beg the 
question insofar as they simply assume what they expect 
is in the work, and to no surprise, end up finding it in 
their interpretive reading. Rorty’s approach to literature 
is wholly contrary.  
 
Ethical theories are not in the narrative, and, therefore, 
narratives do not deliberately employ ethical theories to 
resolve dilemmas that arise in the course of the story. 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., p. 390. 
11
 Some clear examples include readings of the fiction of 
John Steinbeck, such as John Timmerman’s deontological 
interpretation in his “John Steinbeck: An Ethics of 
Fiction” or John J. Han’s “‘I Want to Make ‘Em Happy’: 
Utilitarian Philosophy in Steinbeck’s Fiction,” both 
included in The Moral Philosophy of John Steinbeck. 
Neither authors nor their characters are under any 
burden to come up with the right or best answers to 
moral dilemmas or controversies conjured by their 
stories. Fiction may shed important light on such matters 
– for instance, the agonizing difficulties of choice and 
action – but the larger purpose of the story is not to tell 
readers how to live or what their obligations are. No 
rule, principle or presumed universal ethical value guides 
the action or meaning of the story. In effect, a Rortyan 
approach to narrative is essentially anti-religious, anti-
ideological, anti-philosophical in any normative or 
prescriptive sense.
12
 
 
III 
 
humanistic intellectuals are  
“people trying to expand their own moral imaginations. 
These … people read books in order to enlarge their 
sense of what is possible and important – either for 
themselves or for their society.” 
 
         Rorty, “The Humanistic Intellectual: 
          Eleven Theses” 
 
    “…we see both intellectual and moral progress not as 
a matter of getting closer to the True or the  
Good or the Right, but as an increase in imaginative 
power … Imagination … constantly operates so as to 
make the human future richer than   
    the human past.” 
 
    “Pragmatists think of moral progress as … like sewing 
together a very large, elaborate, polychrome quilt.”  
 
         Rorty, “Ethics Without Principles”  
 
 
A number of Rorty’s leading ideas about literature and 
morality were initially introduced in Section II, in 
summarizing what he is not saying about the matter. 
Therefore, in this section I simply attempt to draw 
together, somewhat more coherently, the notions 
integral to his overall view and without which we could 
                                                 
12
 Further evidence and confirmation of what Rorty 
rejects about the relation between literature and 
morality – and how “theory” or “ideology” or 
“philosophy” do not provide a method of reading or an 
ethic of reading – is found in “The Pragmatist’s Progress: 
Umberto Eco on Interpretation,” in: Philosophy and 
Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999) pp. 131-147. 
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not make much sense of how literature can, in fact, work 
toward moral progress.  
 
Christopher Voparil, in his chapter, “The Politics of the 
Novel,” confirms that for Rorty “the novel is the primary 
vehicle of moral reflection in a liberal democratic 
culture.” Further, through what Rorty terms, 
“sentimental education” [enlarging the sentiments],  
 
 works like Dickens’s Bleak House, Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, and Nabokov’s Lolita … can forge a 
democratic moral community of citizens attuned 
to suffering and more likely to see those 
different from themselves as ‘one of us.’ Because 
it is instrumental in fostering an ability to identify 
with the suffering of others, literature can be 
linked to the pursuit of justice, understood as a 
form of loyalty to other human beings.
13
 
 
Eduardo Mendieta, in discussing Rorty’s understanding 
of the nature of philosophy and its role, points out that 
“A society with politics … would have philosophy as a 
dialogue partner in the great conversation about what 
society should become.” However,  
 
Philosophy has only poetry to offer, a type of 
inspirational jostling that foments a type of 
utopia that is generally expressed in literary 
terms … When it [philosophy and literature] is 
not instigating our moral and social imaginaries, 
trying to expand our loyalties, it is performing 
the humble job of clearing the pathways to a 
better society.
14
 
 
Both Rorty scholars point to five central themes that 
frame and express Rorty’s understanding of how 
narratives embrace morality and, in some instances, 
contribute to moral progress: moral imagination, 
sympathy and empathy, sentimental literature, 
expanded loyalty, and achieving a greater justice. In 
what follows I elaborate briefly on each, using Rorty’s 
seminal essay, “Ethics Without Principles,”
15
 as a primary 
                                                 
13
 Voparil is here distilling key ideas from Rorty’s essay, 
“Justice as a Larger Loyalty” in Christopher J. Volparil, 
Richard Rorty: Politics and Vision (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2006), p. 61. 
14
 Eduardo Mendieta, “Introduction” to Take Care of 
Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself: Interviews 
With Richard Rorty, pp. xxvi-xxvii. 
15
 Rorty, “Ethics Without Principles,” in: Philosophy and 
Social Hope, pp. 72-90.  
touchstone for a summary, in my own words, of his key 
points. Throughout, we will do well to bear in mind 
Rorty’s account of his overriding objective in another 
leading essay, “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens,” for his 
words provide foundation for the five principal themes. 
Writes Rorty, “My purpose … is to develop an antithesis 
between the ascetic taste [of ascetic priests] for theory, 
simplicity, structure, abstraction, and essence and the 
novelist’s taste for narrative, detail, diversity and 
accident.”
16
 
 
Imagination is the starting point for Rorty’s conception. 
In “Ethics Without Principles” he repeatedly speaks of 
the need for an increase in imaginative power. To this 
end, the reader’s encounter with a story may stimulate 
the imagination and open up a wider horizon of 
possibilities for how she understands herself and others, 
as well as her society and the world at large. Thus, 
Rorty’s initial focus is on individual persons – the creator 
of the narrative, the lives and experiences of the 
individual characters in the story, the reader as a unique 
person with a perspective, and, of course, the reader’s 
involvement with the characters and with others in her 
world. As noted earlier, the proliferation of imagination 
spawned by reading goes well beyond the boundaries of 
any theory, argument, principle or even basic emotions 
and feelings. At critical times narratives open up and 
vigorously challenge the moral imagination, causing the 
reader to both feel and reflect on motives, behaviors 
and their consequences, and how people can and do 
help or hurt others. In my own writing on John 
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men I demonstrate how the 
novella expands the range and complexity of fellow-
feeling and, thereby, the moral experience of the reader, 
doing so through an imaginative leap inside the lives and 
experiences – personal, economic, political – of the main 
characters.  
When the moral imagination is thus opened, a path is 
cleared for heightened awareness and sensitivity to the 
plights of others. The reader no longer simply 
                                                 
16
 Rorty, “Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens,” in: The Rorty 
Reader, p. 313. 
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intellectualizes or critiques a text, but rather takes the 
reading experience into her heart as well as mind. Rorty 
states, “it is best to think of moral progress as a matter 
of increasing sensitivity to the needs of a larger and 
larger variety of people and things.”
17
 Through sensitive 
reading the reader becomes more alert to the fullest 
dimensions of the story, particularly on an affective and 
social level. A character no longer stands simplistically 
for an idea or principle, for good or bad, but rather 
reflects a myriad complex of feelings, dreams and 
aspirations, regrets, and uncertainties about how to act 
and about what is good.  
 
Enhanced sensitivity is the first move toward what Rorty 
calls sympathy for the characters and their lives. In his 
usage it is important to note that sympathy is not 
restricted to “feeling sorry for” or pitying another. In its 
deeper and more original sense, it denotes the prospects 
for sameness of feeling or affinity of one person for 
another, and elicits actions or responses that follow 
naturally from such affinity. It rests on a kind of mutual 
liking or understanding that further rests on the ability 
to enter into another person’s mental state – their 
feelings and desires. Rorty puts the matter very directly: 
“Moral progress is a matter of wider and wider 
sympathy.”
18
 
 
Sympathy, in this enlarged sense, opens to closely 
related empathy, a sort of personal identification 
(another favorite Rorty term) with another in order to 
better understand the person and hopefully feel 
something like what she feels. Rorty frequently alludes 
to how stories function in unique ways to cultivate 
greater empathy, in the concrete sense of causing the 
reader to experience some approximation of the pain 
and suffering of others. As we sense another’s pain, we 
naturally wonder about its causes. This provokes deeper, 
wider reflection on the problems and shortcomings of 
individuals and groups, their relations to one another, 
and of society more broadly. This essential Rortyan point 
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 Rorty, “Ethics Without Principles,” p. 81. 
18
 Ibid., p. 82. 
is echoed by other recent authors, whose new books on 
the troubled humanities, ruminate on the role of the 
humanities in creating a heightened alertness to the 
possibilities of being human, and how greater self-
awareness leads to greater sympathy-empathy and 
appreciation for the predicaments of numerous, varied 
others.
19
 
 
Literature that opens the moral imagination, thus 
providing a possibility of greater sensitivity and 
sympathy for the suffering of others, constitutes what 
Rorty at times refers to as a sentimental literature that 
facilitates sentimental education. Sentiment for Rorty 
appears to be a subtle combination of feelings and 
impressions that provide a basis for judgment and 
action. It reflects sensibility, delicacy and depth of 
emotion, and is similar to Hume’s notion of sentiment 
(rather than reason) as the basis of morality. 
Importantly, sentiment, or sentimental, are not 
disparaging terms for Rorty when applied to literature 
and the arts generally. In literary criticism there is a well 
established tradition in which the label “sentimental” 
marks a death blow for any work of fiction. A work 
deemed sentimental is thereby accused of being 
superficially emotional and maudlin, not guided by 
thoughtfulness, by reason. We can hear in this echoes of 
Aristotle’s explanation of how tragic poetry functions 
emotively or Plato’s denunciation of the poets as too 
emotional and distracting to reason. But, for Rorty, 
insofar as a sentimental story reflects tenderness, 
subtlety and depth of feeling – reaching widely into the 
reader’s experience and sensibility – it is a positive 
attribute. Such stories make possible the cultivating of 
sentiment – directed primarily toward the feelings and 
sufferings of others – and a kind of redemptive, 
sentimental education for readers and the communities 
they inhabit.  
                                                 
19
 Cf., for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Profit: 
Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2010) and Geoffrey G. 
Harpham, The Humanities and the Dream of America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
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The reader’s growing connectedness with others, 
evolving from heightened awareness and identification 
through feeling with strong fictional characters, may 
gradually bring about what Rorty describes as a “greater 
we” and an “expanded loyalty.” Recognizing that they 
are one of us begins with accepting characters in stories 
as being like us in fundamental ways, in our mutual 
capacities for change, suffering, growth, and dreams for 
a better future. This broadened appreciation for the 
plights of fictional characters then enables us to better 
comprehend our own predicaments. And as we gain 
broader and deeper self-awareness we begin to identify 
all the more with the problems of others. In a Deweyan 
pragmatist sense, Rorty’s aspiration for a “greater we” 
reflects an expanded community of people who share 
common interests, experience, struggles, and goals. As 
Rorty says, “Moral development in the individual, and 
moral progress in the human species as a whole, is a 
matter of re-marking human selves so as to enlarge the 
variety of the relationships which constitute those 
selves.”
20
 
 
Narratives help us, as readers, to understand the 
struggles people, and societies, undergo in search of 
freedom, equality, and fairness. This path of discovery 
may well begin with our own such struggles, but the 
narratives we embrace, and take into ourselves, make all 
the clearer the sense and extent to which all such 
difficult efforts, and the hardship and pain that 
accompany them, are common to peoples throughout 
the world, regardless of culture, religion or ethnicity. On 
Rorty’s account this is all implicated in the struggle to 
achieve a “greater justice,” put simply, to realize 
increased freedom, equality, and fairness in our own 
society and others around the world. He identifies such 
struggles in novels of moral protest by writers like 
Charles Dickens, James Baldwin, and Harriet Beecher 
Stowe, to name but a few. Their various fictions 
emphasize, for example, the detailed, negative impacts 
of economic class, racism and slavery on the lives of 
individuals, and how societal structures and institutions 
                                                 
20
 Rorty, “Ethics Without Principles,” p. 79. 
thwart realization of freedom and equality. But they 
may, also, suggest ways in which people, drawn together 
as [reader] communities with common interests and 
purpose, can constructively work toward a brighter 
future characterized by expansions in freedom, equality, 
and fairness, to wit, a greater manifestation of justice. As 
Rorty writes, the basic moral dilemmas we confront are 
not conflicts between loyalty (i.e. to our family) and 
justice (i.e. for the whole of society), but rather conflicts 
“between loyalties to smaller groups and loyalties to 
larger groups.”
21
 When as readers, we think not just with 
our feelings but with accompanying critical reason, and 
when we deliberately seek a larger loyalty (greater 
justice), we are engaged in two sides of the same 
activity. Indeed,  
 
any unforced agreement between individuals 
and groups about what to do creates a form of 
community, and will, with luck, be the initial 
stage in expanding the circles of those whom 
each party to the agreement had previously 
taken to be ‘people like ourselves.’ The 
opposition between rational argument and 
fellow-feeling thus begins to dissolve.
22
  
 
Skillfully drawn narratives about people and their 
situations have far greater efficacy in launching this 
process than does any theory or ideology.  
 
In sum for Rorty there exists a line of evolution from 
opening the moral imagination, to enhanced sympathy-
empathy, to cultivating proper moral sentiments, to 
expanded loyalty and the pursuit of a greater justice. 
What he calls “inspirational literature” and “inspired 
reading” can uniquely and powerfully merge in this 
development. When Rorty attributes inspirational value 
to works of literature, he means that such works “make 
people think there is more to this life than they ever 
imagined.”
23 
Such works have “nothing to do with 
eternity, knowledge, or stability, and everything to do 
with futurity and hope – with taking the world by the 
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 Rorty, “Justice as a Larger Loyalty,” p. 434. 
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 Ibid., p. 441. 
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 Rorty, “The Inspirational Value of Great Works of 
Literature,” in: Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 133. 
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throat and insisting that there is more to this life than 
we have ever imagined.”
24
 And, perhaps somewhat 
ironically, on Rorty’s terms, it may even be possible to 
hope for a new found religion of literature “in which 
works of the secular imagination replace Scripture as the 
principal source of inspiration and hope for each new 
generation.”
25
 Even though he here refers to the 
possibility of a new found “religion of literature” it would 
be, in my view, mistaken to conclude the Rorty is re-
introducing religion or a religious world view in any 
customary sense. Key words in the above quotation are 
“secular” and “replace Scripture.”  
 
While some may speculate that Rorty’s thinking about 
the role of literature in the reader’s private development 
or private reflection (as found, for example, in some 
aspects of his analyses of Nabokov and Proust) retains 
some elements from religion, I think this is clearly 
secondary to his main point. Literature for Rorty is 
essentially a secular endeavor. It constitutes a living 
assembly of texts (stories) that may well (and happily) 
supplant profound religious texts as principal sources of 
hope and inspiration. Rorty’s “religion of literature,” and 
his continual use of the word “redemption,” does not 
connote any sort of redemption or deliverance from evil, 
any spiritual cleansing that may lead to salvation or 
another, better life, or even moral purification. For Rorty 
redemption need have little or nothing to do with 
religion or religious experience as traditionally 
understood. Contrarily, his approach to the novel 
suggests a possible redemption (recovery from) the 
insularity of individual persons, from exclusive fixation 
on self-interest, the impotency of imagination, the 
sadness of callous hearts, and from the tyranny of 
theory. This is all of a piece with literature, as conceived 
by Rorty, stimulating the sort of inspired and enraptured 
readings of texts that he considers the mark of a 
pragmatist method of approach, one that focuses chiefly 
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on making the text, the story, useful, as opposed to 
getting it right.
26
 
 
IV 
 
“…when you weigh the good and the bad that the social 
novelists have done against the good and the bad that 
the social theorists have done, you find yourself wishing 
that there had been more novels and fewer theories. “ 
 
         Rorty, “Heidgegger, Kundera and Dickens” 
 
“There is more significant philosophy in the  
American novel than there is in the output of our 
philosophy departments.“ 
 
         Gustav Emil Mueller, “Philosophy in  
          The Twentieth Century Novel”  
  
 
In the spirit of pragmatism, the veracity and fruitfulness 
of Rorty’s ideas on literature and moral progress will, in 
large part, be a function of their application and 
usefulness. To what extent then are his notions helpful 
in reading certain writers and their novels? In what 
respects do such novels reflect the process of reader-
story interaction Rorty describes? Earlier I cited the 
writers Dickens, Baldwin, and Stowe, all of whom Rorty 
shows appreciation for as vivid examples of the struggle 
for an “expanded we” and a “greater justice.” He would 
be inclined I think to call certain of their works 
“sentimental novels” that induce enhanced moral 
feelings and reflection. His comments on them are brief 
and sporadic, spread through various of the essays cited 
earlier, but he would count these authors as among 
those who may well contribute to moral progress, so 
long as their works are not read, as is typical, through a 
restrictive funnel of theory, ideology or pre-defined set 
of values. Accordingly, I propose that a close, openly 
imaginative reading or re-reading of Bleak House or 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin begins to add fleshy detail to Rorty’s 
grandest hopes and aspirations for stories.  
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Probably the most sustained and elaborated application 
of Rorty’s manner of reading and interpretation involves 
Milan Kundera, Vladimir Nabokov, and George Orwell. 
Kundera is something of a literary hero for Rorty. His 
views on the imaginative world of the novel (as 
expressed, for example, in The Art of the Novel), and the 
extent to which they countervail philosophy and 
ideological certitudes, coincide with Rorty’s own ideal of 
a democratic, liberal utopia in large part facilitated by 
narratives. But his most extensive treatment of writers 
would be Nabokov and Orwell. Rorty lauds both for 
getting inside of (and sensitizing audiences to) the 
cruelty and humiliation suffered by many, whether 
stemming from individuals, groups or institutions. The 
two chapters on these authors in Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity are well known to students of Rorty’s work, 
and will not be analyzed here. Suffice it to say that both 
are of considerable importance in getting a fuller grasp 
on Rorty’s views, and a thoughtful re-reading of either 
becomes a prime moment for concretizing Rorty’s 
generalities.
27
 
  
To extend the range of speculative application a bit 
further, I will suggest the work of fellow American and I 
believe kindred spirit, John Steinbeck. Rorty writes 
favorably, albeit very briefly, of Steinbeck on several 
occasions. For instance, he points to a scene in The 
Grapes of Wrath as being “Perhaps the most vivid 
description of the American concept of fraternity.” The 
scene involves the sharing of limited food with a starving 
migrant family and Rorty writes, “As long as people in 
trouble can sacrifice to help people who are in still worse 
trouble, Steinbeck insisted, there is fraternity, and 
therefore social hope.”
28 
Elsewhere, he categorizes 
Grapes as a socialist novel of the 1930’s era written “in 
the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was 
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absolutely right, but that our country would have to 
transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln’s hopes.”
29
 
  
Steinbeck, like Rorty, was largely a man of America, 
made in part from the cloth, the very texture of this land 
– its history, culture and ideals. He was a man of deep-
seated hope who firmly believed in the prospects of 
progressive, evolutionary development of man and 
society over long swaths of time. Steinbeck embraced a 
profound sense of meliorism that I believe Rorty shares. 
Steinbeck believed in what he termed the infinite 
perfectibility of man though it could, of course, never be 
fully realized. Rorty is of similar mind when he writes, 
“you cannot aim at moral perfection, but you can aim at 
taking more people’s needs into account.”
30
 For 
Steinbeck there was the ever-present possibility of 
achieving a greater and more efficacious community, 
growing out of sensitivity to others, trust, loyalty, and 
basic friendship. Witness, for instance, his masterful 
treatments of human community in works like Of Mice 
and Men, Cannery Row as well as Grapes of Wrath. 
Moreover, Steinbeck had an inherent environmental and 
global sensibility and understanding well before we had 
wide spread recognition of or even a vocabulary for such 
things, while many of his leading characters are 
culturally diverse (Mexicans, Asians, native Americans) 
and sympathetically related to one another in ways 
Rorty would very likely approve. Importantly, these 
characters often struggle together, in relative solidarity, 
in seeking greater fairness, equitable treatment, and 
improved living conditions. To use Rorty’s term, they 
display enthusiasm for a “greater justice.” 
  
Therefore, I offer a modest suggestion – that Rorty 
would have found fertile narrative ground for 
instantiating his ideas about literature and morality in 
Steinbeck novels beyond The Grapes of Wrath – the 
Pulitzer prize winning, quintessential story of 
Depression-era America and its moral response to 
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economic as well as political and individual desperation. 
He would no doubt have found what is arguably the 
most powerful and dramatically moving illustration of 
loyalty and friendship anywhere in American literature in 
Of Mice and Men. He would have, also, witnessed there 
a lived sense of fraternity amongst members of the 
economic underclass, in this case, migrant laborers, and 
their collective need to articulate the suffering and 
injustice of a class system structured around heartless 
owners and contingent laborers. He would have “felt” 
the living, day-to-day experience of debilitating racism 
and sexism in the characters of Crooks and Curly’s wife. 
There is good reason why Of Mice and Men – as novella, 
multiple movies, and various stage plays – remains so 
popular today, with respect to sales and audience 
reception. A Rortyan explanation seems to me part of it. 
Of Mice and Men grabs readers and viewers at a deep 
affective level, evoking their sympathies for the plight of 
powerless, everyday people whom Steinbeck masterfully 
develops into heroic-like fictional characters capable of 
moving people to action. His characters, through the 
power of narrative, make us suffer with them. They 
make us entertain the very real possibility of an 
“expanded we.”  
  
In Cannery Row Rorty would have seen, in the context of 
a raucous and satirically hilarious story about a collection 
of social misfits, a passionate and expansive exploration 
of human community – its meaning for simple people, 
how it gets formed, and what its prospective 
ramifications are. Cannery Row tweaks our collective 
funny bones, challenges our finer moral sensibilities, as it 
gladdens our hearts with the redemptive power of 
human fellowship and its liberating potentialities. Once 
again, loyalty and friendship merge to elevate the 
human spirit out of the vagaries of subsistence living, to 
achieve levels of mutual understanding, satisfaction, 
even joy, that the material conditions would seemingly 
never make possible.  
  
In the lesser known but hugely popular (particularly in 
Europe) WW II-era novel, The Moon Is Down, Rorty 
would revel in the emerging resistance movement 
among residents of a small Norwegian (so it is assumed) 
town that comes to be invaded and occupied by 
fictionalized German Nazis. How the citizens and their 
local leaders gradually, surreptitiously, invisibly band 
together, in an uprising of sticks and stones and spirit 
over guns and bombs, is eloquent testimony to the 
power of human dignity and freedom. Quite simply, the 
townspeople cannot, will not, live under oppression. 
They are persons and they must be free. They must 
reverse the injustice of occupation and, miraculously, 
they pull it off. The story is hopeful and inspiring, and 
naturally reverberated with thousands of underground 
readers throughout Europe during the war years. While 
an admitted work of propaganda, it, nonetheless, has 
lasting effect on the human pursuit of freedom and 
justice. It advances Rorty’s aspirations for narratives that 
make a difference.  
  
Lastly, I hope eventually to develop a separate paper 
that will attempt a Rortyan interpretation of the moral 
dimensions of Steinbeck’s final and frequently 
overlooked novel, The Winter of Our Discontent, the one 
work in his corpus that Steinbeck identified as being 
simply about morals and morality. But for now, in closing 
this section, I simply allude to a bold statement 
Steinbeck makes in the frontispiece to the book. He 
warns that instead of trying to identify specific fictional 
people or places in the story, readers would do better, 
“to inspect their own communities and search their own 
hearts, for this book is about a large part of America 
today.”
31
 Rorty would surely have resonated to this 
admonition. In considering Steinbeck’s all too briefly 
referenced works here, and in imaginatively speculating 
on the guiding spirits of both John Steinbeck and Richard 
Rorty, we can best grasp hold of both by bearing in mind 
Rorty’s generic instruction to readers of stories: “people 
merely need to turn their eyes toward those who are 
getting hurt and notice the details of the pain being 
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suffered…”
32 
When once asked by a graduate student 
what his philosophy was, Steinbeck responded, 
somewhat tongue in cheek, by saying he had no idea 
really. What he did know is that innocent people get 
hurt and suffer, and he did not like it. He thought we all 
needed to work, in our various ways, to put a stop to it.  
 
V 
 
 A tentative appraisal of Rorty on literature and moral 
progress might evolve from a few observations and 
questions. I conclude the paper by raising at least some 
of them. Some critics might note that Rorty’s radical 
ideas landed him on the fringes of academe, summarily 
dismissed (or worse, condemned) by both philosophers 
and literature specialists. How could he ever be taken 
seriously without a firm disciplinary home and accepted 
philosophical methodology? In the end, this mattered 
little to Rorty, and it should matter little to us, students 
of Rorty. Among his lasting achievements was to show us 
all the full and genuine possibilities of interdisciplinary 
inquiry. He demonstrates convincingly the superiority of 
pragmatic pluralism and diversity, outgrowths of 
interdisciplinarity, to the more fashionable 
multiculturalism that has gripped the academy for at 
least the last three decades. Rorty breaks down walls, 
and no better example could be offered than his outlook 
on morality and ethics. For him ethics is not just the 
province of philosophy or religion. It is found with equal 
force and vigor in the arts and literature. While some 
critics may condemn him for mixing politics and ethics 
with literature, alleging a consequent diminution in 
aesthetic integrity or purity, Rorty believes that 
narratives, messy and realistic as they may be, are for 
the purpose of opening up imagination and linking 
people together. For him, traditional aesthetic values are 
to be supplanted by sensibility, community building, and 
the pursuit of justice. Put simply, his overriding 
objectives for literature are radically different, and must, 
in fairness, be understood and assessed on their own 
terms.  
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Some may claim that Rorty’s notion of moral progress 
applies only to particular, limited authors and selected 
texts. Obviously, his own literary illustrations are pointed 
and reflect his favorites. But I would respond in two 
ways. First, I think it entirely plausible that more works 
could well be included within the Rorty inventory. If we 
exercise, with Rorty, narrative and moral imagination 
and look carefully, we may well come up with a variety 
of narratives from different periods, styles and locations. 
My earlier speculations about Steinbeck were meant to 
tentatively illustrate this point. Secondly, it would not be 
entirely wrong to charge a certain limitation involved in 
Rorty’s thinking about the novel, but such charge misses 
a fundamental point about literary theory. Any and all 
theories of literature are, by their very nature, selective 
as to the particular works of literature that serve to best 
illustrate what the theory is saying. To be more precise, 
Rorty’s preferred works are what he variously calls the 
“literature of moral protest,” “sentimental literature,” or 
“inspirational literature,” and we have identified several 
examples earlier. Surely, within America alone, following 
modernism, writers like Barth, Pynchon, De Lillo, and 
Auster have experimented with the disappearance of 
strong characters and plot. Indeed, they may be seen as 
having given up altogether on typical notions of plot 
development or characters capable of inducing moral 
progress. They display serious reservations about the 
power of language or any literary form to grasp reality, 
including social reality, let alone advance it along. This, 
for sure, is not Rorty’s “literature of social hope.” He is 
aware of such writers and their works, referring to them 
in Achieving Our Country as a literature of “acquiescence 
in the end of American hope.” While I do not think he 
could truly engage such works, or have much to say 
about them, Rorty’s dismissive posture toward such 
novels does not negate such an alternative way of 
conceiving and executing the novel. It is simply not the 
sort of literature that confirms, illustrates or advances 
his notion of what literature is and what it is capable of 
accomplishing within the human community. This is 
hardly different in any meaningful way from, for 
example, Sartre’s rejection (in What is Literature?) of the 
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so-called “pure poetry” of Valéry and Mallarmé because 
it was too formalistic, ethereal, and abstracted from 
living social realities. It is no coincidence that Sartre’s 
own socio-political theory of literature is best 
understood and illustrated by reference to his literary 
works – Nausea, No Exit, The Flies – or to texts like 
Richard Wright’s Black Boy. Likewise, we should not 
forget that Aristotle (in his Poetics) clearly had Oedipus 
in view as both inspiration and illustration for his theory 
of literature as organic unity that imitates nature and 
causes a purgation of the emotions. Obviously, there 
exists a great and wonderful variety of literary works and 
literary theories. Equally as obvious, no one theory could 
ever engage or explain such wide variation in forms, 
styles and thematic emphases. But this need not 
diminish the significance or applicability of any theory of 
literature. It simply confirms that the nature and 
function of literary art is too vast and diverse a subject 
matter to be adequately handled by a single conception. 
In short, I do not believe Rorty would have much interest 
in the experimental literature mentioned above, but this 
in no way defuses the significance of his own ideas about 
literature and morality.  
  
Some would no doubt want to ask Rorty whether moral 
progress can be measured? Is there a scale of justice or 
fairness within literature, within the real world outside 
the narrative? How would we ever know when justice is 
achieved, and how could it ever be confirmed, one way 
or the other, that the reading of stories had anything to 
do with human actions? While these seem reasonable 
questions, they tend to miss Rorty’s point. Of course, 
there is no scale or measure of moral progress, other 
than generally improving social conditions, no 
mechanism that could definitively prove that progress 
has been realized and that novels have somehow 
contributed to it. Rorty’s ideas are projective, enveloped 
by hope and human ideals. He is not interested in proof 
or precise calculation. If a narrative cannot, does not, 
give us a precise position on anything, why would 
anyone even want a specific measure of its effects and 
outcomes? Such questioning reflects the sort of analytic 
or logical temper in which Rorty does not traffic. Lack of 
precise measurement or proof, however does not belie 
the efficacy of narratives or Rorty’s ideas about just how 
they work.  
  
I suspect that Rorty’s lasting legacy on the question of 
literature, and its relation to morality and moral 
progress, will be the extent to which he worked 
assiduously and creatively to liberate both literature and 
morality from the tyranny of theory and ideology. In his 
pushing of boundaries, he has opened up the space for a 
fresh start. He has given legitimacy to the moral 
imagination, and vitality to the role of moral experience 
in our reflection and action, both individually and 
collectively. As an antidote to the sterile, purely 
academic analyses of much of literary and ethical theory, 
he has infused literature and philosophy with hope and 
very real human purpose. For this we should be forever 
in his debt. 
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It seems that it should be easy to talk about pragmatism 
and poetry. There have been numerous, well-researched 
connections and mutual influences going back and forth 
between American poets and American pragmatist 
philosophers for decades. These affinities have been 
discussed by some key literary critics representing 
various schools of thought and generations. Richard 
Poirier has done a lot in his Poetry and Pragmatism to 
establish a firm linearity linking Emerson, via William 
James, with such key figures of American poetry as 
Robert Frost, Gertrude Stein, and Wallace Stevens.
1
 
Continuing this line, the crucial role of Emerson’s 
concepts in influencing American modernist poetics has 
been affirmed by Jonathan Levin, who, with Emerson on 
his mind, has called this mode “the poetics of transition” 
in a study by the same title.
2
 Another important critic, 
Frank Lentricchia, concentrating less on Emerson, has 
also emphasized the role that the Harvard intellectual 
climates, shaped by the near-pragmatist discussion 
maintained by James, Royce and Santayana, had on the 
shaping of the aesthetic poetic views of Stevens, Frost, 
Eliot and Pound.
3
 James’s influence as a philosopher of 
the psychology of belief has been discussed, in relation 
to Hulme, Pound, and Stevens, by Patricia Rae.
4
 In a 
more recent study, Joan Richardson, a premiere Stevens 
scholar, constructed a much larger narrative which 
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shows Emerson, pragmatist philosophers, and modernist 
American poets, notably Stevens, as reciprocally 
nurturing voices belonging to one larger stream of 
American thought, which dates back to Jonathan 
Edwards and the intellectual culture of the Puritans, and 
which anticipates the findings of 20
th
 century science in 
the fields of psychology and physics.
5
 Dewey’s 
influences, although they seem to be referred to less 
frequently, have not gone unnoticed. His version of the 
ties binding democracy with the need for experiment 
had its poetic counterpart in the poetics of William 
Carlos Williams, a relation that has also been pointed to 
by John Beck.
6
  
 
The connections between pragmatism and poetry are 
not limited to the modernist phase of American poetry. 
Among the younger generation of critics, Andrew 
Epstein has used Emerson’s views on the contingent 
nature of the self to discuss the rich interplay of the 
aesthetic and the personal that contributed to the 
overall artistic success of the New York school of poetry.
7
 
Michael Magee, in turn, has shown the combined 
influence of Emerson and Dewey on the New York poetic 
avant-gardes, which, precisely because of the 
Emersonian-Deweyan influence, produce forms of 
political efficacy and engagement.
8
 
 
And yet, despite all this rich record of connections, there 
lingers a sense of something uncertain, undecided, a 
chance unrealized, a blurred area of disappointment. It 
seems that much more should be made of the suggested 
intellectual and aesthetic commerce. The map of the 
liaisons established so far seems very unstable and pale. 
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Pragmatism and poetry remain close, but pragmatism 
does not seem to have produced any more lasting 
platform of discussion that would be influential for our 
thinking about poetry, and markedly different from 
other theoretical approaches. On the contrary, 
pragmatism, with its vast poetic potential, seems merely, 
at best, to echo the theses of indeterminacy of meaning 
and instability of the self that have, much more forcibly, 
been imposed by approaches which, in fact, operate on 
terrain that was originally opened by early pragmatist 
thought. What is an even more serious problem is the 
position of some critics who, like Charles Altieri, claim 
openly, if mistakenly, that pragmatism simply does not 
offer anything new or sustainable in the area of the 
aesthetics of the poetic text.
9
  
 
Without engaging directly with views so openly 
unfavorable to pragmatism at this point, I am going to 
follow my opposite intuition and try to return to neo-
pragmatism, in a variety of its formulations and 
derivations, in order to look for such perspectives on it 
that will show it as an aesthetic/philosophical platform 
offering an alternative to other currently prevailing 
approaches. That this is a worthwhile project is 
suggested by a large blank spot found in the middle of 
the existing work by the literary critics. None of the 
studies conducted by the literary critics sympathetic to 
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Addressing Rorty, the critic argues that pragmatism is 
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escape any given set of sentence protocols. Altieri’s 
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genius from extreme originality (developed in Practicing 
Philosophy) does not win Altieri’s favor either, as 
unconvincing in its combination of meliorism and 
aesthetic values. For Altieri, such combination is always 
detrimental to the aesthetic. 
pragmatism mentioned above makes an important case 
or argument based on the work of the contemporary 
neo-pragmatists. Among these, the biggest stress is, as I 
signaled above, on the classical phase of the 
development of pragmatism, the ideas of James and 
Dewey, and modernist poetry. Even the studies that 
make forays into the area of contemporary poetry treat 
pragmatism as if it ceased evolving, coming to a full stop 
with Dewey’s contribution. The work of Rorty is either 
ignored or openly dismissed.
10
 Shusterman’s work is not 
very popular among American literary critics either. 
What is more, there are some important writers, for 
example Alexander Nehamas, presenting views on 
aesthetics that make them important allies of pragmatist 
aesthetics, who also seem to be neglected in poetry 
studies. The result of the lack of proper attention to the 
potential that neo-pragmatism may bring into the 
discussion of poetry is that the existing pragmatist 
literary criticism often sounds as if it were repeating a 
message that already belongs elsewhere.
11
 In the 
following article, I am going to refer to Rorty, Donald 
Davidson, Alexander Nehamas, and Richard Shusterman, 
in order to show in what way their writing offers a 
specific cluster of ideas providing inspiration for critics 
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 By ignoring these new texts in pragmatism, the 
existing critical approaches miss a lot. They become easy 
targets for such critics as Altieri, who has shown, for 
example, how Poirier relies too much on Emerson, and 
how he belittles Stevens’s play with the structure of 
belief. On other occasions, by not going beyond Dewey 
toward, say, the alliance of Rorty and Nehamas, these 
studies do become vulnerable to charges of instrumental 
treatment of the poetic text. I do not think it is an 
accident that a critic largely enthusiastic about 
pragmatism, who, like Michael Magee, has written in an 
illuminating manner about Frank O’Hara, has not been 
able to deal with O’Hara’s friend and poetic rival John 
Ashbery. On the other hand, when they are engaged, the 
pragmatist views do not seem to offer much more than 
the message already honed by post-structuralism and 
deconstruction. Levine and Epstein, as well as Poirier, 
can, at best, point out that the message of the transient 
character of the self and knowledge claims was first 
explored and employed by Emerson and the classical 
pragmatists, not by the French theory.  
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and poets alike by reinterpreting their understanding of 
the tasks and potentialities of poetic language. 
There is strangeness and force in the new American 
pragmatism, which is difficult to articulate, and which 
stems from its unique combination of “the will to 
believe,” or participate in one’s reality, despite the full 
awareness of its provisional and contingent character. If 
properly evaluated, this quality would make neo-
pragmatism a more fascinating partner for 
contemporary poetry, which often seeks beauty that 
“exists by logic of strange position,” to use a phrase from 
the poet John Ashbery.
12
 To appreciate the neo-
pragmatist position would mean to enter a radically 
unfounded, and thus ironical, participation in the orders 
of reality in which their permanently unstable, and thus 
poetically defamiliarized character, is a spur to their 
change, and in which the center of significance is shifted 
from “matter,” “materiality,” and “language” back to the 
non-foundationally understood human productivity of 
meaning. This position, as I will try to show, is the irony 
of radical pragmatist post-humanism whose difference 
with other theories lies in its refusal to either explain or 
justify the human by recourse to any sort of the 
inhuman. When applied to poetry, this excess should 
result in new critical language in which the message of 
the “death” of the traditional lyrical subject would give 
way to a flexible, ironically distanced, and yet significant 
sense of the selves that emerge inevitably whenever a 
poetically enhanced play of meanings is involved. 
 
To outgrow and move past the already aged message of 
the various forms of the simple demise of the authorial 
subject would also mean to regulate the ongoing 
discussion of the relation between the language of 
poetry, its material layer, and its relation to the material 
world. Over large areas of the debates circling around 
American poetry, the thesis of the disappearance of the 
traditional lyrical subject, often supported by French 
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post-structuralism, has gone hand in hand with the 
emergence of a form of objectivity sought in an 
enhanced adherence to the material layer of the poetic 
language and the bare materiality of the physical world.  
 
The combination of the increased attention to the 
autonomous materiality of language and the banishing 
of forms of individual subjectivity is best observed in 
American poetry in the close proximity of the theory and 
practice of the LANGUAGE poets and many younger 
poets influenced by it. Although the LANGUAGE 
movement, with its derivations, does not by any means 
exhaust the rich and dynamic poetic scene in America, 
its theoretical advancement is an important indicator of 
the larger tendencies in American poetry. It is against 
the variety of materialism and its companion notion of 
the dispersal of the authorial self professed by this 
poetic/theoretical formation that the originality and 
difference of the neo-pragmatist program for the 
discussion of poetry may become visible. 
 
The Materiality of LANGUAGE 
 
When Charles Bernstein opens his volume of essays, The 
Content’s Dream, he develops a concept of poetry as a 
mode of objective thought in artificially created poetic 
forms, or measures. These are not, of course, to be 
employed for their own sake, but for their capacity of 
exposing the material features of language itself. 
Language takes center stage, as it is modulated by the 
artifice of the poetic form. Only in such language can 
significant communication take place. To be sure, this is 
not a communication from a “subject” or “speaker”; 
rather, it is the generalized, not quite personalized, 
“mental being” that can now enjoy a renewed contact 
with the world. Combining ideas on language from 
Wittgenstein and Benjamin, Bernstein stresses the fact 
that, since there are no mental essences beyond the fact 
of language (Wittgenstein’s lesson), “languages 
therefore have no speaker if this means someone who 
communicates through these languages, [not in them]” 
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(Benjamin’s lesson).
13
 With this shift from the speaker, 
or language user, to language itself, we become 
attentive to a larger notion of language, all sorts of sign 
systems, or even “nameless, non-acoustic languages, 
languages issuing form matter.”
14
 Among these systems, 
according to Benjamin, who is here closely followed by 
the American critic, we “recall the material community 
of things in their communication.”
15
 
 
This line is developed in a later collection of essays by 
Bernstein’s colleague and one of the central figures of 
the LANGUAGE movement, Lyn Hejinian, entitled 
tellingly, Language of Inquiry. The title is important: it 
points immediately in the direction of the hoped for 
efficacy of poetry as a special language of open-
mindedness and lack of prejudice characteristic of 
science in its neutral approach to its materials. In an 
essay called “Strangeness,” one of the central pieces of 
the volume, Hejinian presents her program for such 
refurbishing of the poetic language that would liberate 
poetry’s apparently natural capacity for realistic and 
objective adherence to the world’s physis. The crux of 
the matter is to realize the necessity of moving from the 
order of the metaphor to that of metonymy. Metaphor, 
with its affinity with the symbol, belongs to a pre-
established code. In short, language based on metaphor 
is too prone to fall victim to all sorts of pre-established 
traps of ideology. Metonymy, meanwhile, by relying on a 
greater accidentality of contiguous connections, 
relations that are both less predictable (not pre-imposed 
or prefigured by the limitations of the code) and 
objective, gives us a better, mode condensed rendering 
of the material context. In other words, it is the 
“incremental,” objectified manner of metonymy that 
makes it a more suitable tool of inquiry, such as the one 
found in science. With it, we obtain “direct and sensuous 
                                                 
13
 Charles Bernstein, Content’s Dream: Essays 1975-84, 
(Los Angeles: Sun&Moon, 1986), p. 62. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid. 
contact with the concrete and material world.”
16
 Should 
poetic language be able to follow such instruction, it 
would attain the desired state of realistic objectivity in 
which “the materials of nature speak.”
17
 
 
A more recent evolution of this widespread and 
influential tendency toward material objectivity is 
observed in the writings of Gerald Bruns. In his earlier 
works, Bruns reaches back to Mallarmé as the precursor 
of the idea of “pure” language, freed from its bondage to 
the senses and meanings of the everyday world.
18
 This 
reading of Mallarmé is later developed toward a new 
sense of “objectivism” in poetry, in which the modernists 
such as William Carlos Williams and Louis Zukofsky are 
early forerunners of such important experimental poets 
of today as Steve McCaffery or Clark Coolidge. All of 
these poets work with the intuition isolated by Bruns 
and earlier traced back to Mallarmé, according to which 
the poetic resides in freeing language of its everyday 
uses and the controlling regime of the human meanings 
toward the pure materiality of the sign and sound. It is in 
such strategies that poets like McCaffery and Coolidge 
manage to push poetry beyond the genre stage of the 
lyric. The lyric recedes and gives way to a purer, non-
hierarchical use of language. A poem by McCaffery is 
praised as “an unmediated inscription of the materiality 
of the letter.”
19
  
 
The special interest and gain of Bruns’s objectivist line is 
that it frees language from the apparently false and 
                                                 
16
 Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), p. 153. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Gerald L. Bruns, of course, pushes aside the whole 
load of Mallermean ideas that smack simply of a strongly 
metaphysical or openly religious inclination vividly 
present in the French poet. In his letters, Mallarmé 
confessed that he wanted to free language toward what 
he called pure poetry, “divorce it from dreams and 
chance” and make it aspire to “the idea of the universe.” 
See Gerald L. Bruns, Modern Poetry and the Idea of 
Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 
103.  
19
 Gerald. L. Bruns, The Material of Poetry (Athens, Ga.: 
The University of Georgia Press, 2005), p. 10.  
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misleading filter of human ideas, which obliterate a 
clearer view of the world. The post-LANGUAGE poets 
realize Williams’s project in which “what the poet is after 
is not realism, but reality itself.”
20
 In Bruns, this becomes 
a project of experiencing a non-mediated life of objects. 
One poet who seems to have perfected this technique, 
even beyond the achievement of the American post-
LANGUAGE poets, is the French poet Francis Ponge. His 
curious descriptive forms are presented by Bruns as the 
true achievement of the poetic of materialism. In 
Ponge’s texts, objects receive a treatment in which they 
fully come to life. There is justice done to the inanimate 
world that was never possible before. For Bruns, Ponge’s 
“objectivism” is found in siding with things, for once, 
against the intruding presence of the human. This kind of 
writing lifts the sentence of oblivion, formerly imposed 
on the thingness of things by the humanized psychology 
of the traditional lyric.  
 
The common aim of the new poetic materialism and 
objectivism could be variously described as the 
elimination of the idea of individual subjectivity, of the 
uniqueness or originality of the personas or voices 
speaking in poetry, and, ultimately, the overcoming of 
humanism, realizing the variously prophesized “end of 
man.” This abolishing of individual subjectivity is already 
visible in Bernstein. We have seen how he works with 
Wittgenstein’s and Benjamin’s ideas on language in 
order to dispense with the view of the speaker as a 
subject who exists before language, and then comes to 
language in order to produce an expression of this 
subjectivity. Speakers exist in the language; they do not 
communicate through it. Could such fully linguistic 
existence, the being in the language, lead to the 
emergence of some sort of individualistic subjectivity? In 
Bernstein, whatever subjectivity may emerge, must be 
fully public, non-private, and thus non-individual. 
Writing as a form of thinking within the formats of the 
poetic measure creates a division in the self, its 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., p. 80. 
separation from its very private experience. Whatever 
there was of the uniqueness in the measure (form) 
employed in the poem cannot testify to the emergence 
of the self thought of as an entity endowed with 
separateness or individuality. On the contrary, even 
though the poetic process might begin in the necessary 
solitude, the solitary self disappears. Writing as 
poetically measured thinking gives us “a privacy in which 
the self itself disappears and leaves us the world” (82). 
Since “the world” is necessarily a shared area, this, 
obviously, is no privacy at all.
21
  
 
A similar disappearance of the separate, individual self is 
noted by Hejinian. Here, the metonymic inquiry and the 
resultant immediacy of contact with the material of the 
world simply disperses the self. The objective being of 
the world overwhelms and obliterates the being of an 
“I,” however conceived. As Hejinian puts it, the 
“language of inquiry” simply “dispossesses” the “I.” The 
poetic “I” is treated almost as the ego of a scientist: it 
must be fully objectified and erased. Hejininian quotes 
Adorno: “the boundary between what is human and the 
world of things becomes blurred.”
22
 
 
The rejection of human individual subjectivity has 
recently received an even stronger formulation from 
Bruns. The critic’s earlier advocacy of the new 
objectivism in the languages of poetry, which I have 
presented above, has now evolved, by way of Bruns’s 
combined reading of Levinas, Agamben, and Deleuze 
and Guattari, toward the idea of a possibility of 
experience in which the human element itself loses all of 
its human identity and melts with its environment. What 
                                                 
21
 It is interesting that in the fragment from Benjamin 
that Bernstein quotes, the idea of the all-pervading 
proliferation of language makes nature dependent on its 
articulation through language, which, in turn, returns us 
to the notion of persons (it is persons who are doing the 
articulation). The notion of a “person” implies 
“personality” and separateness from other personalities. 
Bernstein does not take up this direction. See Bernstein, 
Content’s Dream, p. 82.  
22
 Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry, p. 147. 
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Bruns is trying to liberate from the cybernetic regimes of 
Cartesian subjectivity is what he names, after Levinas, 
“the human at the level of the singular – that is ‘prior to 
the distinction between the particular and the 
universal’.”
23
 A human creature so conceived is less a 
nominative I, burdened with Cartesian tasks of 
representation, than a corporeal, flesh endowed, 
accusative moi, relating with the world in “a mode of 
sensibility or exposure to the touch.”
24
 In this mode, 
importantly, the human regains contact with its flesh, 
rather than just having a body, the latter being a 
controllable construct of the homogenizing social 
systems.  
 
The whole project is one of the de-creation of the 
subject. The “flesh” that the subject existing in the 
accusative mode of touch and sensibility recaptures 
belongs to the area of “bare life.” The term, borrowed 
from Agamben, signifies the state of “sovereignty” 
achieved by stepping into the freedom of animal non-
identity, “a condition of exteriority, in which, by a 
sovereign decision, a human being ceases to be regarded 
or treated as human.”
25
 It is in such animal “solar 
experience” of community with the rest of being, 
outside any cybernetic controlling system, that the 
organism achieves freedom, and sheds the misery of the 
human.
26
 The entry into this mode also entails the shift 
to what Bruns is calling, after Deleuze and Guattari, “the 
body without organs.”
27
 The “bare life” of the “body 
without organs” introduces the creature, now trans-
human or trans-animal, into the condition of non-
identity in which it escapes the false political 
identifications of the homogenous social order.  
 
The discussion on and around American poetry that I am 
outlining is conducted by both poets and critics. So far I 
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 Gerald L. Bruns, On Ceasing to Be Human (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 16. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid., p. 23. 
26
 Ibid., p. 28-29. 
27
 Ibid., p. 67. 
have discussed the views of literary critics. Before I move 
on to the poets, I would like to mark the difficulty of 
such an easy division between theoreticians and 
practitioners. Among the critics discussed above, two of 
them, Charles Bernstein and Lyn Hejinian, are also well-
recognized and influential poets. The situation in 
American poetry has long ceased to be one in which a 
poetic talent, free from the influences of theory and 
theoretical poetics, simply submits poetic texts to be 
explicated with the use of academic theoretical tools. 
The two practices are now much intertwined. Some 
American poets engage in critical prose; others, who do 
not, are aware of the philosophical instruments used by 
the critics.  
 
There is also a larger consequence of such cross-
insemination. Within the excess of interpenetrating 
ideas we might register an alliance of critical and 
theoretical concepts that have been derived inductively 
by the study of homegrown American traditions with 
ideas imported to America from continental philosophy, 
primarily post-Heideggerian, French post-structuralism. 
Gerald Bruns’s writings present a good example of such 
synthesis. Again, these imports do not exist in “pure” 
forms and are by no means an exclusive property of 
critics. The philosophical-theoretical concepts 
themselves have been so pervasive that they now inform 
the thinking and awareness of both those who write 
poems, when they write poems, and those who write 
critical essays, when a critical essay is what they set out 
to write.  
 
And yet, with all this free evolution of concepts, writing 
formats, and influences, there emerges a clear affinity 
between the criticism of the human based individualized 
subjectivity present amidst the indigenous, American 
poetic traditions, and the huge boost given to this 
criticism by French, post-Heideggerian theory. It is 
against the background of this alliance, clearly at work 
amidst the LANGUAGE and post-LANGUAGE 
critical/poetic milieu, that the neo-pragmatist theoretical 
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difference I am going to present will become clear. Thus, 
before I move on to present a sketch of the neo-
pragmatist stance on poetic aesthetics, I am going to 
briefly discuss three poets whose work testifies to the 
merger of American traditions and French theory. 
 
The LANGUAGE Practice and the Death of the 
Individualized Subject. 
 
The first of these poets is Jack Spicer, whose technical 
and procedural innovation in the 1950’s more than 
justifies his frequent identification as a proto-LANGUAGE 
poet. An important figure of the San Francisco 
renaissance of the 1950’s, Spicer created a peculiar 
understanding of the state in which the poet is found 
when approaching poetry and language. In a poem 
called “Thing Language,” whose central metaphor brings 
together the mass of language and the ocean, Spicer 
writes: “A drop / Or crash of water. It means / Nothing. / 
It is bread and butter / Pepper and salt. The death / That 
young men hope for. Aimlessly / it pounds the shore.”
28
 
The poetic utterance comes from a special space in 
which the voice sounds as if its source was situated 
somewhere in the realm of the inanimate and inhuman. 
The poem enters the realm of inanimate matter, and this 
entry is enhanced by the disjunctive, syntactically 
distortive form, clearly anticipatory of the later 
experiment of the LANGUAGE group. There is a 
depersonalization in these poems; what speaks is not a 
“persona,” “lyrical subject,” or “ego,” but the substance 
of the inanimate, the world of non-organic minerals, 
“salt” more than “pepper.”
29
  
                                                 
28
 Jack Spicer, “Thing Language,” in: The Collected Books 
of Jack Spicer, ed. Robin Blaser (Santa Rosa: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1999), p. 217.  
29
 To be sure, there is a rich tradition behind this sort of 
perception of the poetic language resident in the midst 
of the American poetic tradition itself. Spicer, as a 
California poet, necessarily evokes Robinson Jeffers’s 
meditations on the inhumanity of the Californian shore 
at Carmel in Big Sur. Even more central and imminent is 
the presence of Emily Dickinson whose poems explored 
states of linguistic consciousness that tried to pierce 
While this side of Spicer’s poetics could easily be 
approached through reference to Spicer’s debt to 
William Carlos Williams, or Robinson Jeffers (a 
paradigmatic California poet), Spicer’s commentators 
often evoke ideas derived from Foucault, Heidegger, or 
Deleuze. Robin Blaser uses Foucault’s ideas (from the 
philosopher’s earlier period) of the obsolescence of the 
human and its dependence on the totality of language, 
thought of as a moving mass, a vast external labyrinthine 
element that annihilates individual subjectivity. 
“Foucault’s thought meets mine,” writes Blaser in the 
essay “The Practice of the Outside,” an afterword to 
Spicer’s collected works, “man is governed by ‘labor, life 
and language’… and these are all of them also an 
‘exteriority’ larger than any one man or many men, 
unmastered and unclosed.”
30
  
 
In a more recent reading, Geoffrey Hlibchuk sees what 
he calls Spicer’s “topological” poetics as an important 
precursor of the post-modern deconstruction of the 
division between the inside and the outside of the 
human organism. What Spicer is said to sense is the 
melting of the human into the material worldliness of 
the world, as Heidegger would say. Hlibchuk reminds us 
that: “In Heidegger… the subject is melded with the 
environment to the point of inextricability.”
31
 This 
concept is then presented in the evolution it undergoes 
in J. Hillis Miller, the early Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze. 
French thought takes the subject out of its well-
delineated, corporeal separateness and seeks its porous 
                                                                       
through the limits of “life.” Dickinson herself is part of 
another, greater tendency, found in American 
Romanticism referred to as American Orphic poetry. I 
believe, however, that the Orphic elements in American 
poetry must be kept separate from the influences of 
contemporary theory. As I argue below, Spicer’s 
Orphicism has a Heideggerian hue in which the relations 
of life and death are in reversed ratio from its 
Emersonian variety. 
30
 Robin Blaser, “The Practice of Outside,” in: Jack Spicer, 
The Collected Books of Jack Spicer, p. 297. 
31
 Goeffrey Hlibchuk, “From Typology to Topology: on 
Jack Spicer,” Contemporary Literature, vol. 51, no. 2 
(Summer 2010), p. 335. 
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distributions over the environment. In Deleuze, 
subjectivity is transformed into a set of “intensities,” 
which then “diffuse the subject and ‘echo’ it across the 
environment.”
32
 Spicer’s “topology”, with its Moebius 
Strip refusal of the inside/outside divide, provides ample 
evidence of this kind of operation, argues the critic. 
 
The disappearance of the individual voice from the 
poems has its anti-ideological import. The role of the 
poet has become that of an investigator, a dismantler of 
ideologies. When Stephen Burt approaches the poetry of 
Rae Armantrout, one of the most successful poets 
emerging from the LANGUAGE movement, he connects 
her disjunctive form with the project of debunking 
capitalist ideologies. Armantrout’s extreme formal care, 
with which she handles the most minute elements of 
poetic craft, becomes a device for the filtering out of 
fictions-spawning metaphors. However, as Burt notes, 
“even those perceptions become suspect for 
Armantrout… because they will always involve 
metaphor.”
33
 The result is poetry of total mistrust and 
suspicion, including the suspicion of language and poetry 
itself. Obviously, the language raised to such 
interrogating power will not bear any notion of the 
speaking subject. Burt again: “Armantrout has become 
the poet of our contemporary frustration with what we 
might call the social construction of everything. After 
Darwin, Freud, Gombrich, Derrida, Foucault, Bourdieu, 
Diebold … we know how little we can be the authors of 
ourselves.”
34
  
 
When Armantrout herself comments on the lyric, she 
owns up to the influence of Stein, but places it in the 
context of the models of poetic language found in 
Jacques Lacan (through Julia Kristeva). Referring to an 
intense play of sound and sense introduced into 
American poetry by Stein, Armantrout speaks of the 
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 Ibid., p. 336. 
33
 Stephen Burt, Close Calls with Nonsense: Reading New 
Poetry (Saint Paul, Minn.: Graywolf, 2009), p. 33. 
34
 Ibid., p. 38. 
repressed memory of the pre-linguistic, identified by 
Kristeva as the chora, which is now heard again in the 
way sound undermines sense. Armantrout writes: “when 
a poem’s sound (the semiotic) begins to overtake its 
sense (the symbolic), we enter the territory of this 
infantile amnesia where the ‘chora’ once reigned.”
35
 On 
these views, poetic quality is found in the disruption of 
the dominant sense structures of everyday language, 
what Kristeva and Lacan would call “the symbolic,” and 
the intrusion, or rather return, of the “semiotic” – a 
transgressive, and prelinguistic element.
36
  
 
A poetics of the dissolution of individualized subjectivity 
is also developed by Susan Howe, another post-
LANGUAGE poet. As one of the most acclaimed 
innovators of poetic forms, Howe has almost completely 
abandoned the idea of the personal poetic utterance 
coming out of an identified speaker. It is the stored 
corpora of language, the records, archives, material 
inscriptions that speak. The poet is merely a compiler of 
sources, a collagist of the existing traces of writing, and 
no specific language user is ever assumed. 
 
As an archeologist of the material preservations of 
discourse, Howe makes us realize that no such 
compilation can ever be complete, just as no rationalized 
discourse can ever be closed. There are always the 
external contents, the bits and pieces of non-sense 
haunting the discourse from an unutterable outside. This 
clearly brings to mind the Derridean notion of the space 
                                                 
35
 Rae Armantrout, “The Lyric,” in: The Grand Piano: an 
Experiment in Collective Autobiography, by Lyn Hejinian 
et al. (Detroit: Mode A, 2009), p. 38. 
36
 Julia Kristeva, Lacan’s disciple, sees poetic language as 
a special case of the linguistic, a language that is 
different from the illusive and deceptive order of 
everyday codes in its capacity of breaking through it and 
reaching back to, or listening to the “pulsations” of, the 
Lacanian pre-linguistic, which Kristeva names the chora. 
It is the pre-linguistic infantile stage of the chaotic mix of 
life and death drives which remains in the backing of the 
linguistic, as the source of energy for the signifying 
process, a “precondition for creating the first 
measurable bodies." See Julia Kristeva, Polylogue (Paris: 
Seuil, 1977), p. 57. 
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of writing, or inscription, as an element that reveals the 
absence – of the self, of the sense – much more than 
presence. History speaks to us, if at all, with an uncanny 
choir of all the voices repressed in the passage of time, 
in broken, staccato rhythms of disjunction and erasure. 
For Howe, history and self are, as for pragmatists, 
relational spaces, but her emphasis seems to be on the 
mysterious absence suffusing all relational systems. In 
her book, Midnight, she writes: “the relational space is 
alive with something from somewhere.”
37
 As in Derrida, 
the relationality of the space of writing results in the 
thought of radical absence and otherness putting a 
check on any possibility of the stabilization of discourse. 
This is why Peter Nicholls, when commenting on Howe, 
quotes Derrida’s conceptualization of writing as the 
practice “focusing particularly on the material character 
of signification, which constantly threatens to 
undermine the ‘pure’ ideality of meaning.”
38
 Such 
writing becomes “a place of unease,”
39
 which prevents 
the work of mourning to be ever completed and keeps 
haunting our rationalizations with the plethora of those 
voices that were never firmly settled in them, the 
memory of which will in this way never be suppressed. 
The network of relations between the found materials 
dissolves the voice and pushes it into a precarious space 
between life and death. Next to writing as a relational 
space fueled by absence, there are frequent remarks and 
snapshots in Howe of older burial technologies: “In most 
towns in New York State there were no hearses until 
around 1830. The dead were borne on a shoulder bier 
sometimes for many miles.”
40
 The death of the subject is 
here fully documented. 
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 Susan Howe, The Midnight (New York: New Directions, 
2003), p. 58. 
38
 Peter Nicholls, “Unsettling Wilderness: Susan Howe 
and American History,” Contemporary Literature, vol. 37, 
no. 4 (1996), p. 591. 
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40
 Susan Howe, Frame Structures (New York: New 
Directions, 1996), p. 6. 
The Neo-Pragmatist Correction of the Material 
Deconstruction of Individual Subjectivity. 
 
What becomes apparent in the juncture of the theory 
and practice of the poets and writers associated with the 
LANGUAGE group is a characteristic and rich theoretical-
practical convergence of themes and concepts. Coming 
together in this cluster are motifs which find their source 
in the past of American poetry and others that can be 
traced to continental theory. Taking a lesson from 
American poetic predecessors, such poets as Gertrude 
Stein, Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, Louis 
Zukofsky, and the objectivists, their LANGUAGE and 
post-LANGUAGE heirs have learned to attend to the 
material actuality and texture of their medium, and to 
see the advantage of admitting and exposing the artifice 
of poetic form. These strategies contribute to the idea of 
poetry as a tool of increased self-awareness, allowing for 
the interrogation and criticism of ideology in disguise of 
naturally accepted values.  
 
On the other hand, the kind of inflation of the role of 
language as an autonomous medium that the 
LANGUAGE poets espouse and profess is additionally 
attended to, explicated, reinforced, and justified with 
ideas derived from French, post-Heideggerian post-
structuralism. In this family of views, language is an 
uncanny space of the dissolution of the individual 
subject, either annihilating it, or forcing it to seek the 
true sources of life beyond itself (in jouissance, or 
silence). As we have seen, Kristeva’s notion of the poetic 
demands that poets seek in radical, syntactic disjunction 
the transgressive and anarchic contact with the area of 
the pre-linguistic. In Lacan, Kristeva’s teacher, the 
subject-formation in the language is inextricable from 
the subject’s acquiescence and acceptance of its own 
mortality as the ultimate reality of existence.
41
 In 
                                                 
41
 Language mortifies the subject in Lacan. Jouissance is 
beyond it, or before it, before the birth into the realm of 
symbols. Paradoxically, life is in the death of the subject. 
At one moment Lacan writes: “when we wish to attain in 
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Heidegger and the early Foucault, language is a space of 
necessity that overwhelms and cancels the individual.
42
 
Finally, in Derrida and his followers, language 
proliferates only to testify to the impossibility of any 
meaning formation, and any ego-formation, gesturing 
beyond itself, either toward silence or toward a plethora 
of noises that haunt all discourse and all narration as 
their repressed other.
43
 
 
The theoretical convergence outlined above can be 
provisionally named the poetics of the material 
deconstruction of individual subjectivity. Its common 
denominator is the decisive banishing of the idea of 
poetry as a space of the expression, or presence, or even 
formation, of individual subjectivity. Language, in its 
materiality, often merging with the recaptured 
materiality of the world, is thought to destroy such 
                                                                       
the subject what was before the serial articulations of 
speech, and what is primordial to the birth of symbols, 
we find it in death, from which his existence takes all the 
meaning it has.” Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (London: Routlege, 1989), pp. 104-5. 
42
 The Heideggerian merger of the linguistic faculty and 
the experience of death is well-known. In recent theory 
it was perhaps most forcibly argued by Giorgio Agamben 
who reminds us of Heidegger’s “essential relation 
between language and death,” in which “language is the 
voice and memory of death.” See Giorgio Agamben, 
Language and Death: the Place of Negativity, trans. 
Karen Pinkus and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2006), p. xi, 46. As for Foucault, at 
least in his early development, it is language, as a 
Dionisiac labyrinth erasing the individual, that represents 
the realm of death and authenticity. In his early book on 
Raymond Roussel, whose uncanny poetry of radical 
impersonality and procedurality, anticipates the 
experiment of the Oulipo group, Foucault wrote that it 
makes us “confront the unbearable evidence that 
language comes to us from the depth of the perfectly 
clear night, and is impossible to master.” See Michel 
Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of 
Raymond Roussel, trans. Charles Ruas (London: 
Continuum, 2004), p. 41. 
43
 In an as yet unpublished paper, presented at a 
conference “Theory That Matters: What Practice After 
Theory” in Łódź, in April 2010, Tadeusz Sławek, a leading 
Polish authority on Derrida, states: “long pages of 
Derrida’s work are, paradoxically, trying to reach and 
perhaps name the essential silence: the speaker has 
been speaking for so long and with such a strain and 
scream that his voice has gotten husky.”  
subjectivity, prevent its formation, and expose it as one 
of the illusions of an outdated, ideologically suspect 
humanism.     
 
What pragmatism and neo-pragmatism have to offer the 
discussion of American poetry is a correction of the 
poetics of material deconstruction. The pragmatist views 
on language, the relation between language and physical 
matter, between language and corporeality, 
communication, the individuality of the work of art, 
suggest that we can easily have a humanity without 
essence, which does not mutilate the world of things by 
its mere presence among them, but brings this world 
into existence, and that we can also have embodied, 
individual subjectivity without detrimental ideological 
blindness. Even more, pragmatism suggests that, in the 
arts, we actually always do have those qualities, and that 
their compulsive avoidance may be a kind of ideological 
overwriting itself. While it is naïve to expect poetry to be 
a place where subjectivities receive an “expression,” 
poetry, being a special state of language, necessarily 
carrying network combinations of human stances, will 
see the ongoing emergence of subjectivities. In the 
remaining section of this essay, I am going to outline the 
neo-pragmatist position on language, aesthetics, the 
idea of self-formation through entering the poetic 
process, and the ironies attendant on this act.  
 
Let us start with language itself. In pragmatism, language 
is not a space external to and inimical to individual 
subjectivity, but a tool of inter-subjective 
communication inseparable from the emergence of 
subjects. Language is the result of human plurality and 
sociality. The need of communication is primary and 
precedes, conditions, without incapacitating, the 
processes of self-formation: the human comes into being 
through the presence of other humans and 
communication with them. Already in Dewey, it is the 
need of communication that makes language a part of 
the world, but not in the sense of a thing having an 
essence, but as an operating human faculty that allows 
PR A G M A T I S M  A N D  P O E T R Y :   
TH E  NE O -PR A G M A T I S T  D I F F E R E N CE  I N  T H E  D I S CU S S I O N  O F  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  AM E R I C A N  P O E T R Y   
Kacpe r Bartczak  
 
 
 56 
humans to change inchoate external impulses into the 
things we know. In Experience and Nature, Dewey wrote: 
“that things should be able to pass from the plane of 
external pushing and pulling to that of revealing 
themselves to man… that the fruit of communication 
should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side 
of which transubstantiation pales.”
44
 Individuals and 
inanimate things exist because of the medium of 
communication. Dewey again: “Where communication 
exists things in acquiring meaning thereby acquire 
representatives, sings and implicates, which are infinitely 
more amenable … more permanent and more 
accommodating, than events in their first estate.”
45
 The 
“first estate” is out there, but it is not a locus of any 
meaning that could or should be recuperated. There is 
no pre-linguistic (Lacan, Kristeva) or extra-linguistic 
(Derrida) jouissance, which should be accessed for the 
rejuvenation of the linguistic. No extra-linguistic realm 
dictates anything, or determines the ensuing movement 
of signification and communication. 
 
It is the process of communication and the emerging 
signification that constitutes all of the environment, with 
all of its energy. Thus, when Donald Davidson opens his 
book on “truth and predication,” truth appears not so 
much a result of the accurate aligning of signs with any 
world outside the signs, any “first estate,” but rather the 
condition and environment in which signification may 
occur at all, a force field that keeps the interlocutors in 
play as agents responsible for the play. It is they who 
speak, not the “world,” not “things in themselves” in 
their stipulated freedom from the human regime. 
“Truth” and significance, the life and death of signs, 
happen in the area of human discourse, are thoroughly 
human phenomena, and belong in everyday, normal 
situations. Davidson continues: “the problem the 
pragmatists were addressing – the problem of how to 
relate the truth to human desire, beliefs, intentions… 
                                                 
44
 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1929), p. 138. 
45
 Ibid., p. 138-9. 
seems to me the right one to concentrate on in the 
thinking about truth,”
46
 and he connects Dewey with 
Rorty: “Rorty captures Dewey’s intention of removing 
truth from a realm so exalted only philosophers could 
hope to attain.”
47
 For Davidson, human beliefs, desires 
(and thus pleasures), in fact all of human psychical life, 
have their life in and through the space of linguistic 
exchange, truth being the name of the human 
commitment to this space, not the name of the accuracy 
of representation. There is no sign exchange that can be 
called language if it does not carry with it the networks 
of human stances and attitudes.  
 
Rorty and Davidson disagree on the ultimate interest, 
import, and value of the term “truth,” but they share the 
Deweyan view according to which all interest, meaning, 
and import reside in the vicissitudes of the 
communication process. The central premise of Rortyan 
philosophy can be found in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, in a fragment which succinctly summarizes the 
argument of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: “Truth 
cannot be out there, because sentences cannot so exist… 
The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are 
not.”
48
 In Dewey, Davidson, and in Rorty, the world does 
not speak, and the notion that there is an independent 
entity called “nature” suffering the regime of human 
notions becomes unintelligible. The world outside the 
human does not offer any system of signification; 
whatever it comes to “signify,” emanates from the 
human element.  
 
The world is lost in this discourse, “well-lost,” as Rorty 
put it in one of his essays, but the loss applies only to the 
non-human world: what is lost, or eliminated, is the idea 
that the non-human offers any instruction for the 
human. In fact, the world in the neo-pragmatist 
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 Donald Davidson, Truth and Predication (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 9. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Richard Rorty, Contingency Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 5. 
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discourse is regained, and it is regained on new rights 
and new conditions. As Rorty argues convincingly in “The 
World Well-Lost,” drawing largely on Davidson’s 
refutation of the scheme-content distinction, the world 
is always with us. As long as we speak, as long as we 
maintain the communication process going and our 
commitment to it fresh, we maintain and preserve the 
world and are in touch with it. There is no gap between 
human language and things. By speaking, we remain 
related to the world. It is the human discourse that is the 
world.
49
 With the pragmatist take on language, we see 
that the radical other of “death,” found in the area of 
language by Heidegger, Agamben, Lacan, or by the early 
Foucault, or the “life” of inanimate matter, the “things 
themselves,” can only be figures for the further 
proliferation of discourse, the further life of the 
organism’s linguistic activity, the further self-creation 
and proliferation of the human capacity for wanting new 
shapes for its world. 
 
This understanding of language and communication has 
tremendous consequences for our understanding of 
what the literary language may be. First, to say that we 
are in touch with the world all the time, as Rorty and 
Davidson say, is to remove the burden of representation 
from among the tasks of language. What it also means, 
however, is that we have no recourse to the drama of 
the human as a filter disturbing either the great Non-
Being of the universe of death or the life of things. 
Secondly, the deconstructive notion that literature, as a 
richly self-annihilating play of language, is the highest 
consciousness of the dissolution of meaning under the 
pressure of this extra-linguistic “outside” has no footing 
after the lesson of neo-pragmatism.
50
  
                                                 
49
 Richard Rorty, “The World Well-Lost,” in: 
Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 13. 
50
 Such is the idea of literature coming out of the books 
of Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller. Their approach uses a 
distinction between the less self-aware, empirical 
languages of the everyday, and the more insightful and 
self-aware languages of literature, that testify, in a kind 
The first consequence will shed light on the relation of 
the human and the world of objects, and I will return to 
it below. The second consequence changes our 
understanding of the status of literary discourse. There is 
no radical break between the languages of everyday 
discourse and literary languages. There is only a shift in 
the environment and context of the communication – in 
its urgency. In everyday discourse, determined by all 
kinds of economic rules, for example Grice’s 
conversational maxisms, or Davidson’s “charity,” there is 
a high degree of urgency, which curbs the indeterminacy 
inherent in all linguistic exchange and pushes toward 
limited communicative goals. In the non-everyday, or, 
say, “literary” communication, such urgency is removed. 
This, however, does not – cannot – mean the removal of 
the linguistic or a breaking through, by means of 
fragmented syntax, dissected word formation, or “pure 
materiality of the letter,” to the “other side” of 
language, the “pre-linguistic” in any of its numerous 
theoretical guises. The literary, or the poetic, is still 
linguistic, unless we want to speak of other aesthetic 
disciplines, such as music or visual arts (whatever is 
meant, for instance, by the “pure materiality of the 
letter” must be either picture or music – not language). 
The removal of the urgency governing everyday 
conversation does not mean abandoning the realm of 
language as a tool that was honed in the conversational 
and communicative contexts. The aesthetic language of 
literature is not radically different from the language of 
everyday conversation, since, as it is clear in Dewey and 
Davidson, the latter are already indebted to the 
aesthetic. The difference is in degree, not in kind. To 
enter the poetic means to intensify the experimental 
search for new possibilities, the search that is already 
present in everyday exchanges, where, however, it must 
give way to the principle of communicative urgency. In 
the poetic, the ordinary communicative ploys are free to 
strike a new pose.  
 
                                                                       
of negative transcendence, to the basic impossibility of 
meaning. 
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Furthermore, in the pragmatist perspective, the life of 
desire and of the human psyche is linguistic, and it 
contains its otherness inside the ongoing communicative 
process. There is no danger that in such life the 
heterogeneity of desire, which the cluster of views I 
called material deconstruction stipulates to be found 
“outside” of language, will be sterilized by the 
homogenizing tendencies of the linguistic subject. As 
Davidson showed in his discussions of malapropisms, an 
ordinary conversation already confronts the subject with 
otherness; otherness inheres in every ordinary linguistic 
situation in which individual idioms collide and exceed 
the platform of language as a rule-governed whole.
51
 It is 
in this Davidsonian contribution to the linguistic thought 
of Dewey and Rorty that we may correct the view that 
“language speaks man.” From the fact that the linguistic 
inventories are bigger and wider than any single 
linguistic situation cannot be inferred that it determines 
the rich network of collisions and distortions that will 
occur in every linguistic situation. Neo-pragmatism 
reverses the relation: it is humans, in their interactions 
that have a chance of rewriting linguistic maps. What 
speaks are humans in particular situations, and the 
literary is an enhancement and an exposure of this 
capacity. 
 
The accelerated immersion in linguistic encounters, 
which is the proper function of the poetic, reformulates 
desire and absorbs it into the whole life of the self. 
Inasmuch as desire takes on significance, it is inextricably 
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 I am referring to Davidson’s model of communication, 
developed in the paper “A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs,” which demands from all involved 
interlocutors an ongoing readjustment of their linguistic 
assumptions and skills. On the view that I am proposing 
here, although the produced modifications of the 
interlocutors’ linguistic inventories (their “prior 
theories”) continue to conform to general semantic 
rules, they also put pressure on those rules and thus 
modify convention and the linguistic network of the self. 
For Davidson’s paper, see Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. 
Ernest LePore (Oxford New York: Basil Blackwell 1986), 
pp. 433-446. 
linked to articulation, not separate from it. This is the 
lesson that Alexander Nehamas draws from Rorty’s 
scattered remarks on self-creation through the writing 
and reading process. Beauty is a spur of creation, but is 
also a spur to indefatigable pursuit of beauty and desire 
that happens in and through the process of 
interpretation.
52
 
 
The interpretive work is present at all levels of reality. 
Not even the everyday appearances of things are free 
from such networks. What we take to be the everyday 
appearance is just the absence of the need to 
reinterpret. Nehamas writes: “what counts as 
observation, as W.V. Quine insisted, is what the 
members of a particular group with similar background 
will agree to immediately, when presented with the 
same phenomenon.”
53
 Necessarily, however, such 
agreements are always dynamic. They change and, with 
them, changes the appearance of things. Interpretation 
enters, and “since each thing resembles and differs from 
infinitely many others, the process can go on forever.”
54
 
Thus, it is even at the level of the everyday ordinariness 
that interpretations are present, as stabilized 
conventions. Aesthetic or artistic action starts when 
these interpretations cease to be latent. The artistic lies 
in the open acceleration of the work of interpretation 
and re-interpretation, in immersing the object in newer 
networks of connections and contexts (Rorty called this 
operation recontextualization). Nehamas again: 
“Nothing is what it is independently of anything else; no 
                                                 
52
 Nehamas’s interpretation of the function of beauty in 
creation departs from the Shopenhauerian gesture in 
which the artist creates in order to cease to want and 
get out of the trap of the ever-unfulfilled desire. Against 
this picture, Nehamas develops a combination of Plato 
and Nietzsche. Alexander Nehamas, Only a Promise of 
Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 131-
133. 
53
 Ibid., p. 124. 
54
 Ibid. 
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moment, no person, no thing has a meaning in and of 
itself.”
55
  
 
In Nehamas we see the full realization of the 
consequence of pragmatist linguistics for the relations of 
the human with the so called realm of matter and 
objects. In the pragmatist view, there is no place for 
what Gerald Bruns is looking for in his promotion of 
materialist poetics, or for Hejinian’s idea active in 
material deconstruction, according to which “the 
materials of nature speak.” The search for the realm of 
things free from the regime of the human, or the idea of 
respecting the world of things on its own, becomes 
indefensible. The best poems of those poets who, like 
Ponge, or like William Carlos Williams, deal with objects, 
do not free their so far suppressed or ideologically 
distorted nature, but raise them into the realm of human 
potentiality. It is the neo-pragmatist approach that 
corrects our stance toward objects: shame is in place 
when there is a shortage of human imaginativeness, not 
when there is an excess of the human. Interpretation, as 
something inescapable, can be enslaving or liberating. It 
is enslaving when its presence is denied; liberating, when 
admitted and attended to. Art offers the latter option, 
by taking special care, or activating, the work of 
interpretation arrested by custom. When Francis Ponge 
confesses that “I have chosen things, objects, so that I 
would always have a break on my subjectivity, calling 
back the object as it exists when I write about it,”
56
 he is 
mistaking excellent interpretive work, of the kind that is 
found in his own poems, for lack of interpretation and 
“objectivity.” No object was ever seen by anybody the 
way he sees them in his poems. The gain in seeing, 
obviously sharable, is subjective in the sense of emerging 
through a uniquely focused artistic attention.  
 
It is also through and in this ongoing, never ending, 
driven-by-the-desire-for-beauty, interpretive pursuit 
that our being in constant touch with the world comes to 
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 Bruns, The Material of Poetry, p. 87. 
open our self-creative touch with ourselves. The joint 
perspectives of Rorty and Nehamas make inescapable 
not only the fact that all ordinariness is already an 
interpretation, but also the fact that the interpretation 
performed in the service of the pursuit of desire and 
beauty is the work of self-creation. This mechanism is 
already seen in the Davidsonian notion of the 
communicative situation: it will put relocative pressure 
on the linguistic networks of the self. Similarly, in Rorty 
and in Nehamas, all interpretation is a relocation of the 
values of the existing relational network, which, 
however, are never freely floating, impersonal entities. 
The relational networks of beliefs, desires, and values, 
are parts of living selves, and as they are transformed, so 
are the selves. Art and the poetic, again, are a self-aware 
entry into the process, and the famed death of the 
author is a fable. For Rorty, self-creation is an 
inescapable result of severing all inquiry from the task of 
representation. Inquiry as recontextualization 
necessarily beams back on the inquirer. The reading and 
writing processes are a special kind of 
recontextualization, one that proceeds without the clear 
goals set by the inquiry of normal science. But the 
removal of clearly set goals does nothing to the 
processes of self-creation. On the contrary, as the 
literary process proceeds, the self comes into contact 
with an array of its possible new configurations that is 
simply vaster than the shapes the self takes in its 
everyday interactions.
57
 
 
Nehamas continues these motifs in Rorty, and refocuses 
them on self-creation through the artistic. In the arts, 
                                                 
57
 I am drawing of course on a large area of Rorty’s views 
and writings. Perhaps there are some more definite 
points on this map that I could refer my readers to. For 
example, I think there is a consistent line that leads from 
texts like “Inquiry as Recontextualization” (in: 
Objectivity, Relativity, and Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) to, say, “Philosophy as a 
Transitional Genre” (in: Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007) to “Redemption from 
Egotism” (in: The Rorty Reader, ed. Christopher Voparil 
and Richard Bernstein, Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010)  
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the prolonged contact with works of art instigates 
interpretive processes that will affect the self. The work 
of art comes into being as a special, unique arrangement 
of motifs and elements. All such arrangement 
“constitutes an individual.”
58
 Works of art, those that are 
created or those that are only interpreted, become 
integral parts of human lives: “beautiful things interpose 
themselves between me and what I already want. They 
give me new things to desire.”
59
 The subject does not die 
in the creative processes; on the contrary, the subject is 
born in them. Nehamas points out that Foucault’s 
criticism of the notion of the author works with a narrow 
concept of the author as a mental state that precedes 
the work of art and can then be treated as a reference 
template for interpretation. The moment we realize that 
creation is an active participation in the network, we will 
realize that no such activity is harmless, leaving the 
subject untouched and unchanged. The work itself will 
appear as a source or hypothesis of individualized 
subjectivity, gaining its shape, however temporary, 
inside the work: “the author emerges as the agent 
postulated in order to account for construing a text as 
the product of an action.”
60
 Authors and subjectivity are 
products of literary works, and authors are the future, 
not the past, of texts. 
 
Finally, in the family of neo-pragmatist approaches, the 
linguisticism of Rorty and the aestheticism of Nehamas 
are complemented by the work of Richard Shusterman. 
His writings provide ample argument for the idea that 
while the interpretive work of self-creation is done in 
and through language, it is not done through language as 
a disembodied abstraction. It is true, of course, that 
there are deep differences between the radical 
linguisticism of Rorty and Shusterman’s someasthetics, 
but these differences cannot be dealt with here for the 
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lack of space. I would like to note at this point, however, 
that the work of many major American poets involved 
the move of combining states of the psyche and 
cognition with states of the bodily. The obvious example 
here is Whitman for whom writing was impossible 
without including forms of somatic awareness. This 
awareness is present in Emily Dickinson, William Carlos 
Williams, Robert Creeley, Frank O’Hara, and many other 
American poets.
61
 Poetry then becomes a space in which 
language and the bodily cease to exist in the manner of 
precedence. Rather than one being a reflection or 
product of the other, they achieve in poems more 
reciprocal, mutually nourishing modes of being. There 
are kinds of language in major poetry that would never 
occur if they were not issued by organisms that are 
simultaneously linguistic and embodied.
62
 
 
Thus, because of the heightened reciprocity of the 
language of a large number of major poets and the 
somatic states registered by this language, I think 
Shusterman makes an important point, which is a 
necessary complementation of Rorty’s insistence that all 
awareness is linguistic. Without solving this philosophical 
difference and going for or against the claim that all 
awareness is linguistic, I only wish to point out that the 
consciousness produced by vast corpora of poetry is 
both linguistic and somatic.
63
 This fact speaks for 
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 It is very interesting to note that even as cerebral and 
cold a poet as Wallace Stevens proves, on closer reading, 
to be drawing on the somatic awareness of bodily states. 
Stevens’s formal discipline and his lexical extravagance 
coexist, render, respond to, alternately cause and 
reflect, the somatic states of strong but deeply 
restrained pleasures. 
62
 Creeley’s meticulous portraits of the material space 
surrounding his speakers implies his heightened 
sensitivity to his corporeal conditions; O’Hara’s urban 
topographies would be incomplete without the language 
of his poems carrying with them the record of the bodily 
states of pleasure or fatigue. 
63
 I am aware, of course, that Shusterman’s position is 
more radical than mine. My reading of poetry makes me 
think that the linguistic and the bodily go hand in hand, 
nourish and enrich one another, ultimately producing 
states of being in which the difference between them 
ceases to exist. I think that Shusterman, on the other 
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Shusterman’s central argument, which highlights 
somatic mindfulness as a form of subjectivity that is 
fuller, wider, and more capacious than merely the 
cerebrally understood linguisticity. This argument speaks 
against “ignore[ing] the body’s subject-role as the living 
locus of beautiful, personal experience”; it “refuses to 
exteriorize the body as an alienated thing distinct from 
the active spirit of human experience.”
64
 The increased 
somatic mindfulness – whether catalyzed by language or 
catalyzing new linguistic formations – is definitely 
present in the kind of subjectivity that is emergent in 
complex poetic texts. 
 
With this neo-pragmatist contribution in mind, however, 
we can return to one of the ideas of radical otherness 
and verify the ideas of those critics who, like Bruns, 
would like to see the body turned into “flesh” or a “body 
without organs” and purified of singular identity. Bruns’s 
argument in Ceasing to be Human is that the decision of 
entering the kind of animal state that will ultimately 
change the controllable “body” into a bare life of flesh 
can produce a form of life that is interesting from the 
communicative and political point of view.
65
  
 
The neo-pragmatist perspective makes these approaches 
much less interesting and debunks them as remnants of 
the metaphysics of the great “outside.” The work of 
Shusterman makes it clear that the fact that the bodily is 
a potential for enlarging the scope of subjectivity, 
against the Cartesian tradition, should not be taken as an 
argument for pushing the bodily into the muteness and 
speechlessness of featureless generality. On the 
contrary, Shusterman shows that the recuperation of the 
                                                                       
hand, would rather insist that important areas of the 
somatic experience are just non-linguistic. In Practicing 
Philosophy, for example, he mentions “a more 
controversial dimension of bodily experience, a quality 
of somatic feeling that lies beneath linguistic formulation 
and often resists it.” See his Practicing Philosophy: 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 31. 
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bodily sphere from the objectifying tendencies of the 
Cartesian heritage involves commerce between the 
bodily and forms of attention and thus articulateness. 
The bodily is freed into a form of subjectivity when it is 
attended to through states of somatic mindfulness, 
which, in my view at least, do not quarrel with greater 
articulateness.  
 
The resulting inclusion of the bodily in the life of 
subjectivity is inseparable from the greater individuation 
and internal differentiation of the bodily features. Within 
Shusterman’s somatic mindfulness, the body itself 
becomes more articulate, both capable of articulation, 
and requiring or influencing greater efforts at 
articulation. While Bruns’s “bare body” is advertised as a 
form of life, it is in fact a form of blandness, personal and 
political disappearance. In the picture proposed by 
Shusterman, the body is beginning to signify more, 
aesthetically and politically, when the organism is 
capable of far deeper interpretive and differentiating 
contact with its somatic sphere. It is when more of the 
bodily can be felt, sensed, named, communicated with, 
accessed by language, by instruction, or by somatic or 
aesthetic action, that the subject has a bigger chance of 
politically aware relation with one’s surroundings.  
 
Conclusions: the Poetic Strangeness of Pragmatism and 
the Poetics of Emergent Selves. 
 
Pragmatism is a difficult position. Its rejection of 
metaphysics is far more radical and insistent than in the 
case of other philosophical styles. Neo-pragmatism 
reinforces, indeed radicalizes, classical pragmatism’s 
message of the central and inescapable position of the 
human element. It is the human, with its meaning 
making and interpretive potential, that is the sole source 
of what we call the world. The only “outside” is in the 
future shapes that the human selves can take, the newly 
emergent shapes of the selves.  
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In the work of Rorty, Davidson, Nehamas, and 
Shusterman, meaning, language, desire and beauty (or 
ugliness) are human states. What I called here the 
convergence of material deconstruction does not so 
much escape the human, as it tries to explain it either as 
a being that is endlessly dependent on the necessity of 
biological death, or a being that is determined by the 
“materiality of language.” In this picture, the human is 
explained as an accident of dead matter or as an 
emanation of language. The radical post-humanist irony 
of the new pragmatism resides in the fact that here, for 
once, there is a firm refusal to reach for any such 
explanation of the human. The neo-pragmatist 
humanity, understood non-essentially as a potentiality 
for new shapes of both singular subjectivities and their 
communities, is not to be explained as an accidental 
error of the absolute emptiness or a terminal of a 
linguistic network. Biological death is a fact of life, not 
the other way round, and language is not a space 
nurturing the work of active negativity, but a non-
essential medium of looking for the future shapes of 
human selves. Rather than being an external element, 
language is an integral part of each self.  
 
As such, however, the human is also infinitely strange. 
To refuse to justify human activity through backing it up 
by appeal to some sort of externality is to see humanity 
as permanently unexplained – thus strange. The lesson 
of the new-pragmatism is that there is no final 
knowledge of what the human may be, or what it may 
become. Consequently, no shape attained by the human 
is stable and making and unmaking are constant and 
inseparable elements of human reality. To say that is to 
enter the mode of active pragmatist irony. Unlike the 
absolute irony of deconstruction, pragmatist irony 
merely stipulates that in imaginative writing 
reinterpretations are constantly at work, and where this 
happens there appear new shapes of selves. Pragmatist 
irony enters when we know that we will be different; 
ironical self-creation happens when we start 
participating actively in the change. 
Contemporary poetry, with its unchecked experimental 
impulse, is certainly a place where such participation 
occurs. With no support in the absolutist thought of 
death in language, it does not revert the selves to the 
non-being of dead materiality; rather, it makes the 
radically ironic move of pushing selves on course toward 
their new shapes. Also, language, although it is never 
entirely the speaker’s possession, bringing with it 
intrusive, inauthentic, ideologically contaminated 
constructions, is not entirely alienated from the self or 
the self from it. With Rorty and Davidson it is more 
proper to say that one can oppose the received 
languages. This opposition, so often registered in 
contemporary American poetry, will result in new 
specific linguistic positions: there will be more language 
and thus more newly evolved subjective positions. These 
positions will imply specific states of interaction with the 
world that are both linguistic and somatic (embodied). 
Thus the transformations that affect the self will have 
lasting consequences in the outside world. Neo-
pragmatism does more than repeat the idea of the 
transitive character of all achieved linguistic states: it is 
also a reminder that, despite their transitiveness, these 
states will affect the world. The neo-pragmatist poetics 
of the evolving self is then a platform for political 
stances, more feasible than the aesthetics of endless 
dissolution.  
 
To sense one’s self evolving through active 
linguistic/poetic activities and to consciously choose this 
state, is to enter ironic self-creation. It is this ironic self-
creation that is the consequence of the combined stance 
of Rorty, Davidson, Nehamas, and Shusterman. 
However, to enter the process and space of ironic self-
creation is also to feel the strangeness of self-
transformation. The state of death-in-life – a dispersion 
of the central Cartesian subjectivity – sensed by some of 
the major American poets, from Whitman, through 
Sevens, to the poets of contemporary disjunctiveness 
(such as the poets I mentioned in this essay) should be 
reinterpreted away from the ideas of the self’s erasure 
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under the larger presence of the mass of impersonal 
language, or the self’s submission to the truth of the 
material world, and brought closer to the family of ideas 
speaking of the emergence of new selves. Each entry 
into the space of increased linguistic play creates a 
relocation and a trembling in the linguistic and somatic 
states of the self. The new selves, as they are glimpsed 
emerging in the poems, create tension between the 
biographical self of the writer and the text. What some 
poets have provisionally identified as the state of a 
poetic “death” can now, with the neo-pragmatist 
contribution, be reinterpreted as the experience of this 
kind of tension and dispersal. But it is not the realm of 
death that is so experienced – there is no play of 
meanings, no states of connective networks, in death. 
 
Rather this experience is the experience of ironic self-
creation: of one’s own self getting destabilized in the 
confrontation of its new emergent selves. I think that 
what happens in the poetry of Howe, Armantrout, or 
Peter Gizzi (a continuator Spicer’s legacy) and many 
other formally innovative American poets, is the 
encounter of this experience. What criticism has failed to 
do so far is to offer language in which poets could see 
their practice not so much as an obliteration of their 
individual subjectivity but a space of its reconfiguration. 
New-pragmatism provides a vital, much needed impulse 
toward such a reinterpretation.  
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For the last three decades the new pragmatism in 
American literary studies has been commonly associated 
with several prominent critics including Steven Knapp, 
Walter Benn Michaels, Stanley Fish, Steven Mailloux, 
Giles Gunn, and Richard Poirier. From a neighboring 
discipline, such philosophers as Richard Rorty, by 
claiming that philosophy and literature do not differ in 
essence, have offered literary scholars vigorous 
encouragement to draw on the pragmatist heritage.
1
 
And yet many of those who have been recognized as 
leading literary neo-pragmatists
2
 – such as Walter Benn 
Michaels and Stanley Fish – remain silent about their 
actual attitude to philosophical pragmatism and deny 
their own writings any substantial consequences.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Rorty emphasizes the parallels between philosophy and 
literature in many of his writings. One of the most 
interesting discussions of those parallels is to be found in 
an interview which he gave to E. P. Ragg in 2002. See 
Richard Rorty, with E. P. Ragg, “Worlds or Words Apart? 
The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: 
An Interview with Richard Rorty,” Philosophy and 
Literature, vol. 26 (2002), pp. 369-396. Elsewhere, Rorty 
goes so far as to claim that philosophy is in fact a literary 
genre. See Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Transitional 
Genre,” in: Philosophy as Cultural Politics. Philosophical 
Papers, Volume 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 91. 
2
 The first book-length publication which announced the 
emergence of neo-pragmatism in literary studies was 
Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New 
Pragmatism (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985) edited by W. J. T. Mitchell. This 
collection of essays includes “Against Theory” by Walter 
Benn Michaels and Steven Knapp as well as critical 
responses to their seminal text followed by Michaels and 
Knapp’s rejoinders. 
3
 This is best exemplified by Stanley Fish’s essay entitled 
“Consequences,” in which he argues that his (and 
anyone else’s) views on theory entail no practical 
consequences whatsoever. See Stanley Fish, 
“Consequences,” in: Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory 
in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1989), pp. 315-341. I take issue with 
Interestingly, even “Against Theory” by Michaels and 
Knapp, the pioneering text of literary neo-pragmatism, 
which came to be identified as a manifesto of the 
movement, seems to owe very little to the most 
influential pragmatist thinkers of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Its central point – that 
interpretation of literature need not (and should not) 
rely on a prescriptive theory of any sort – is empiricist 
through and through, and as such it draws on an 
epistemological position which considerably predates 
the emergence of pragmatism. In fact, the closest Knapp 
and Michaels get to aligning their perspective with 
philosophical pragmatism is when they refuse to 
separate knowledge from true belief; however, at no 
point are they prepared to acknowledge that their 
argument is informed by the views expounded in the 
works of Charles Sanders Peirce or William James. 
Therefore, “Against Theory” may be described as anti-
theoretical, but not necessarily as pragmatist. Whether it 
is genuinely pragmatic
4
 also remains an open question. 
 
Gerald Graff’s works belong to a different category. 
Although like his close friend, Stanley Fish, Graff has 
never declared himself to be a pragmatist, on closer 
inspection most of his writings on literature and liberal 
education, unlike Fish’s, reveal both pragmatist 
inspirations and far-reaching pragmatic ramifications. 
                                                                       
Fish’s position in Disciplining the New Pragmatism: 
Theory, Rhetoric, and the Ends of Literary Study 
(Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: 
Peter Lang, 2006), especially pp. 129-135. 
4
 Throughout this essay I maintain a distinction between 
the two adjectives – pragmatist and pragmatic – even 
though they are both semantically related to 
pragmatism (from Gr. pragma: action, a deed, an affair) 
and may be treated synonymously in another context. I 
use ‘pragmatist’ to refer to the nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century philosophical tradition, which is either 
explicitly or implicitly invoked in some contemporary 
writings, while ‘pragmatic’ implies practice, action, and a 
matter-of-fact, forward-looking attitude characteristic of 
those who seek to transform their immediate 
environment. In the case of most of the literary and 
educational criticism I discuss here, ‘pragmatic’ (or ‘neo-
pragmatist’) seems to be a more adequate qualification 
of its practice-oriented, empirical thrust. Accordingly, I 
reserve ‘pragmatist’ for a possible description of its 
philosophical provenance. 
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Therefore I find it somewhat surprising that so far Graff 
has not been included in the ranks of the most 
prominent neo-pragmatists either by his adversaries or 
by his supporters. My claim is that the majority of Graff’s 
works do deserve the label of pragmatism, perhaps even 
more so than most of the texts produced by the card-
carrying neo-pragmatists. Not only does his position on 
pedagogy emerge as a creative and intelligent 
interpretation of John Dewey’s views presented, inter 
alia, in Democracy and Education but also, perhaps more 
importantly, Graff’s contributions are predominantly 
practical, rather than theoretical. They shy away from 
purely philosophical speculation and are meant to make 
a real difference, at least within the academic world. 
Consequently, as I argue here, even though there are 
few direct references to Dewey’s corpus in Graff’s 
works,
5
 it is still possible to read his markedly non-
philosophical writings as contextualized applications of 
Dewey’s general views on progressive education.  
 
One of the most significant pragmatist tenets which 
Graff subscribes to involves the notions of knowledge 
and communication. For Dewey knowledge is not a 
matter of a faithful representation of some external 
reality but a mode of social practice which crucially 
depends on interaction with other human beings and 
our environment: “If the living, experiencing being is an 
intimate participant in the activities of the world to 
which it belongs, then knowledge is a mode of 
participation, valuable in the degree in which it is 
effective.”
6
 If the acquisition of knowledge involves 
participation, then the essence of education lies in 
developing communication skills. Consequently, as Gert 
Biesta has it, Dewey’s theory of education is a theory of 
                                                 
5
 In my view, Graff’s arguments do not necessarily 
require a philosophical validation to be effective. It is not 
his priority to make them appear philosophically sound; 
what matters is that his writings successfully address the 
key dilemmas connected with the tasks and functions of 
the contemporary humanities.  
6
 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (A Penn State 
Electronic Series Classics Publication, 2001), p. 345. 
communication.
7
 In the context of contemporary 
academia, this translates into Graff’s contention that we 
live in an argument culture and the mission of the 
university should be to prepare its students for 
participation in public life. More specifically, by exposing 
them to intellectual conflicts, educators should develop 
their students’ critical and argumentative skills. That 
imperative underlies Graff’s model of ‘teaching the 
conflicts,’ which I discuss at length further on in this 
essay. 
 
Another crucial issue raised in Democracy and Education 
concerns the status of the student. Unlike many 
traditional pedagogical approaches which conceive of 
the student as the object of educational efforts on the 
part of the teacher, Dewey’s progressive position may be 
described as learner-oriented. His notion of the process 
of education, which, as I have already indicated, relies on 
participation, communication and mutual engagement 
of both parties (i.e., the student and the teacher), 
precludes the possibility of forcing anything upon or into 
the learner because, by doing so, the teacher may 
“distort and pervert human nature.”
8
 Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that, according to Dewey’s 
commentators, “[s]tudents as intentional, independently 
capable, autonomy-deserving persons are at the core of 
[his] work.”
9
 Among Graff’s recent writings, Clueless in 
Academe is a very eloquent reminder of how important 
it is to take the student’s perspective into account in 
humanities education. What is particularly valuable 
about Graff’s work (and, at the same time, emblematic 
of his pragmatism) is that he addresses the most burning 
questions in the contemporary academy by looking at 
the effectiveness of university education from the point 
                                                 
7
 See Gert Biesta, “‘Of All Affairs, Communication Is the 
Most Wonderful’: The Communicative Turn in Dewey’s 
Democracy and Education,” in: John Dewey and Our 
Educational Prospect: A Critical Engagement With 
Dewey’s Democracy and Education, ed. David T. Hansen 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 26. 
8
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 30. 
9
 Gary D. Fenstermacher, “Rediscovering the Student in 
Democracy and Education,” in: John Dewey and Our 
Educational Prospect, p. 97. 
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of view of ‘a generic alienated student.’
10
 He invariably 
analyzes those questions (which I discuss at length in 
Sections II and III) with a view to eliminating 
misunderstandings and unnecessary complications. 
Moreover, Graff’s writings envisage a future in which a 
reformed and improved humanities education will 
realize its potential to make students’ and teachers’ 
academic experience meaningful and satisfying. 
 
Graff’s pragmatism is also reflected in his choice of the 
epigraph for Literature Against Itself, the first major 
statement of his position on literature and its functions. 
By adopting Lionel Trilling’s observation (“I think this is 
the great sin of the intellectual: that he never really tests 
his ideas by what it would mean to him if he were to 
undergo the experience that he is recommending”
11
), 
Graff stresses the necessity of correlating intellectual 
reflection with practice. I highlight the correlation 
throughout this essay; however, I begin with Graff’s 
general views on literary studies and education at large, 
and it is not until I reach Section II that I focus on more 
detailed academic issues that he considers particularly 
urgent. Finally, Section III is concerned with Graff’s 
constructive suggestions and solutions, which he 
proffers in the hope of finding answers to some of the 
crucial problems of the humanities education and 
research, including those which currently beset literary 
studies. 
 
I 
 
Graff’s status in the academy can hardly be described as 
that of a theorist of literature, culture or education, 
although in his writings there are numerous passages 
which explicitly address theoretical, philosophical and 
social issues. Still, their thrust is usually subordinated to 
a practice-oriented agenda. The presence of ideological 
                                                 
10
 See Gerald Graff, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling 
Obscures the Life of the Mind (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 130-131. 
11
 See Gerald Graff, Literature Against Itself: Literary 
Ideas in Modern Society (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 1. 
and methodological statements in his books varies 
considerably, his early publications being more 
consistently programmatic in this respect. Published in 
1979, Literature Against Itself is definitely a case in 
point. There, Graff engages in polemical discussions with 
poststructuralism, New Criticism and a score of other 
positions that deny literature’s entanglement in history, 
politics, and social conditions which have inspired it and 
affected its shape and message. In that polemic, he 
elaborates a critique which obliges him to clearly define 
his own perspective. This is not to say that in his later 
writings he avoids identifying his stance on many key 
theoretical questions. Most of those, however, occur in 
specific contexts, in discussions which are not primarily 
intended as contributions to the broadly defined 
discourse of theory. 
 
What follows in this section is an overview of Graff’s 
chief assumptions about literary studies, cultural studies, 
education, intellectualism, and democracy. The very fact 
that those assumptions are less and less forcefully 
articulated in his recent books is testimony to their non-
dogmatic quality and Graff’s open-mindedness about 
various views and critical positions. This is illustrated by 
a telling passage in the introduction to his 1992 book, 
Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts 
Can Revitalize American Education. There, he 
acknowledges that in Literature Against Itself he 
underappreciated the value of the views he was 
attacking and acknowledges that by studying them 
closely he has learnt more from his adversaries than 
from his allies. Thereby, he issues a warning against 
“clos[ing] ourselves off from new ways of thinking.”
12
 
When critics of his writings find fault with Graff’s 
apparent inconsistencies over the course of his long and 
                                                 
12
 Gerald Graff, Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching 
the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education (New 
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 
viii. From the vantage point of the present, it seems 
surprising that in the early 1990’s Graff should have 
been accused of being doctrinaire – see Harold Fromm, 
“Establishing A Way in a World of Conflicts,” in: Teaching 
the Conflicts: Gerald Graff, Curricular Reform, and the 
Culture Wars, ed. William E. Cain (New York and London: 
Garland, 1994), p. 72. 
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eventful academic career, they miss a crucial point about 
its value. Namely, it has never been his intention to 
develop a new comprehensive system; rather, his 
avowed aim has always been to contribute to improving 
the status quo by ameliorating the effects of current 
educational practices. 
 
At the very outset of Chapter One of Literature Against 
Itself Graff explicitly declares his assumptions about 
literature and its scope, his position being clearly 
antagonistic to all sorts of formalist approaches. In a 
particularly plain and articulate manner which will come 
to define his rhetoric in later writings, he opens his 
discussion of cultural and literary issues with an explicit 
announcement of what his book is going to be about and 
what he is going to argue in it. He declares his interest in 
how “both literature and our ways of talking about it 
have been conditioned by social pressures and how they 
have in turn influenced social life.”
13
 Against the 
arrogations of latter-day aestheticists who want to 
detach the fine arts from their historical and political 
contexts, Graff maintains that “[m]ost theories of the 
nature of literature are more or less concealed theories 
of the nature of man and of the good society.”
14
 
Accordingly, he ascribes an instrumental function to 
literature and its discussions; literature is defined by its 
relevance to, and influence on, moral and social 
questions. In other words, talking about literature should 
not be an end in itself, but a means to an end. And the 
end is firmly embedded in our reality, in the daily human 
transactions which, once inspired by literary themes and 
patterns, stand a chance of being enriched and refined.
15
 
 
                                                 
13
 Graff, Literature Against Itself, p. 1. 
14
 Ibid., p. 1. 
15
 There is an obvious congruence here between Graff’s 
views and William James’s notion of meliorism. For 
penetrating discussions of James’s meliorism see Scott R. 
Stroud, “William James on Meliorism, Moral Ideas, and 
Business Ethics,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, vol. 45, no. 3 (2009), p. 379, and Henry Jackman, 
“James’s Empirical Assumptions: On Materials, 
Meliorism, and Eternalism,” Streams of William James, 
vol. 6, no. 1 (2004), p. 25. 
Literature Against Itself is first and foremost Graff’s plea 
for recognizing the value of realism and referentiality in 
literature. In the face of concerted attacks on the 
referential status of fiction, he stands by the traditional 
assumption that one of the primary functions of literary 
discourse is to reflect and represent something outside 
of itself. Crucially, nowhere in his book does he claim 
that works of literature are simply iconic images of 
reality; rather, well aware of the complex nature of 
artistic conventions, Graff merely emphasizes the 
impossibility of completely divorcing the literary signifier 
from its signified. To expose the faulty logic of anti-
realists, he reconstructs their argument about the 
increasingly ‘unreal’ quality of contemporary reality: 
“Proceeding from the valid insight that something has 
happened to the sense of reality and that modern 
technological reality is in some profound sense unreal, 
many writers and critics leap to the conclusion that 
literature must for this reason abandon its pretensions 
to represent external reality and become either a self-
contained reality unto itself or a disintegrated, dispersed 
process.”
16
 To their objection that the mimetic 
perspective seems excessively naïve, Graff responds by 
noting that the problem lies in the absence of a good up-
to-date critical vocabulary which would be sophisticated 
enough to do justice to the intricate relationship 
between the fictive and the real.
17
 He concludes by 
putting a premium on the “critical and explanatory 
power”
18
 of literature, which is dependent on external 
validation. 
 
Another crucial premise which defines Graff’s position 
on literature is closely connected with his major claim 
about art being inextricably interwoven with history. In 
her famous essay published in 1929, Virginia Woolf 
described fiction in terms of a spider’s web which is 
“attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still attached to 
life at all four corners.”
19
 Graff seems to subscribe to this 
                                                 
16
 Graff, Literature Against Itself, p. 9. 
17
 See ibid., pp. 12-13. 
18
 Ibid., p. 13. 
19
 Virginia Woolf, “A Room of One’s Own,” in: The 
Norton Anthology of English Literature, 5
th
 Edition, Vol. 2 
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position when he insists that “only a historical view 
provides a perspective from which to assess the richness 
and poverty of the contemporary.”
20
 Commenting on a 
passage from D. S. Carne-Ross’s essay “Scenario for a 
New Year,” he arrives at the conclusion that “history is a 
criticism of the present.”
21
 Consequently, what he 
proposes is a “rehabilitation of history”
22
 in literary 
studies, a program which views history in the totality of 
its development. In some respects, Graff’s ideas 
anticipate the emergence of New Historicism in the 
1980’s, although his argument is not so firmly based in a 
clearly defined ideological agenda. Characteristically, his 
conclusions are practice-oriented; in this particular 
context, he elaborates on the benefits which applying a 
historical perspective in literary studies might bring to 
education. 
 
Graff’s writings usually steer clear of politics but there is 
an essay of his which openly addresses the issue of 
politically committed pedagogy. In it, he expresses his 
skepticism about the assumptions of radical pedagogy, 
identifying an insoluble dilemma which most teachers 
face. Either they have to suppress their own political 
agendas in order to make classrooms more democratic 
and less hierarchical or they explicitly engage with 
pressing political issues which carry an educational 
potential at the risk of imposing their views on their 
students and, consequently, of being accused of 
pedagogical authoritarianism and indoctrination. Graff’s 
response to this dilemma is quite ingenious: he opts for 
removing the opposition between the two strategies by 
refusing to adopt an a priori political stance. In a truly 
pragmatic manner, he maintains that “like most 
questions about teaching, the question of how to bring 
political issues into classrooms is contingent on specific 
local contexts.”
23
 Further, Graff acknowledges that his 
preferred policy is to follow “a devil’s advocacy politics in 
                                                                       
(New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 
p. 1999. 
20
 Graff, Literature Against Itself, p. 124. 
21
 Ibid., p. 124. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Gerald Graff, “Teaching Politically without Political 
Correctness,” Radical Teacher, no. 58 (2000), p. 26. 
class, opposing whatever is the dominant mindset of the 
students.”
24
 In other words, his professed views are not 
his own; Graff is prepared to advocate any contestable 
position, depending on “the ideological tilt of the 
students.”
25
 His choice of a relevant strategy is adjusted 
to the pedagogical requirements of a particular 
situation. Political issues are thus given an appropriate 
airing while the teacher abstains from imposing her/his 
own agenda on the students. 
 
Graff’s claim about his own commitment to educational 
outcomes rather than political views is not to be 
construed as his renunciation of the latter. In the most 
recent of his writings he declares his interest in what he 
describes as “democratizing academic culture.”
26
 The 
best way to achieve this goal is, according to Graff, by 
helping “students become active participants in the 
important conversations of the academic world and the 
wider academic sphere.”
27
 This lies at the foundations of 
his project, which consists in demystifying academic 
culture and empowering students by developing their 
argumentative talents (more on this in Section II). The 
project, developed in Clueless in Academe and They 
Say/I Say, involves a crucial ethical dimension which 
epitomizes Graff’s views and provides a significant 
continuity between Literature Against Itself and his 
latest books. The dimension is aptly expressed in Graff’s 
own description of his approach to writing which “asks 
writers not simply to keep proving and reasserting what 
they already believe but to stretch what they believe by 
putting it up against beliefs that differ, sometimes 
radically, from their own.”
28
 Writing is thus to be dialogic 
in the sense that it should be open to contestation and 
counterarguments; writers are obliged to take into 
account the perspectives of all those who think 
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otherwise.
29
 On the face of it, his project may not look 
like much of a contribution to the promotion of 
democratic ideals, but Graff is well aware of the 
formative function of a liberal education and realizes 
that some basic skills connected with writing and 
thinking will have far-reaching consequences as soon as 
his students become active participants in public life. 
 
Graff is convinced that the skills inculcated in his 
students will turn them into intellectuals, that is, 
individuals who feel at home in the culture of ideas and 
arguments. He carefully distinguishes, however, 
between being educated and being an intellectual: “Not 
all ‘academics’ are ‘intellectuals,’ and intellectuals come 
in many different types, including academic scholars, 
journalistic public intellectuals, policy wonks, 
information managers, media pundits, and legal and 
government professionals. What these different types 
have in common … is a commitment to articulating ideas 
in public.”
30
 That is why he insists that, rather than 
acquiring a solid knowledge of a particular field, students 
should be primarily exposed to the techniques of arguing 
and making claims, defending their positions and 
identifying those of others. Those competences are likely 
to prove useful in their lives outside the university, no 
matter what positions they are going to hold. In this 
respect, their education is supposed to be thoroughly 
practical, and Graff puts emphasis on its terminus ad 
quem, that is, the ends it is meant to serve. 
 
A practical thrust is also clearly visible in Graff’s 
approach to criticism and theory. Unlike most who 
oppose introducing students to a discourse which is 
secondary to literature itself, he believes that, in the 
academy, criticism is the very air we breathe: “[l]ike 
                                                 
29
 Wayne C. Booth seems to endorse Graff’s position 
when he puts forward his notion of ‘listening-rhetoric’ 
which consists in “the whole range of communicative 
arts for reducing misunderstanding by paying full 
attention to opposing views.” Wayne C. Booth, The 
Rhetoric of Rhetoric: The Quest for Effective 
Communication (Malden, Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), p. 10. 
30
 Graff, Clueless in Academe, p. 2. 
Molière’s gentleman who suddenly realized he had been 
speaking prose all his life, we need to recognize that 
criticism is what we inevitably do when we talk about a 
work of art.”
31
 What students are exposed to in the 
classroom is not an unmediated contact with ‘English 
literature’ because our perception of the literary text is 
predetermined by critical discourse which supplies us 
with the only available models of discussing literature. 
Graff claims that even the crudest and most 
spontaneous reactions to literature (his examples 
include “Oh, wow” and “It sucks”
32
) constitute samples 
of ‘secondary’ critical discourse. Therefore there is no 
point in denying students access to critical texts on the 
grounds that they are too difficult and students are not 
prepared to understand them until they have studied 
the literary text in detail, as those texts are vital models 
of how to read and discuss literature in a rigorous way 
(more on this in Section III). After all, the primary task of 
the English department is to educate competent critics, 
rather than artists who will emulate the language of 
fiction or poetry. 
 
Graff’s notion of theory is also couched in simple, 
pragmatic terms. In Beyond the Culture Wars he follows 
Terry Eagleton’s reflections on the subject and comes to 
the conclusion that theory is tantamount to thinking.
33
 
Graff notes that we are usually forced to rethink some 
crucial assumptions about what we do when someone or 
something poses a challenge to what we have taken for 
granted. Then theory ‘breaks out,’
34
 as he has it; it is 
“the kind of self-consciousness that results when a 
community ceases to agree on these heretofore 
seemingly obvious, ‘normal’ assumptions….”
35
 
Consequently, Graff distinguishes between the kind of 
theory which the New Pragmatists (in this case Walter 
Benn Michael and Steven Knapp) attack in their essay 
“Against Theory” and a more broadly understood 
“discourse concerned with the legitimate principles, 
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assumptions and premises of literature and literary 
criticism.”
36
 The most elaborate definition of theory he 
offers is to be found in the final pages of Professing 
Literature: 
 
Thus, another way of describing literary theory is 
as a discourse that treats literature as in some 
respect a problem and seeks to formulate that 
problem in general terms. Theory is what is 
generated when some aspect of literature, its 
nature, its history, its place in society, its 
conditions of production and reception, its 
meaning in general, or the meanings of particular 
works, ceases to be given and becomes a 
question to be argued in a generalized way. 
Theory is what inevitably arises when literary 
conventions and critical definitions once taken 
for granted have become objects of generalized 
discussion and dispute.
37
 
 
In other words, Graff identifies theory with our critical 
response to the increasingly unstable and contestable 
quality of the received notions of culture, literature and 
communication. Theory emerges from specific historical 
circumstances which have given rise to our incertitude 
and apprehensions concerning those notions. In effect, 
theorizing is, paradoxically, a practical, therapeutic mode 
of reflection
38
 which embarks on the task of dispersing 
doubts and arriving at clear and convincing answers to 
the nagging questions about the status of intellectual, 
artistic and social conventions and definitions. 
 
II 
 
One of the most pragmatic aspects of Graff’s 
professional activity is connected with his critique of 
academia’s excesses and deficiencies, particularly in the 
context of humanities education. Most of his writings 
are intended as interventions or correctives which deal 
with specific problems and offer practical solutions. In 
this section I take a closer look at Graff’s views on 
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 This is how Richard Rorty describes pragmatism in his 
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Rorty, “Worlds or Words Apart?”, p. 373. 
research and education to see how his books address 
the institutional impasses that are all too evident in the 
contemporary university. His primary focus is on literary 
studies (or what Jacques Derrida described as “this 
strange institution called literature”
39
) and the English 
department as its basic locus, but many of the points he 
makes apply in equal measure to academia at large. 
 
It is already in Literature Against Itself that Graff 
expresses his criticism of the contemporary measures of 
professional achievement. His principal worry is that 
quantitative ‘production’ of scholarship and criticism 
may, in the long run, result in increasing neglect of the 
“canons of proof, evidence, logical consistency, and 
clarity of expression.”
40
 In Professing Literature, his 
historical overview of the profession of literary studies, 
he observes that a paradigm shift occurred after World 
War II. Earlier, scholars had been encouraged to publish 
but their primary duty was to acquire knowledge (“Study 
much, publish little” was the academic motto since the 
establishment of Johns Hopkins, the first research 
university in the United States
41
). In the second half of 
the 20th century “publish or perish” became a 
professional imperative for all those who wanted to 
further their academic careers. According to Graff, one 
of the crucial problems with the recent deluge of 
scholarly publications is that they have served no 
purpose whatsoever, save that of safeguarding the 
academic positions of their authors. 
 
One of the deplorable consequences of prioritizing 
published research is the denigration of teaching. Graff 
seems to realize that the process is inevitable
42
 and yet 
he is determined to reach a compromise between the 
two by claiming that research may and should be geared 
to teaching, at least up to a point. For that to happen, 
we must first recognize that “[a]cademia itself has 
become part of the mass culture industry, which 
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disseminates and popularizes academic trends and 
theories.”
43
 The problem with translating this insight into 
practical solutions is that academia does not know how 
to advertize its own benefits: what it has to offer is often 
obscured from public view by unintelligible jargon, its 
own prejudices against being communicative (even at 
the cost of being reductive), and the assumption of 
incompatibility between the cloistered universe of the 
university (what Graff also describes in terms of “the 
ivory-tower mandarinism of the professors”
44
) and the 
world outside. Students themselves are often 
discouraged from developing an interest in the research 
done by their professors due to what Graff identifies as 
the mystification of research as such and an entrenched 
conviction that it is too sophisticated for 
undergraduates. The research would certainly be fit for 
them, Graff concludes, “if it were better written and 
more interestingly conceived.”
45
 
 
Graff’s critical remarks about research constitute a 
significant contribution to the ongoing debate over the 
future of literary studies. Equally insightful are his 
reflections on literary education, especially those 
concerned with the curriculum. In Beyond the Culture 
Wars he devotes much of his attention to the issues 
which are directly relevant to the organization of literary 
courses as well as their contents. First, against the 
charges of conservative critics, he argues that the 
alleged ‘canonicide’
46
 has not really occurred; in his 
opinion the claims that contemporary fiction of 
mediocre artistic quality has replaced the classics on 
most reading lists are overblown. Graff argues that the 
canon evolves in a much less revolutionary manner, by 
“accretion at the margins, not by dumping the 
classics.”
47
 And yet our attitude to the classics requires a 
reconsideration because what really endangers them is 
the reverential awe with which we approach those 
writings. By protecting them from disrespect, we betray 
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anxiety about their actual value: “Though this protective 
attitude postures as a form of reverence of Western 
culture, it really betrays a lack of confidence in that 
culture, whose monuments we evidently fear cannot 
stand up to criticism.”
48
 Graff abstains from advocating 
radical alterations of the canon but he is decidedly 
critical of the conservative positions represented by such 
prominent defenders of the classics as Harold Bloom.
49
 
 
According to Graff, many conservative postulates about 
education are unacceptable for the simple reason that 
they are ineffective. For example, William J. Bennett’s 
naïve assumption of a common culture should be 
transformed into “a common discussion about culture, 
which implies agreement only to debate our different 
beliefs, tastes, and values, with the help of whatever 
common language, assumptions, and conclusions we are 
able to discover through the process of discussion 
itself.”
50
 Likewise, on a more practical level, Graff is 
skeptical of those commonsensical approaches to 
literature which stipulate that the students ‘just read the 
books.’ He believes that teaching literature always 
involves its interpretation, and pretending otherwise will 
be pedagogically disastrous in the long run.
51
 What he 
stresses is that reading books is a social activity which is 
meant to provide intellectual stimulation. To vindicate 
the potential value of heretofore marginalized works of 
literature, he indicates that texts are never difficult or 
easy in themselves; what matters is the kind of questions 
asked about them. As Graff puts it, “There is no 
functional connection between the status level of a text 
(however this may be measured) and the degree of 
complexity or difficulty attained by the interpretation of 
it for some hypothetical average reader.”
52
 A corollary of 
this is that, for didactic purposes, interpretation is more 
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important than its own object. Again, Graff is pragmatic 
to the point of treating even the greatest works of 
literature instrumentally. 
 
Open to new developments in education as he is, Graff is 
not prepared to accept those innovations that duck 
rather than confront existing pedagogical problems. 
When it comes to the curriculum he realizes that it 
cannot possibly reflect a common culture but neither is 
he happy with what he calls “a mere cafeteria counter of 
professorial research interests.”
53
 This model, based on 
the field coverage principle, assumes that individual 
courses have nothing to do with each other; they are not 
integrated in any way so as not to impose any totalizing 
framework on the curriculum. Each course constitutes 
an independent unit, which, according to Graff, leads to 
“the course fetish”: detached from the institutional 
setting and isolated from the outside world, it is based 
on “the cult of the great teacher.”
54
 The course fetish is 
closely connected with an idealized image of academic 
education: 
 
… the most familiar representation of the 
sentimental image of the course as a scene of 
conflict-free community is the one presented on 
untold numbers of college catalog covers: A 
small, intimate class is sprawled informally on 
the gently sloping campus greensward, shady 
trees overhead and ivy-covered buildings in the 
background. Ringed in casual semicircle, the 
students gaze with rapt attention at a teacher 
who is reading aloud from a small book – a 
volume of poetry, we inevitably assume, 
probably Keats or Dickinson or Whitman. The 
classroom, in these images, is a garden 
occupying a redemptive space inside the 
bureaucratic and professional machine. It is a 
realm of unity and presence in a world otherwise 
given over to endless difference, conflict, 
competition, and factionalism.
55
 
 
Graff’s ironic image demonstrates how not only students 
but also teachers delude themselves into believing that 
education may be stripped of its institutional and 
ideological dimension when the professors refuse to 
acknowledge larger responsibilities beyond their own 
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courses. The university will never serve its basic function 
– that of preparing students for handling real-life 
problems in a world rife with social differences and 
conflicts – unless individual courses are purposefully 
coordinated to reflect the diversity of perspectives and 
ways of arguing about vital issues.
56
 Hence Graff’s 
insistence that the curriculum be “a microcosm … of a 
clash of cultures and values in America as a whole.”
57
 
This assumption underlies his conception of ‘teaching 
the conflicts,’ which I will enlarge on in Section III of this 
essay. 
 
One of the most penetrating insights that Graff offers 
about liberal education is connected with what he calls 
the argument game, which should give coherence to the 
entire curriculum. In Clueless in Academe, he argues that 
students are baffled not so much by the content of the 
various courses they attend
58
 as by the opacity which 
accompanies academic communication. In effect, what 
should be prioritized is obscured and made inaccessible: 
the best and most useful aspects of academic discourse 
lose out in confrontation with academia’s peculiar 
predilection for unintelligibility and obfuscation. Graff 
has no doubt that what is central to humanities 
education is skill of argumentation, which is closely 
related to persuasive public discourse. Taking his cue 
from Hillel Crandus, he highlights the importance of 
Arguespeak, the kind of persuasive discourse that is 
common to many verbal modes of public activity. 
Besides strictly academic contexts, it is present in 
journalistic communication, political debates and even in 
the talk of students themselves.
59
 Graff claims that 
learning Arguespeak has far-reaching educational and 
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personal consequences; it entails “becoming socialized 
into a way of life that changes who you are.”
60
 By 
acquiring argumentative skills, students develop their 
own sense of self in relation to others and learn to 
define and defend their perspectives in confrontation 
with alien points of view.
61
 Clearly, Graff’s vision of their 
academic socialization into the argument culture is 
premised on a holistic notion of education. 
 
III 
 
The centrality of persuasive argument in the university 
and culture in general seems to be Graff’s formula for 
remedying the crucial problems which have recently 
bedeviled academia. The critics of his project may object 
that his own argument is restricted to the humanities at 
best, and to literary studies at worst. It is a fact that 
Graff is principally concerned with liberal education but 
at numerous points he claims that clear and reasoned 
persuasion underlies many other discourses, including 
the sciences. Certainly, his position transcends the 
purview of literary education and seems to assume a 
transdisciplinary perspective which may become a more 
productive approach in the future.  
 
In an interesting essay concerned with disciplinarity, 
Sheldon Pollock makes a forceful claim about philology 
being a particularly fitting candidate for the status of a 
core knowledge form. He identifies three minimal 
requirements that such knowledge forms will have to 
meet in the twenty-first-century university. Those 
involve an awareness of the discipline’s own historicity, a 
global and comparable perspective and an 
understanding of the changing criteria for truth-claims 
made both in the past and at the present time (what he 
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calls ‘epistemic politics’).
62
 To be sure, Graff does not 
formulate his own project in terms of a new philology; 
what emerges from his writings, however, may be 
construed as a blueprint for refashioning not just the 
English department but also humanities education as a 
whole. At the same time it is evident that his 
contributions rely on the rhetorical and philological 
tradition which has emphasized the significance of 
writing and speaking as crucial modes of participation in 
public discourse.
63
 Therefore, in this section, I discuss 
Graff’s practical suggestions which are intended to 
improve both the quality of communication within the 
academy and its public image. 
 
Chronologically, Graff’s first major contribution is 
presented at length in Beyond the Culture Wars, 
although it is anticipated already in the final pages of 
Professing Literature.
64
 His solution to the problem of 
the mixed-message curriculum, which I discussed in 
Section II, is the project of teaching the conflicts. Graff’s 
working assumption is that contemporary conflicts in the 
academy are “a measure of its vitality, not its decline.”
65
 
Hence his plea that we recognize the legitimacy of 
conflicts in the university. Otherwise, we will only delude 
ourselves that we constitute an intellectual community: 
“While it [i.e., the university] welcomes diversity and 
innovation, it neutralizes the conflicts which result from 
them. This it does by keeping warring parties in 
noncommunicating courses and departments and by 
basing the curriculum on a principle of live and let live: I 
won’t try to prevent you from teaching and studying 
what you want if you don’t try to prevent me from 
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teaching and studying what I want.”
66
 And yet, by 
bringing various conflicting views out of the closet and 
making them explicit to the students we are more likely 
to give them an opportunity to “make sense of their 
education and their lives.”
67
 Consequently, for Graff, 
‘teaching the conflicts’ is shorthand for a pragmatic 
program which stands a chance of bestowing coherence 
and purpose upon the curriculum. 
 
Graff illustrates the idea of incorporating conflicts into 
the curriculum by discussing his own teaching practice. 
He describes the case of Heart of Darkness by Joseph 
Conrad, a book which he used to teach as a universal 
parable of reason and unreason. However, once he 
realized that its reception may vary depending, e.g., on 
the reader’s ethnic background he started looking at the 
work from other angles, too. What inspired this shift of 
perception was an essay by Chinua Achebe, who claims 
that Conrad’s presentation of black Africa is shot 
through with racism. Graff decided to contrast those two 
perspectives (i.e., his own interpretation of Conrad’s 
work and Achebe’s) with each other and present the 
critical conflict to his students. More than that, he 
encouraged them to read short essays representing 
positions which are hostile to his own, thereby giving the 
students a chance to develop a critical perspective on 
their instructor’s views. Also, he invited other critics and 
teachers into his class to debate the controversial issues 
and expose the latent disagreements about Conrad’s 
book, which academics usually brush under the carpet as 
soon as they enter the classroom. The experience of 
teaching Heart of Darkness has led Graff to conclude 
that “[i]nstead of endlessly lamenting the intrusion of 
politics into the curriculum, we would do better to bring 
into the curriculum itself whatever may be instructive in 
the clashes of political and philosophical principles that 
have shaped it.”
68
 If liberal education is to be more 
sensitive to the plurality of perspectives which 
characterizes democratic societies, teaching the conflicts 
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is certainly a good strategy for exposing students to the 
disputes and disagreements which they will face in non-
academic contexts. 
 
In a more general sense, Graff’s notion of teaching the 
conflicts reflects his view of academic discourse as a 
conversation, rather than a monologue. The idiom of 
entering the conversation, borrowed from Kenneth 
Burke,
69
 is central to Graff’s approach to academic 
writing. In his incisive critique of academic habits of 
communication, he describes what many academics 
write as being “turgid, pretentious, jargon-ridden, and 
humorless.”
70
 In consequence, their ideas are not clearly 
expressed, and certainly are not accessible to anyone 
outside the immediate circle of the few specialists who 
are concerned with the same field. Graff realizes that it 
is impossible to renounce the jargon completely: he does 
not encourage scholars to translate their insights into 
slang or nursery rhymes. Still, he believes that academic 
writing would benefit enormously from relying on what 
he describes as a bridge discourse, which would make 
communication between the academics and the 
students more effective.
71
 His notion of the bridge 
discourse assumes that academic writing should 
incorporate elements of both the vernacular and the 
academic. Often, that will involve restating the same 
points in two different ways: “effective academic writing 
tends to be bilingual (or ‘diglossial’), making its point in 
Academese and making it again in the vernacular, a 
repetition that, interestingly, alters the meaning.”
72
 
Again, what underlies Graff’s position is a conviction that 
the gap between academic and non-academic cultures is 
not so wide, and there is no reason why it should be 
exaggerated by the opacity of language in which 
academics couch their most important conclusions. 
 
One of the most effective solutions to the opacity of 
academic discourse is the judicious use of 
metacommentary. In They Say/I Say, Graff and Cathy 
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Birkenstein begin their discussion of the issue with a 
simple explanation of what they mean by 
metacommentary. They state that it is “a way of 
commenting on your claims and telling others how – and 
how not – to think about them.”
73
 Metacommentary 
occurs in everyday conversations, not just in academic 
writing; in fact, our daily reliance on such formulas as 
‘What I mean to say is that…’ or ‘I don’t want you to 
think that…’ or ‘I’m not saying that…’ suggests that all 
modes of communication benefit from such 
clarifications. Still, in the context of academic writing 
metacommentary is particularly important. Here is how 
Graff and Birkenstein explain the reasons for using it: 
 
Even the best writers can provoke reactions in 
readers that they didn’t intend, and even good 
readers can get lost in a complicated argument 
or fail to see how one point connects with 
another. Readers may also fail to see what 
follows from your argument, or they may follow 
your reasoning and examples yet fail to see the 
larger conclusion you draw from them. They may 
fail to see your argument’s overall significance, 
or mistake what you are saying for a related 
argument that they have heard before but that 
you want to distance yourself from. As a result, 
no matter how straightforward a writer you are, 
readers still need you to help them grasp what 
you really mean.
74
 
 
The point that Graff and Birkenstein make about the 
usefulness of metacommentary is plain and does not 
seem to need restating. The value of their most recent 
book, however, lies in more than just the simple 
conclusion that academic writing should involve a 
clarifying dimension. Above all, They Say/I Say is a 
practical compendium of writing techniques, including 
examples of usage and ready-made templates which 
students, but also more experienced writers, may 
incorporate into their arguments to make them cogent 
and persuasive. Graff’s educational pragmatism is here 
at its best; instead of theorizing écriture (or any other 
philosophical abstractions), he focuses on practical skills 
which translate directly into more effective ways of 
communicating with others. 
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Another useful strategy for making academic writing 
relevant to as many readers as possible consists in what 
Graff describes as ‘planting a naysayer in your text.’
75
 
Even the most carefully thought-out texts may fail to 
generate a lively response on the part of their target 
audience if their writers fail to inscribe them in a certain 
oppositional framework. In other words, to engage the 
reader’s attention, our writing must make a point in 
relation to other positions on an issue, preferably by way 
of contrast. It is not enough to state our own claim; we 
must also indicate why this claim needs to be made. The 
best way to do so is by pitching our views against 
commonly held beliefs, or those of recognized 
authorities in a given field. Thereby, we provide a 
rationale for our writing and answer two all-important 
questions which Graff encourages all writers to ask 
themselves before they make their own claim: ‘So 
what?’ and ‘Who cares?’
76
 Otherwise, the claims are not 
‘arguable,’ that is, without the necessity of defending 
them by providing convincing arguments writers will 
never persuade anybody of their significance. In this 
sense, the best and most interesting academic texts 
advance claims which at first appear controversial and 
counterintuitive. 
 
Given Graff’s interest in writing and his conviction that 
“the public argument culture is the name of the 
academic game,”
77
 it comes as no surprise that he 
highlights the centrality of composition courses to 
humanities education in general. This is not to say that, 
in the context of pedagogical practices, he has no other 
suggestions to offer. In Beyond the Culture Wars, he 
observes that academic writing could gain a new 
impetus from a dialogue with journalism, which may 
provide models of how to convey complex issues in a 
concise and appealing manner. Also, he has a number of 
interesting ideas about how to effect curricular 
integration. One of them involves “an adaptation of the 
academic conference or symposium to the needs of the 
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undergraduate curriculum.”
78
 Another envisages 
collaboration between teachers from different 
departments who would assign the same text in a 
particular semester and then hold a transcourse 
conference “in order to compare different approaches, 
clarify disputed issues, and give students a more 
dramatic sense of the wider debate than a single course 
can provide.”
79
 All these ideas assume the usefulness of 
coordinated teaching, one of Graff’s major postulates 
connected with refashioning the present-day academy. 
Implicitly, they also entail a redefinition of the role of the 
teacher and her/his authority in the classroom. No 
longer a solo performer – satirically portrayed as the 
vanguard professor-intellectual already in Literature 
Against Itself
80
 – she/he must be poised to have her/his 
views challenged and, possibly, also defeated by those 
who bring different perspectives into the conversation. 
This may be one of the main reasons why Graff’s 
program has not been enthusiastically received in many 
quarters. After all, few professors will be happy to 
relinquish part of their authority and prerogatives unless 
they realize that, in the long run, it is in their own 
interest. 
 
Apropos literature courses, Graff emphasizes the value 
of exposing students to secondary sources which 
contextualize and interrogate the literary text itself. His 
insistence that critical essays are particularly useful 
didactic materials may seem questionable, yet his 
argument is cogent and firmly rooted in his notion of 
humanities education. To begin with, he claims that 
many teachers tend to overrate the primary experience 
of literature, which they oppose to secondary analyses. 
This approach rests on the conviction that an inchoate 
response is more authentic, while critical discussions of 
literature may involve an imposition of the teacher’s 
perspective on the students’ spontaneous reactions. 
However, this is to ignore the fact that our reactions are 
always mediated by a cultural context which provides us 
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with a critical vocabulary to articulate our response to 
the text. In the classroom, when we ask students to 
speak about how they ‘feel’ about a book, or a poem, we 
assume that they already know how to express their 
primary experience in relatively communicative 
discourse. Graff maintains, in turn, that this response 
requires models of assessing and analyzing texts, which 
only critical essays may offer.
81
 Literary education is, 
accordingly, a matter of developing students’ critical 
skills, rather than giving them an opportunity to enjoy 
what they might fail to appreciate on their own. This is 
not to say that a critical assessment of a work of 
literature should not tap into the students’ primary 
aesthetic experience, but exposing them to carefully 
chosen critical writings may be the best way to engage 
their attention and elicit articulate responses: once they 
see that a literary text is a subject of critical controversy 
and there are issues which the critics disagree about, 
they are likely to be drawn into an exchange of 
opinions.
82
 Finally, students are encouraged to express 
their responses in a language which matches the rigor 
and coherence of academic writing. 
 
It is emblematic of Graff’s views that all his assumptions 
are tested in classroom conditions. That is why he is 
aware of the potential problems that might result from 
exposing students to excessively sophisticated critical 
discourse: “When teachers recoil at the idea of assigning 
criticism, they are often thinking of opaque or 
unreadable criticism whose effect in their classes has 
been or would be deadly. Yet even when criticism is lucid 
and well written it may be poorly suited to students’ 
needs, and end up only confirming suspicions that such 
material has nothing to say to anyone who is not an 
academic specialist.”
83
 Therefore what is required of the 
teacher is considerable discrimination in the choice and 
preparation of the critical writings. Graff describes how 
over many years he has accumulated a number of 
published essays which, by trial and error, proved to be 
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useful in his own teaching.
84
 Also, he has co-edited with 
James Phelan two textbooks organized around the 
critical controversies surrounding Mark Twain’s 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and William 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest. The books contain primary 
texts along with selected critical essays which reflect the 
debates and disagreements between the critics. 
Students are thereby provided with a larger context 
which gives them a chance to relate their responses to 
those already made by others. Again, underlining this 
particular didactic strategy is Graff’s belief that the 
opposition between teaching and research is 
unnecessary
85
 and that humanities education should put 
a premium on students’ argumentative skills, which they 
are likely to find useful in public contexts. 
 
My discussion of Graff’s views and writings has been 
largely expository but now it is time to return to the 
claim which I made at the outset of this essay. It is true 
that he has never explicitly identified his position as 
pragmatist and yet, from what I have discussed above, it 
clearly transpires that Graff’s notions of literature and 
pedagogy are akin to those of John Dewey and other 
champions of progressive education. Moreover, the 
thrust of Graff’s arguments is almost invariably practice-
oriented, while his academic career has been testimony 
to his commitment to bettering not only the academic 
community but also democratic society at large. This 
ameliorative dimension of his intellectual activity puts 
him in the ranks of the most prominent contemporary 
scholars and teachers whose interpretation of 
pragmatism puts the lie to Marshall Sahlin’s sarcastic 
definition of the university as an institution which is 
concerned with “the pursuit of disinterested knowledge 
by self-interested people.”
86
 It is fair to conclude that 
Graff’s writings, as well as other forms of his academic 
activity, emerge as genuine harbingers of a better future 
for the humanities. 
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PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS: LITERARY AND ANALYTIC ROOTS 
Richard Shusterman 
Florida Atlantic University 
 
 
 
Readers might not be surprised to find me in this special 
issue on pragmatism and literature not only because my 
philosophical reputation now rests primarily on the work I 
have done in pragmatist aesthetics but also because the 
issue’s guest editor Dr. Małecki recently devoted a very 
intelligent monograph to my contributions to pragmatism 
and literary studies, his book entitled Embodying 
Pragmatism: Richard Shusterman’s Philosophy and Literary 
Theory (2010).
1
 There is no reason to contest Małecki’s 
portrayal of me as an American pragmatist philosopher who 
also engages important insights and arguments from 
contemporary French and German theorists (though often 
polemically) and who has a penchant for unconventional 
philosophical topics such as popular art and somaesthetics. 
But it is useful to recall (both to myself and to other readers) 
that I enjoyed an active career in philosophy and literary 
theory long before I began considering myself as a 
pragmatist and invoking the theories of pragmatist 
philosophers in my work.
2
 So in this brief essay I wish to 
revisit some of my central views on literary theory that 
precede my conversion to pragmatism and to consider the 
ways they anticipated (and perhaps led to) my later explicitly 
pragmatist theories. 
 
It was only in mid-career (in the late 1980s) that I began to 
appreciate the rich value of pragmatist philosophy and tried 
to formulate an aesthetics founded on pragmatist principles. 
My guide, of course, was John Dewey, whose Art as 
                                                 
1
 Wojciech Małecki, Embodying Pragmatism: Richard 
Shusterman’s Philosophy and Literary Theory (Frankfurt am 
Main-New York: Peter Lang, 2010). 
2
 Dr. Małecki is certainly aware of this earlier career, since he 
has published interviews with me that touch on it. For 
readers interested in this material, see Richard Shusterman, 
“Od literatury do somatoestetyki: Z Richardem 
Shustermanem rozmawia Wojciech Małecki” [“From 
Literature to Somaesthetics: An Interview with Richard 
Shusterman, by Wojciech Małecki], Teksty Drugie, No. 6 
(2009), pp. 198-221. His choice to give his book a sharper 
focus by limiting it to the pragmatist material is surely 
reasonable. 
Experience
3
 seemed to define the field because it was the 
only systematic pragmatist treatise in aesthetics. My 
Pragmatist Aesthetics
4
 sought both to defend the Deweyan 
pragmatist project against the arguments of analytic 
philosophy, whose rise to dominance since the 1950s 
marginalized pragmatist thinking in aesthetics and other 
philosophical fields. But it also tried to redeem the 
experiential, embodied nature of pragmatist aesthetics that 
was disregarded or often explicitly rejected by 
neopragmatists like Richard Rorty for whom experience was 
a philosophically useless and indeed pernicious notion, 
committing us to the fallacious, foundationalist “myth of the 
given.”  
 
Trained as analytic philosopher in Jerusalem and Oxford, I 
had initially dismissed Dewey as a vague, fuzzy thinker 
unable to formulate crisp and concise arguments. Moreover, 
his prose struck me as flat, flaccid, and prolix. Such matters 
of literary style were important to me because my initial 
research focus was literary theory and the philosophy of 
literary criticism. Moreover, it was solidly nested in analytic 
philosophy, indeed exclusively so. My first two articles, 
published during my Oxford student days, were devoted to 
literature and the logic of its criticism and appeared in 
highly-ranked analytic journals: “The Anomalous Nature of 
Literature”
5
 and “The Logic of Interpretation.”
6
 Other early 
papers were devoted to topics involving the convergence of 
literature and analytic philosophy: Bertrand Russell’s literary 
fiction, the different logics of literary evaluation and critical 
reasoning, the analytic philosophical influences on T.S. 
Eliot’s literary theory and practice.  
 
My first book, The Object of Literary Criticism,
7
 was a 
conventional work of analytic philosophy and far from the 
provocative topics (like rap, popular culture, and 
somaesthetics) with which my pragmatism is often 
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 See John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Capricorn, 
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7
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identified. It was instead devoted to mainstream analytic 
questions in philosophy of literature (i.e., the identity and 
ontological status of works and the logic of methods used in 
interpreting and evaluating them). Its analytic style was that 
of ordinary language philosophy made most famous by 
Wittgenstein’s later work at Cambridge and by J.L. Austin (in 
Oxford). My thesis supervisor at Oxford, J. L. Urmson, was 
Austin’s student and literary executor, and The Object of 
Literary Criticism was based on my dissertation of that title, 
submitted for the Oxford D. Phil. in 1979. I was, indeed, so 
completely (and complacently) absorbed in the Anglo-
American analytic context that this book on literary theory 
pays no attention at all to European poststructuralist theory 
and deconstructionist criticism, though they were already 
the dominant fashion in American literary and critical 
theory. Nor did it pay any attention to German critical 
theory, nor to pragmatism. C.S. Peirce was the only 
pragmatist philosopher mentioned in the book, and his 
appearance had nothing to do with his pragmatist ideas but 
rather with his logical notion of types and tokens, which was 
sometimes applied in analytic theories of work identity and 
individuation.  
 
In Hebrew there is a proverb to the effect that doctrines 
deeply learned in one’s youth (imbibed, as it were, with 
one’s mother’s milk) are not forgotten. My early analytic 
training in Jerusalem and Oxford was so thorough that my 
philosophical style of argument remains greatly marked by 
it, and in many contexts I still reach for my analytic toolbox 
of distinctions and strategies. Nonetheless, five years after 
the publishing my book on analytic literary theory, I was 
already beginning to worry about the limitations of the 
analytic approach in aesthetics and feel the attractions of 
pragmatism. Though my next book T.S. Eliot and the 
Philosophy of Criticism
8
 remained essentially an analytic 
study, its last chapter showed the pragmatist dimensions of 
Eliot’s theory and practice and was entitled “Pragmatism 
and Practical Wisdom.” Moreover, in the “Introduction” to 
an important collection of essays on Analytic Aesthetics that 
I edited for Blackwell,
9
 I argued that the most promising 
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 Richard Shusterman, T.S. Eliot and the Philosophy of 
Criticism (London and New York: Duckworth and Columbia 
University Press, 1988). 
9
 See Richard Shusterman (ed.), Analytic Aesthetics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989). 
directions in analytic aesthetics had a distinctly pragmatic 
dimension.  
 
My conversion to the general pragmatist perspective was 
already complete by 1992, when my book Pragmatist 
Aesthetics appeared – along with its abridged French version 
L’art à l’ètat vif .
10
 A close seminar reading of Dewey’s Art as 
Experience (done with a cadre of doctoral students, many of 
them in dance and oozing with experiential embodied 
enthusiasm) was what converted me to pragmatism, and I 
used that book’s pragmatist perspectives to criticize the 
narrower, scholastic confines of analytic aesthetics. Though 
Dewey has remained the most lasting inspiration for my 
pragmatist thinking, I have increasingly recognized how 
many of his aesthetic theories were anticipated by other 
American pragmatists: Ralph Waldo Emerson, Alain Locke, 
C.S. Peirce, and, perhaps most significantly, William James. 
Having demonstrated their contributions to pragmatist 
aesthetics in other publications,
11
 I turn here instead to how 
certain key themes I advocated as pragmatist aesthetics 
were already present in the Wittgenstein- and Austin-
inspired analytic theories formulated in The Object of 
Literary Criticism and more generally in my published work 
through the mid-1980s. 
 
Though initially convinced that my pragmatist conversion 
took me very far from the thoroughly analytic approach of 
The Object of Literary Criticism, when I reread that text for 
its publication in French translation, I realized that this book 
was largely shaped by key themes that likewise centrally 
structure my pragmatist approach, themes that I now 
believe helped lead me toward pragmatism but also to 
certain French thinkers, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel 
Foucault, who became increasingly important in my work.  
 
One of these central themes is pluralism. Rather than 
assuming, as theory too often does, that there is only one 
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 See Richard Shusterman, L’art à l’état vif: la pensée 
pragmatiste et l’esthétique populaire (Paris: Minuit, 1992). 
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 For Emerson, see my “Emerson’s Pragmatist Aesthetics,” 
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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); for James, see my 
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right answer, logic, purpose, or method in the critical 
enterprise, my first book and early articles argue for a 
plurality of aims and frameworks in literary criticism, a 
plurality of legitimate logics and purposes in interpretation 
and evaluation, and a plurality of ways and contexts for 
defining the identity of literary works, whose ontological 
complexity also displays a plurality of aspects or dimensions. 
Literature and criticism are essentially valued, essentially 
complex, and essentially historical concepts, and therefore 
also essentially contested concepts. In these fields of 
competing methods, attitudes, purposes, styles and 
concepts, an open-minded pluralism of letting rival 
approaches have a chance to prove their different values in 
different contexts seemed the most reasonable approach.  
 
This spirit of pluralism still inspires my pragmatist insistence 
on the value of both high art and popular art, the variety of 
useful modes of appropriating and understanding them, the 
legitimacy of different ways of living a philosophical life, the 
useful multiplicity of levels of body consciousness, and the 
variety of helpful somaesthetic disciplines, etc. Recognizing 
the plurality of useful practices and values (even when they 
sometimes compete for our attention or adherence) seems 
to be the best way to maximize our benefits in pursuing the 
multiple values of life. If I already recognized this in my 
analytic writings, it was not until my pragmatist phase that I 
was able to formulate this principle in terms of what I call 
the “inclusively disjunctive stance” in either/or situations: 
that when faced with different promising options, we should 
not presume that we must only accept one but should rather 
try to reconcile and realize as many as we can profitably 
combine together. Thus when asked whether we want to 
drink water or wine with our meal, there is no reason why 
we cannot drink both. In literature, there is no reason to 
limit one’s reading to poetry rather than prose, fiction rather 
than nonfiction, or vice versa.
12
  
 
Likewise in criticism, there is no reason to affirm that only 
intentional or historical interpretation is legitimate while 
more creative, performative interpretation must be 
outlawed. The plurality of literary and critical forms is not an 
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 For more discussion of this stance, see the “Introduction” 
to the second edition of Pragmatist Aesthetics (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
anything goes relativism. There are better and worse 
interpretations, for example, but judgments of better and 
worse depend on the specific contexts in which one is 
interpreting (a newspaper review versus a scholarly article) 
and the purposes for which one seeks an interpretation (to 
discover the author’s intention or to make the work more 
relevant and meaningful to today’s readers). The analytic 
pluralism I developed with respect to interpretation was 
distinguished from a more limited pluralism which 
recognizes merely a plurality of valid objects and methods of 
interpretation. This limited pluralism allows for different 
approaches to or aspects of a work of literature with respect 
to which true or plausible interpretive assertions can be 
made.  
 
My analytic pluralism went farther in arguing that not all 
interpretations are assertions that could be true or plausible; 
some have the logical status of recommendations while 
others are more like performatives rather than constative 
assertions. Literary interpretation, I argued, has no single, 
essential logic but is a family of games that often compete 
for our attention and for priority of value. Their validity and 
value (and the same goes for rival games of literary 
evaluation) depend not on antecedent philosophical or 
logical grounding but on the quality of their fruits in actual 
critical practice. “It is not the job of the philosopher of 
criticism, as analyst, to award the birthright” or provide an 
absolute ranking of these different practices, I wrote in The 
Object of Literary Criticism. “Having identified and analyzed 
these different and often competing critical practices, the 
analytic philosopher,” I continued “must let them justify 
themselves, as they have justified and must justify 
themselves, in actual critical practice.”
13
  
 
Here we see how the primacy of practice for critical theory is 
another central pragmatist theme that pervades my early 
analytic work. As practice generates and shapes theory, so 
methodologies or logics of interpretation and evaluation are 
assessed in terms of the aims and fruits of their practice. The 
validity and value of different logics is not an abstract 
pluralist notion of tolerance but a recognition that criticism’s 
multiple methods are pragmatically justified by the different 
aims and values these practices realize. Although The Object 
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of Literary Criticism is clearly a philosophical text of critical 
theory (that even occasionally employs abstract logical 
formulae), it tries to express the crucial importance of 
practice not only by general assertions but by specifically 
deriving its views on the logics of interpretation and 
evaluation from the actual practice of critics – by introducing 
and analyzing the specific arguments that especially 
influential critics have made.
14
 The idea of integrating 
practical literary criticism into my analytic philosophical 
theory naturally continued into my work in pragmatism 
where it evolved into full scale analyses of literary works, 
elite and popular. Pragmatist Aesthetics thus contains a 
chapter built on a close critical reading of Eliot’s “Portrait of 
a Lady” and the lyrics of “Talkin’ All that Jazz” by the 
Brooklyn rap crew Stetsasonic. Here, however, rather than 
relying primarily on analyzing the interpretations of other 
critics, I practiced my own interpretive analyses. 
 
Working with real rather than hypothetical critical discourse 
exemplifies a fundamentally empirical orientation that I later 
found repeatedly emphasized by the classical pragmatist 
tradition. James and Dewey highlight experience not only as 
a crucial cognitive ground, instrument, and mode of 
assessment for theorizing, but also as the essential locus for 
realizing aesthetic values. Because my analytical study of 
literary criticism draws its examples from different periods 
of literary history, its empiricism has a diachronic dimension 
that shows how changing historical contexts can alter the 
aims and methods of literary critical practices. This empirical 
sense of historical change likewise reveals that literary 
critical practices rely on a background of cultural institutions 
and conventions that are always embedded in larger social 
and ideological contexts that are more than merely aesthetic 
or purely literary. It was from Wittgenstein and Austin that I 
first learned to appreciate the crucial role of historical and 
institutional contexts and conventions in determining 
meaning, practice, and theory. These historicist, 
                                                 
14
 If the critical work of T.S. Eliot and F.R. Leavis figures most 
prominently in my early analytic work in philosophy of 
criticism, that is not only because they were the most 
influential critics for Oxford literary culture at that time, but 
also because their major texts were largely available in 
inexpensive paperbacks. For a penurious graduate student 
who felt uncomfortable in stuffy Oxford libraries and liked to 
own and annotate his readings, this factor of cost-efficiency 
was significant – revealing an altogether different manner in 
which pragmatic thinking shaped my doctoral work. 
contextualist, and institutional perspectives prepared me to 
embrace the genealogical, contextual, sociopolitical 
dimensions of Dewey’s pragmatist thought, along with those 
of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.
15
  
 
These three authors, who helped push me beyond the limits 
of analytic philosophy taught me something that my 
doctoral thesis essentially ignored: the theorist’s 
interventionist role in the cultural transformation of 
practices. The Object of Literary Criticism and my other work 
in analytic aesthetics emphasizes that the field of criticism is 
essentially contested – containing many practices or critical 
“games” (with fundamentally different logics) that compete 
with each other for dominance, power, and esteem. This 
pluralism came with a “hands-off” theoretical attitude in 
which the philosopher is supposed to analyze and compare 
those established practices but never to intervene by 
suggesting alternative methods or by championing some 
disparaged or neglected artistic genre. My later work in 
pragmatism, while still emphasizing the values of pluralism 
and the need to begin by recognizing and analyzing 
established cultural forms, is more engaged in the 
transformation of cultural (including critical) practices. The 
role of theory, as I now see it through pragmatist eyes, is not 
just to mirror cultural truths and their related practices but 
to improve them. That melioristic impulse is highlighted in 
my detailed pragmatist advocacy of certain kinds of popular 
art and of the art of living, and in affirming the cultivation of 
certain somatic disciplines for heightened awareness and 
attention. The meliorist impulse is also present in my case 
for the importance of writing in efforts of self-improvement 
in pursuing an ethical art of living as a form of philosophical 
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 The contextualist perspective can also be reflexively 
brought to bear on the analytic/pragmatist contrast that is 
widely used and that I deploy here. The contrast of these 
philosophical styles (which themselves are quite diverse in 
style) gets its effective meaning only within a particular 
context or background. The fact that many central themes 
remain continuous in my move from analytic to pragmatist 
aesthetics should warn us not to treat analytic and 
pragmatist philosophy as a neat dichotomy of incompatible 
orientations. There is indeed a significant strain of important 
twentieth-century philosophers who combine analytic 
methods and pragmatist insights: Nelson Goodman, Richard 
Rorty, Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and 
also Wittgenstein and Austin. I see my work as inspired by 
that illustrious tradition. 
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life.
16
 If meliorism implies advocacy, does advocacy not 
preclude pluralism? Not at all. For pluralism is not an 
“anything goes anywhere” indifference.  
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EURO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL PRAGMATISM:  
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, HUMANIST CONTROVERSIES, 
AND PURPOSEFUL MEDIATION  
Steven Mailloux 
Loyola Marymount University 
 
 
 
For over a century Euro-American pragmatism has 
developed as a philosophical movement that takes 
seriously the human significance of language. Indeed, 
one might characterize much pragmatist thought as 
specifically being preoccupied with rhetoric, the use of 
language in a context to have effects. Inside the 
academy this rhetorical pragmatism often registers as a 
language-centered form of humanistic anti-
foundationalism that refuses absolute distinctions 
between subject and object, meaning and significance, 
fact and value, knowledge and opinion, aesthetics and 
politics. In various non-academic public spheres, one 
version of this pragmatism supports a progressive 
pluralism and an inclusive deliberative democracy. In the 
following remarks, I would like to explore this tradition 
of Euro-American rhetorical pragmatism and one of its 
prominent features: a rhetoric of purposeful mediation. 
 
Among recent rhetorical pragmatists we might include 
such academic and public intellectuals as Giles Gunn, 
Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and Jeffrey 
Stout.
1
 These are neo-pragmatists who give special 
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 See Steven Mailloux, Reception Histories: Rhetoric, 
Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 22-42; idem, 
Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English, 
Speech, and Composition (New York: Modern Language 
Association, 2006), pp. 42-44, 51-52, 118-21; Steven 
Mailloux and Keith Gilyard, “Conversation,” in: 
Conversations in Cultural Rhetoric and Composition 
Studies, ed. Keith Gilyard and Victor E. Taylor (Aurora: 
Davies Group, 2009), pp. 30-51. Also see Stanley Fish, 
“Rhetoric,” in: The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. H. Aram 
Veeser (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 116-44; Keith 
Gilyard, Composition and Cornel West: Notes toward a 
Deep Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2008); Robert Danisch, Pragmatism, 
Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric (Columbia: 
attention to rhetoric or (more narrowly in Rorty’s case) 
persuasion in the public sphere and connect this 
rhetorical attention explicitly to their articulation of 
pragmatism as a philosophical or critical theory. Such 
rhetorical pragmatism can be viewed as a version of 
postmodern sophistry: These neo-pragmatists are like 
some older Greek sophists partly because they share the 
pre-Platonic belief in a primordial unity of rhetoric and 
philosophy. Viewed from within the historical argument 
made by Edward Schiappa and others, sophists and 
pragmatists do not radically separate language use from 
the search for truth, rhetoric from philosophy.
2
 It was 
Plato, the argument goes, who established this 
separation in the Gorgias when he coined the new term 
rhêtorikê and negatively distinguished it from 
philosophia. Rhetorical pragmatists reject this version of 
Platonism and embrace instead an anti-Platonist 
sophistic rhetoric. 
 
But these contemporary neo-pragmatists do not 
emphasize their sophistic legacy as extensively as an 
earlier rhetorical pragmatist, the once-forgotten British 
philosopher, F. C. S. Schiller. I want to return here to an 
argument I made in my book Reception Histories, in 
which I claimed that Schiller’s reading of Protagoras was 
essential to his early version of pragmatism that he 
called humanism.
3
 During the turn to the twentieth 
century, the discourse of absolute idealism dominated 
the rhetorical context of philosophical debate in 
England. It was explicitly against this epistemological and 
metaphysical hegemony that F. C. S. Schiller directed 
much of his polemical energies, especially in his two 
                                                                       
University of South Carolina Press, 2007); and Nathan 
Crick, Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts 
of Becoming (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2010).  
 
2
 Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in 
Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 40-49; Mailloux, 
Reception Histories, pp. xii-xiii. 
 
3
 Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 27-32. Also see Mark 
J. Porrovecchio, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dawn of 
Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); and, more generally, 
Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism, ed. Steven Mailloux 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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early books Humanism in 1903 and Studies in Humanism 
four years later. Both of these books were praised by the 
American pragmatists, William James and John Dewey, 
the former calling Schiller pragmatism’s “most vivacious 
and pugnacious champion.”
4
 
 
One of the distinguishing features of Schiller’s 
humanistic pragmatism was his use of Protagorean 
sophistry as an explanatory argument for his own 
theory. In fact, it is not too much of an exaggeration to 
say that Schiller’s reception of Protagoras constituted his 
philosophical position. That reception was an exemplary 
instance of a theoretical argument reading the past to 
mark out a place in the intellectual present and to set an 
agenda for the immediate future. Schiller’s pragmatism 
re-interpreted sophistry to establish his anti-idealist 
argument within the cultural conversation of the early 
twentieth century. Schiller read Plato against the grain of 
the ancient philosopher’s attack on sophistic rhetoric, 
and in so doing, he demonstrated how the insights of 
pragmatism and sophistry coincided perfectly. Schiller’s 
reception of the sophists locates at least one form of 
pragmatism firmly within a sophistic rhetorical tradition, 
and Schiller enthusiastically argued for branding this 
form with the name “humanism.” 
 
Humanism has always been about human being and 
becoming. In classical Greece, Protagoras said, “Humans 
are the measure of all things, of things that are that they 
are and of things that are not that they are not.” 
Platonists rejected such sophistry and could quote in 
support of their case the Athenian in Plato’s Laws who 
declares “it is God who is the measure of all things, not 
humanity as some say” (716c). Though often in other 
terms, some of the most important “humanist 
controversies” of the last century restaged this debate 
                                                 
 
4
 William James, “Humanism,” Nation 78 (3 March 
1904), pp. 175-76; rpt. James, Essays, Comments, and 
Reviews, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, 
and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), p. 551.  
over Protagorean sophistry and Platonist philosophy.
5
 
During one such controversy, Schiller’s 1903 book 
rejected the Platonist’s charge that the human-measure 
dictum leads to skepticism and relativism. Instead, 
Schiller argues, Protagoras’s claim that “man is the 
measure of all things,” when “fairly interpreted, … is the 
truest and most important thing that any thinker ever 
has propounded. It is only in travesties such as it suited 
Plato’s dialectic purpose to circulate that it can be said to 
tend to skepticism; in reality it urges Science to discover 
how Man may measure, and by what devices make 
concordant his measures with those of his fellow-men.”
6
 
One goal of sophistic rhetoric is to investigate and 
theorize how this rhetorical process takes place, to 
establish what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one 
citizen’s measures with those of his or her fellow-
citizens. 
 
In his next book, Studies in Humanism, Schiller more 
clearly and more extensively demonstrates how his 
humanism is both sophistic and pragmatist. He remarks 
on the political context of classical Greece, noting that 
“the great humanistic movement of the fifth century 
B.C., of which [the Sophists] were the leaders, is now 
[early twentieth century] beginning to be appreciated at 
its true value … The rise of democracies rendered a 
higher education and a power of public speaking a sine 
qua non of political influence – and, what acted probably 
as a still stronger incentive – of the safety of the life and 
property, particularly of the wealthier classes.” The 
political, economic context of sophistic education 
resulted in “a great development of rhetoric and 
                                                 
 
5
 See, for example, late-twentieth-century debates in 
the U.S. Culture Wars and specialized academic 
controversies over postmodernism or poststructuralism. 
Various anti-humanisms, neo-humanisms, and post-
humanisms marked out significant theoretical positions 
within these heated intellectual and political conflicts. 
On the rhetoric of these and other humanist 
controversies, see Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 20-
21, 151-81; and “Humanist Controversies: The Rhetorical 
Humanism of Ernesto Grassi and Michael Leff,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric (forthcoming).  
 
6
 F. C. S Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays 
(London: Macmillan, 1903), p. xvii. 
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dialectic,” and the sophists definitely exploited this 
situation, growing wealthy in catering to their well-to-do 
clientele.
7
 Schiller remarks in passing on the 
contradictory (democratic and undemocratic) origins of 
sophistic rhetoric and thus prefigures later debates over 
the problematic ideological affiliations of neo-sophistry 
and the dangerous political consequences of rhetoric 
more generally. Like many rhetorical pragmatists after 
him, Schiller identifies rhetoric with democracy – only in 
such a political structure, he argues, could sophistic 
rhetoric develop – but he also acknowledges that 
rhetoric could serve undemocratic interests when 
rhetorical education was restricted to the socio-
economic elites. 
 
There is a lot more to say about Schiller’s reading of 
Protagoras, especially in his 1908 pamphlet, Plato or 
Protagoras?, but instead I want to move on to some 
implications of the sophistic legacy for rhetorical 
pragmatism in relation to contemporary debates over 
the future of democratic deliberation. To make this 
move I will fast forward exactly one hundred years. 
 
“In case you haven’t heard, Barack Obama is a 
pragmatist.” So begins Christopher Hayes’s December 
2008 Nation article called, fittingly enough, “The 
Pragmatist.”
8
 After noting how the term has often been 
used to describe the newly elected President and how 
that President himself has used the word “pragmatism” 
in recent public statements, Hayes asks: what exactly 
does it mean to call President Obama a pragmatist? In 
answering this question, Hayes helpfully points to 
“Obama’s famous rhetorical dexterity, which he’s 
marshaled to tremendous effect – giving progressives as 
well as centrists reasons to believe he shares their values 
and outlook. In a postelection essay on Obama, George 
Packer noted these two strains of his campaign rhetoric 
                                                 
 
7
 F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London: 
Macmillan, 1907), pp. 31-32.  
 
8
 Christopher Hayes, “The Pragmatist,” The Nation (29 
December 2008), pp. 13-16.  
http://www. thenation.com/article/pragmatist (accessed 
Dec 15, 2011). 
and dubbed them the ‘progressive Obama’ and the 
‘post-partisan Obama.’” According to Hayes, “pragmatic” 
here means something like “post-ideological.” Saying 
Obama is a pragmatist means simply that he is not a 
dogmatic ideologue; he is someone interested in 
practically getting things done and not someone blindly 
following an abstract ideological principle. But these are 
merely popular uses of the terms pragmatic and 
pragmatist. What, if anything, do they have to do with 
the more precise usage in relation to the specific 
tradition of American pragmatist philosophy? 
 
Hayes himself raises this question when he notes:  
 
Pragmatism in common usage may mean simply 
a practical approach to problems and affairs. But 
it’s also the name of the uniquely American 
school of philosophy whose doctrine is that truth 
is pre-eminently to be tested by the practical 
consequences of belief. What unites the two 
senses of the word is a shared skepticism toward 
certainties derived from abstractions – one that 
is welcome and bracing after eight years of [the] 
failed, faith-based presidency [of President 
George W. Bush].  
 
Hayes then tries to connect Obama intellectually to 
American pragmatist philosophy by way of the 
President’s political admiration for Abraham Lincoln. He 
implies that Obama’s admiration for Lincoln connects 
him to American pragmatism partly because the war 
Lincoln oversaw was a significant influence on the 
earliest philosophical pragmatists:  
 
Having witnessed, and in some cases 
experienced firsthand, the horror of violence and 
irreconcilable ideological conflict during the Civil 
War, William James, Charles Peirce and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes were moved to reject the 
metaphysical certainty in eternal truths that had 
so motivated the [dogmatically ideological] 
abolitionists, emphasizing instead epistemic 
humility, contingency and the acquisition of 
knowledge through practice – trial and error.
9
  
 
                                                 
 
9
 For a different, more detailed argument tying Obama 
to Pragmatism via Lincoln, see Susan Schulten, “Barack 
Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey,” Denver 
University Law Review, vol. 86 (2009), pp. 807-818. 
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I will return later to the placing of President Obama in 
the pragmatist tradition, but for now I want to re-deploy 
a text Hayes cites in explaining that tradition, Louis 
Menand’s The Metaphysical Club. We can use a passage 
from Menand’s prize-winning book to transform Hayes’s 
specific claim for a connection between pragmatism and 
Obama into a broader argument about American 
pragmatism and U.S. rhetoric in general. Menand writes 
that after the Civil War the pragmatists “changed the 
way Americans thought – and continue to think – about 
education, democracy, liberty, justice, and tolerance. 
And as a consequence, they changed the way Americans 
live – the way they learn, the way they express their 
views, the way they understand themselves, and the way 
they treat people who are different from themselves. 
We are still living, to a great extent, in a country these 
thinkers helped to make.”
10
 Among Menand’s claims 
here most relevant to my topic are the ones asserting 
that pragmatism significantly affected the way 
Americans express themselves (their rhetoric) and the 
way they interpret themselves (their identities), what we 
might call an American rhetorical hermeneutics.
11
 I 
would like to follow up on just one strand of this 
rhetorical hermeneutics and speculate about Euro-
American pragmatism’s effects on U.S. rhetoric in 
various academic and non-academic contexts. This 
speculation involves making a case for pragmatism as a 
possible source for or at least influence on an American 
rhetoric of purposeful mediation.  
 
An obvious place to begin is William James’s 1907 book 
Pragmatism, whose very subtitle “A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking” implies a mediating purpose for 
James’s popular lectures, a mediation between the old 
                                                 
 
10
 Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of 
Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2001), p. xi (emphasis added). 
 
11
 A rhetorical hermeneutics focuses on the relation of 
rhetoric and interpretation and in one of its forms 
combines rhetorical pragmatism in philosophical theory 
with cultural rhetoric study in critical practice. See 
Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Power (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), pp. 3-18; and Disciplinary 
Identities, pp. 42-65.  
and the new. James famously defined pragmatism as a 
method of thinking and a theory of truth. The method 
looked to results, consequences of beliefs, ideas, actions; 
and truth was defined controversially as what works. 
“The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be 
good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons.”
12
 That last phrase provides an 
opening for teasing out the contours of a specifically 
rhetorical pragmatism: The true is the rhetorical 
compliment we give (the figurative label we posit) for 
whatever proves itself (argumentatively justifies itself 
through reasons) to be good in the way of belief. Put 
differently, to identify a specifically rhetorical 
pragmatism is to work out the way that pragmatism as a 
philosophical movement is a rhetorical way of thinking 
with a rhetorical theory of truth. As James explains his 
pragmatist approach more fully, he makes its strategy of 
purposeful mediation explicit. James calls pragmatism “a 
mediator and a reconciler,” a “mediator between tough-
mindedness and tender-mindedness,” and a “mediator 
between empiricism and religion”
13
 He describes 
pragmatism “as a mediating system” and offers 
“pragmatistic philosophy” as “just the mediating way of 
thinking” his audience requires.
14
 
 
We find this same mediating way of thinking and its 
embodiment in a rhetoric of mediation throughout the 
American pragmatist tradition. Pragmatism is an 
intellectual solution to a cultural problem, which means 
it is a pragmatic response to a question in a specific time 
and place. A typical problem or question for pragmatism 
arises from the public recognition of a widespread 
cultural conflict; and the typical pragmatist response is 
not to choose sides but to mediate. This mediating 
rhetorical strategy can be seen in James’s Pragmatism in 
1907 and almost a hundred years later in Jeffrey Stout’s 
Democracy and Tradition. Interestingly, the conflicts 
                                                 
 
12
 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1978), p. 42. 
13
 Ibid., p. 43, 129, 7. 
14
 Ibid., p. 7, 26. 
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addressed by both thinkers involve religion. In James’s 
case it is a conflict between Darwinian Science and 
Christian Religion; for Stout it is a dispute over the role 
of religion in a democratic polis. James addresses his 
problem by mediating between what he calls tough-
minded and tender-minded mental make-ups; Stout’s 
rhetoric mediates between liberal democratic secularists 
and what he calls the new anti-liberal traditionalists. 
 
In Democracy and Tradition Stout proposes to resolve 
the dispute over the contemporary role of religion in the 
public sphere by arguing that pragmatism as (what he 
provocatively calls) “democratic traditionalism” makes 
room for religious voices in political deliberation.
15
 Like 
James though less explicitly than Schiller, he makes use 
of rhetorical concepts and traditions all along the way. 
For Stout “culture is an enduring collection of social 
practices, embedded in institutions of a characteristic 
kind, reflected in specific habits and intuitions, and 
capable of giving rise to recognizable forms of human 
character.”
16
 One particular aspect of culture is central 
to Stout’s mediating rhetorical strategy. That aspect is 
tradition: “a matter of enduring attitudes, concerns, 
dispositions, and patterns of conduct”; for example a 
democratic tradition “inculcates certain habits of 
reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and 
authority in political discussion, and love for certain 
goods and virtues.”
17
 Underlying these notions of culture 
and tradition is a theory of practices and a value given to 
particular rhetorical practices within certain traditions, 
such as democracy. 
 
Stout’s primary aim is to “make plain” how “a tradition 
of democratic reasoning, dispositions, and attitudes that 
the people have in common” serves as the “adhesive 
element in our sociality.”
18
 Stout thus claims that his 
“conception of the civic nation is pragmatic in the sense 
                                                 
 
15
 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 13.  
16
 Ibid., p. 28 
17
 Ibid., p. 3. 
18
 Ibid., p. 4. 
that it focuses on activities [practices] held in common 
as constitutive of the political community.”
19
 But the 
practical activities of a democracy are not just 
procedural forms: “They are activities in which 
normative commitments are embedded as well as 
discussed. The commitments are substantive. They guide 
the discussion, but they are also constantly in dispute, 
subject to revision, and not fully determinate.”
20
 Stout 
gives as examples of texts that embody such democratic 
normative values the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the Nineteenth Amendment, Lincoln’s 
Second Inaugural, and Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a 
Woman.” Stout advocates the rhetorical practices of 
public deliberation and notes the other social practices 
in which rhetorical activities are situated and which 
serve as topics of deliberation, such as voting and the 
electoral process.  
 
Stout specifically takes up the question: What “is the 
role of free public reason in a political culture that 
includes conflicting religious conceptions of the good”?
21
 
To answer this question, he rhetorically focuses on “the 
discursive core of democratic culture,”
22
 noting that “by 
highlighting the significance of public deliberation, 
democratic political arrangements bring to light their 
symbiotic relationship to a surrounding culture in which 
the shared discursive practices of the people are of 
primary importance.”
23
 Stout’s rhetoric of purposeful 
mediation develops a pragmatist account of U.S. 
democratic culture, rhetorically analyzing both past 
mediated conflicts and present conflicts in need of 
mediation. In so doing, Stout notes the mediating 
strategies of others in the pragmatist tradition. For 
example, he notes how in an earlier time “Dewey sought 
a spiritual path between the extremes of militant 
atheism and arrogant traditionalism.”
24
  
 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
20
 Ibid., p. 5. 
21
 Ibid., p. 2. 
22
 Ibid., p. 195. 
23
 Ibid., p. 4. 
24
 Ibid., p. 32. 
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Armed with rhetorical pragmatist assumptions, Stout 
characterizes the current impasse within American 
democratic deliberation as a conflict between secular 
liberal political philosophers and religious-oriented, anti-
liberal-democratic new traditionalists. Because of the 
discord resulting from religious diversity, “secular 
liberals,” he writes, “have strongly urged people to 
restrain themselves from bringing their religious 
commitments with them into the political sphere.” In 
contrast, “many religious people have grown frustrated 
at the unwillingness of the liberal elite to hear them out 
on their own terms, and have recently had much to say 
against the hypocrisies and biases of secularism.”
25
 
Stout’s mediating rhetoric, like James’s before him, 
argues for (what I am calling) a rhetorical pragmatism, 
one that “can transcend the current standoff between 
secular liberals and the new traditionalists – and do so 
by borrowing crucial insights from both sides.”
26
 Thus, 
he argues against “the Manichean rhetoric of cultural 
warfare,”
27
 and for the pragmatic rhetoric of conflict 
mediation, not complete resolution but rather respectful 
recognition of both basic disagreement and shared 
consensual values.  
 
Such pragmatist mediation is a practical accomplishment 
sometimes aided by theoretical articulation. As practical 
accomplishment, overcoming conflict takes place in a 
democracy through public deliberation and development 
of character, that is, collectively through democratic 
consensus and individually through democratic virtue. As 
a rhetorical accomplishment within public deliberation, 
pragmatic mediation of conflict requires the 
development of consensual overlap, not prior 
overarching agreement about the content of abstract 
concepts and principles. It requires verbally holding 
others responsible to give reasons for their opinions but 
not restricting beforehand the kind of reasons (secular 
or religious) that can be used in the public sphere. For all 
citizens participating in democratic deliberation, Stout 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 63. 
26
 Ibid., p. 13. 
27
 Ibid., p. 10. 
recommends a specific kind of “conversation”: “an 
exchange of views in which the respective parties 
express their premises in as much detail as they see fit 
and in whatever idiom they wish, try to make sense of 
each other’s perspectives, and expose their own 
commitments to the possibility of criticism.”
28
  
This practical, rhetorical accomplishment can be assisted 
by theoretical articulation, self-reflective commentary 
on both the substance and process of the ongoing 
accomplishment. Stout sees such metacommentary to 
be the special task of public philosophers, to whom 
Stout recommends adopting a pragmatist point of view. 
This pragmatist viewpoint sees the “function of moral 
principles with respect to the ethical life of a people” to 
be “essentially expressive, a matter of making explicit in 
the form of a claim a kind of commitment that would 
otherwise remain implicit and obscure.” The role of 
“public philosophy,” then, should be a rhetorically-
mediating “exercise in expressive rationality.”
29
 That is, 
public philosophers are intellectuals who express the 
reasons implicitly motivating citizens in their public 
deliberations. But we might just as easily characterize 
the public intellectual who performs this expressive 
theoretical function as a rhetorician. In fact, isn’t this 
public theoretical articulation an area where again the 
philosophy/rhetoric distinction (certainly the opposition) 
tends to collapse, and thus couldn’t we say that the 
pragmatist public intellectual is not just rhetorical in his 
or her mediating practice but also sophistic in theoretical 
orientation? Following Schiller’s interpretation of 
Protagoras, doesn’t a rhetorical pragmatist today 
assume the human-measure maxim (even when the 
appeal is to the divine) and try to discover and establish 
what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one citizen’s 
measures with those of fellow-citizens? Stout as a 
rhetorical pragmatist attempts to fulfill his role as public 
philosopher through the theoretical articulations of his 
book Democracy and Tradition. In so doing, he presents 
a sophistic rhetorical pragmatist framework for public 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., p. 10-11. 
29
 Ibid., p. 12. 
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deliberation in a democracy, advocating a rhetorical 
strategy of purposeful mediation. 
 
Let me conclude by returning to the academic and 
popular claim that President Obama is a pragmatist, in 
my view a rhetorical pragmatist. To date the most 
comprehensive study published on Obama’s pragmatist 
roots is James T. Kloppenberg’s Reading Obama: 
Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition. A 
noted intellectual historian, Kloppenberg charts the 
marked influence of philosophical pragmatism on 
Obama’s intellectual development from the readings and 
discussions in his Harvard Law School courses to his 
immersion in Deweyan progressive political thinking 
during his days as a Chicago community organizer and as 
a law professor at the University of Chicago.
30
 
Kloppenberg comments often on Obama’s mediating 
style, his “commitments to philosophical pragmatism 
and deliberative democracy – to building support slowly, 
gradually, through compromise and painstaking 
consensus building.”
31
 Kloppenberg calls Obama “a 
principled partisan of democracy and pragmatism in the 
tradition of James and Dewey. He believes in the 
founders’ ideals of equality and liberty. But he believes 
that achieving those goals requires working to forge 
agreement about forms of democratic experimentation, 
and he believes that those experiments must be 
followed by the critical assessment of results.”
32
 
 
Besides connecting Obama with the classical early 
pragmatists, Kloppenberg also mentions the influence of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, whom Cornel West and others call a 
Christian pragmatist.
33
 In 2007 candidate Obama 
                                                 
 
30
 See James T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams, 
Hope, and the American Political Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), 63-71. Also see Bart 
Schultz, “Obama’s Political Philosophy: Pragmatism, 
Politics, and the University of Chicago,” Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, vol. 39 (2009), pp.127-73; and Robert 
Danisch, “Obama and the Pragmatist Tradition,” 
unpublished manuscript. 
31
 Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, p. 83. 
32
 Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, p. 221-222. 
 
33
 Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, pp. 22, 120, 250; 
Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A 
referred to Niebuhr as one of his “favorite 
philosophers.”
34
 Asked what he got out of Niebuhr, 
Obama responded that he took away “the compelling 
idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship 
and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our 
belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t 
use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take 
away ... the sense we have to make these efforts 
knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve 
idealism to bitter realism.” Here we see the same 
mediating rhetoric, mediating between pessimism and 
optimism, between idealism and realism, that we find 
elsewhere throughout the American pragmatist 
tradition, including in Niebuhr’s own book The Irony of 
American History, which, for example, praises the 
mediating strain of American thought “most perfectly 
expressed by James Madison” who “combined Christian 
realism in the interpretation of human motives and 
desires with Jefferson’s passion for liberty.”
35
  
 
Perhaps the most striking example of Obama’s own 
pragmatist rhetoric of mediation involves his thoughtful 
response to the passionate rhetoric of Reverend 
Jeremiah Wright and his vociferous critics. In Dreams 
from My Father, Obama had described his admiration for 
Reverend Wright, who, he noted, was a reader of Paul 
Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and black liberation 
theologians.
36
 Then, famously and still controversially, 
Obama demonstrated his skill at mediating rhetoric in an 
18 March 2008 speech, “A More Perfect Union,” in 
which he (at least for the moment) refused to repudiate 
Wright despite his disagreement with his views. 
Throughout the speech, Obama tried to reconcile 
without dissolving many differences, many oppositions, 
not the least of which was that between Black anger and 
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White intolerance. Here is just one piece of Obama’s 
mediating, unifying rhetoric about “America’s 
improbable experiment in democracy”: “I chose to run 
for the presidency at this moment in history because I 
believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of 
our time unless we solve them together, unless we 
perfect our union by understanding that we may have 
different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we 
may not look the same and we may not have come from 
the same place, but we all want to move in the same 
direction – towards a better future for our children and 
our grandchildren.”
37
 
 
Given the argument I am making that Obama can be 
viewed within a rhetorical pragmatist tradition, it is 
somewhat ironic that three years into his presidency the 
close fit between his rhetorical power and his mediating 
pragmatism is being questioned by some of his former 
supporters. In “The Pragmatic President” Fareed Zakaria 
writes that liberals are disappointed with President 
Obama “because of his persistent tendency to 
compromise.”
38
 Their criticism “stems from a liberal 
fantasy that if only the President would give a stirring 
speech, he would sweep the country along with the 
sheer power of his poetry.” That is, prior to his election 
and soon after, his supporters marveled at the rhetorical 
power of his mediating progressive pragmatism. Now, 
some of those same people criticize Obama for giving up 
on the power of his rhetoric in the process of making 
pragmatic compromises. In contrast, Zakaria defends the 
President’s record of accomplishments in today’s highly 
polarized politics: “Obama is a centrist and a pragmatist 
who understands that in a country divided over core 
issues, you cannot make the best the enemy of the 
good.” Thus, we might say, a pragmatist’s mediating 
rhetoric is sometimes the only way to get something 
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done in difficult situations of extreme ideological 
partisanship. 
 
Still, it is also worth noting the limits of mediating 
rhetoric within deliberative democracy, limits fully 
acknowledged by Obama in this passage from The 
Audacity of Hope: 
 
Democratic deliberation might have been 
sufficient to expand the franchise to white men 
without property and eventually women; reason, 
argument, and American pragmatism might have 
eased the economic growing pains of a great 
nation and helped lessen religious and class 
tensions that would plague other nations. But 
deliberation alone could not provide the slave his 
freedom or cleanse America of its original sin. In 
the end, it was the sword that would sever his 
chains.
39
 
 
In light of such historical examples, Obama the rhetorical 
pragmatist notes the limitations of rhetorical 
pragmatism and its rhetoric of purposeful mediation. He 
admits:  
 
The best I can do in the face of our history is 
remind myself that it has not always been the 
pragmatist, the voice of reason, or the force of 
compromise, that has created the conditions for 
liberty. … I’m reminded that deliberation and the 
constitutional order may sometimes be the 
luxury of the powerful, and that it has sometimes 
been the cranks, the zealots, the prophets, the 
agitators, and the unreasonable – in other 
words, the absolutists – that have fought for a 
new order. Knowing this, I can’t summarily 
dismiss those possessed of similar certainty 
today – the antiabortion activist who pickets my 
town hall meeting, or the animal rights activist 
who raids a laboratory – no matter how deeply I 
disagree with their views. I am robbed even of 
the certainty of uncertainty – for sometimes 
absolute truths may well be absolute.
40
  
 
Ultimately, Obama turns back to the political figure with 
whom he has so often identified. He writes, “I’m left 
then with Lincoln, who like no man before or since 
understood both the deliberative function of our 
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democracy and the limits of such deliberation.”
41
 Not 
forgetting such sobering reminders, rhetorical 
pragmatists will surely continue their strategic advocacy 
of purposeful mediation, further developing the long 
pragmatist tradition of a “mediating way of thinking” 
within specialized intellectual debates as well as the 
popular politics of our deliberative democracies.  
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